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    <item>
      <title>fkie_cve-2026-102748</title>
      <link>https://db.gcve.eu/vuln/fkie_cve-2026-102748</link>
      <description>&lt;p&gt;Dgraph is an open source distributed GraphQL database. Prior to 25.4.0, Dgraph Zero registers administrative HTTP routes on port 6080 without authentication when the administrative interface is enabled. The /removeNode route accepts attacker-controlled id and group values and passes them to Server.RemoveNode, where group 0 can trigger ProposePeerRemoval. A remote unauthenticated attacker who can reach the Zero HTTP port can read topology through /state, allocate identifiers through /assign, access the exposed /moveTablet administrative route, or remove membership through /removeNode, disrupting the Zero control plane and destabilizing Alpha nodes that depend on Zero. The route registration occurs in dgraph/cmd/zero/run.go, and the demonstrated membership-removal path reaches Server.RemoveNode and ProposePeerRemoval. This issue is fixed in version 25.4.0.&lt;/p&gt;</description>
      <content:encoded>&lt;p&gt;Dgraph is an open source distributed GraphQL database. Prior to 25.4.0, Dgraph Zero registers administrative HTTP routes on port 6080 without authentication when the administrative interface is enabled. The /removeNode route accepts attacker-controlled id and group values and passes them to Server.RemoveNode, where group 0 can trigger ProposePeerRemoval. A remote unauthenticated attacker who can reach the Zero HTTP port can read topology through /state, allocate identifiers through /assign, access the exposed /moveTablet administrative route, or remove membership through /removeNode, disrupting the Zero control plane and destabilizing Alpha nodes that depend on Zero. The route registration occurs in dgraph/cmd/zero/run.go, and the demonstrated membership-removal path reaches Server.RemoveNode and ProposePeerRemoval. This issue is fixed in version 25.4.0.&lt;/p&gt;</content:encoded>
      <guid isPermaLink="false">https://db.gcve.eu/vuln/fkie_cve-2026-102748</guid>
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    <item>
      <title>GHSA-qj98-gp63-54xj — Dgraph: Zero Unauthenticated HTTP Admin removeNode Denial of Service</title>
      <link>https://db.gcve.eu/vuln/ghsa-qj98-gp63-54xj</link>
      <description>&lt;p&gt;&lt;strong&gt;Affected:&lt;/strong&gt; Go: github.com/dgraph-io/dgraph/v25&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;### Summary&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;Dgraph `v25.3.8` exposes a Zero HTTP administrative surface that is unauthenticated when port `6080` is reachable.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;The exposed routes include:&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;- `/state`
- `/assign`
- `/removeNode`
- `/moveTablet`&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;An unauthenticated request to `/removeNode?id=1&amp;amp;group=0` on a single-node standalone deployment breaks the Zero control plane and leaves Alpha repeatedly failing to reconnect to `localhost:5080`.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;### Details&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;The issue exists because Zero administrative HTTP endpoints are registered directly without any authentication or IP-whitelist wrapper.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;Relevant code paths:&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;- `worker/server_state.go:41`
- `dgraph/cmd/zero/run.go:295-301`
- `dgraph/cmd/zero/http.go:106-129`
- `dgraph/cmd/zero/zero.go:475-477`&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;The relevant behavior is:&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;- `disable-admin-http=false` by default
- `/removeNode` accepts attacker-controlled `id` and `group`
- `removeNode` forwards those directly into `Server.RemoveNode`
- for `group=0`, `Server.RemoveNode` immediately calls `ProposePeerRemoval`&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;This means a remote unauthenticated caller can directly trigger destructive membership operations if `6080` is exposed.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;### PoC&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;### Read state without authentication&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;```bash
curl -i http://127.0.0.1:6080/state
```&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;Observed response included:&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;- Zero node `id=1`
- `groupId=0`
- `leader=true`
- cluster topology and tablet state&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;&amp;lt;img width=&amp;#34;1878&amp;#34; height=&amp;#34;810&amp;#34; alt=&amp;#34;图片&amp;#34; src=&amp;#34;https://github.com/user-attachments/assets/c6a0001c-bcf7-45b6-a301-481f918be98a&amp;#34; /&amp;gt;&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;### Write-capable route without authentication…&lt;/p&gt;</description>
      <content:encoded>&lt;p&gt;&lt;strong&gt;Affected:&lt;/strong&gt; Go: github.com/dgraph-io/dgraph/v25&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;### Summary&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;Dgraph `v25.3.8` exposes a Zero HTTP administrative surface that is unauthenticated when port `6080` is reachable.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;The exposed routes include:&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;- `/state`
- `/assign`
- `/removeNode`
- `/moveTablet`&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;An unauthenticated request to `/removeNode?id=1&amp;amp;group=0` on a single-node standalone deployment breaks the Zero control plane and leaves Alpha repeatedly failing to reconnect to `localhost:5080`.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;### Details&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;The issue exists because Zero administrative HTTP endpoints are registered directly without any authentication or IP-whitelist wrapper.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;Relevant code paths:&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;- `worker/server_state.go:41`
- `dgraph/cmd/zero/run.go:295-301`
- `dgraph/cmd/zero/http.go:106-129`
- `dgraph/cmd/zero/zero.go:475-477`&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;The relevant behavior is:&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;- `disable-admin-http=false` by default
- `/removeNode` accepts attacker-controlled `id` and `group`
- `removeNode` forwards those directly into `Server.RemoveNode`
- for `group=0`, `Server.RemoveNode` immediately calls `ProposePeerRemoval`&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;This means a remote unauthenticated caller can directly trigger destructive membership operations if `6080` is exposed.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;### PoC&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;### Read state without authentication&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;```bash
curl -i http://127.0.0.1:6080/state
```&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;Observed response included:&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;- Zero node `id=1`
- `groupId=0`
- `leader=true`
- cluster topology and tablet state&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;&amp;lt;img width=&amp;#34;1878&amp;#34; height=&amp;#34;810&amp;#34; alt=&amp;#34;图片&amp;#34; src=&amp;#34;https://github.com/user-attachments/assets/c6a0001c-bcf7-45b6-a301-481f918be98a&amp;#34; /&amp;gt;&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;### Write-capable route without authentication…&lt;/p&gt;</content:encoded>
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