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    <lastBuildDate>Wed, 28 Oct 2026 22:36:43 +0000</lastBuildDate>
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      <title>fkie_cve-2026-104895</title>
      <link>https://db.gcve.eu/vuln/fkie_cve-2026-104895</link>
      <description>&lt;p&gt;The asynchronous Smile parser (NonBlockingByteArrayParser) uses a raw-binary length prefix taken from untrusted input to allocate a byte[] before the body is read, with no upper bound and no overflow check. On the raw-binary marker 0xFD, _decodeVInt() computes (value &amp;lt;&amp;lt; 6) + (i &amp;amp; 0x3F) without the (value &amp;gt;&amp;gt;&amp;gt; 25) != 0 overflow guard present in the blocking SmileParser._readUnsignedVInt, and _startRawBinary then allocates the declared length immediately.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;A Smile feed of roughly ten bytes can therefore force an eager allocation of approximately 2 GB, producing an OutOfMemoryError on reactive or asynchronous Smile endpoints. A VInt crafted to overflow int yields a negative length and a NegativeArraySizeException, a RuntimeException that is not a JacksonException and so escapes the parser contract. Either outcome crashes the request or processing thread.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;This is the same class of issue as CVE-2020-28491 in the CBOR parser of this library, which was fixed with a LONGEST_NON_CHUNKED_BINARY guard; the asynchronous Smile parser never received the equivalent guard. No privileges or user interaction beyond the ability to submit data for parsing are required.&lt;/p&gt;</description>
      <content:encoded>&lt;p&gt;The asynchronous Smile parser (NonBlockingByteArrayParser) uses a raw-binary length prefix taken from untrusted input to allocate a byte[] before the body is read, with no upper bound and no overflow check. On the raw-binary marker 0xFD, _decodeVInt() computes (value &amp;lt;&amp;lt; 6) + (i &amp;amp; 0x3F) without the (value &amp;gt;&amp;gt;&amp;gt; 25) != 0 overflow guard present in the blocking SmileParser._readUnsignedVInt, and _startRawBinary then allocates the declared length immediately.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;A Smile feed of roughly ten bytes can therefore force an eager allocation of approximately 2 GB, producing an OutOfMemoryError on reactive or asynchronous Smile endpoints. A VInt crafted to overflow int yields a negative length and a NegativeArraySizeException, a RuntimeException that is not a JacksonException and so escapes the parser contract. Either outcome crashes the request or processing thread.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;This is the same class of issue as CVE-2020-28491 in the CBOR parser of this library, which was fixed with a LONGEST_NON_CHUNKED_BINARY guard; the asynchronous Smile parser never received the equivalent guard. No privileges or user interaction beyond the ability to submit data for parsing are required.&lt;/p&gt;</content:encoded>
      <guid isPermaLink="false">https://db.gcve.eu/vuln/fkie_cve-2026-104895</guid>
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