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      <title>fkie_cve-2026-102728</title>
      <link>https://db.gcve.eu/vuln/fkie_cve-2026-102728</link>
      <description>&lt;p&gt;Two client-side TLS/DTLS handshake parsers in NetX Secure read fields from a server-supplied message before validating that the message is long enough to contain them. Both are bounded out-of-bounds reads on a remotely reachable path, both are reached from a TLS or DTLS client connecting to a malicious or malformed server, and both have the same shape: the bounds check exists and returns the correct status, but it runs after the read it is meant to guard.&lt;/p&gt;</description>
      <content:encoded>&lt;p&gt;Two client-side TLS/DTLS handshake parsers in NetX Secure read fields from a server-supplied message before validating that the message is long enough to contain them. Both are bounded out-of-bounds reads on a remotely reachable path, both are reached from a TLS or DTLS client connecting to a malicious or malformed server, and both have the same shape: the bounds check exists and returns the correct status, but it runs after the read it is meant to guard.&lt;/p&gt;</content:encoded>
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      <title>GHSA-rqmh-m9w6-hv3m</title>
      <link>https://db.gcve.eu/vuln/ghsa-rqmh-m9w6-hv3m</link>
      <description>&lt;p&gt;Two client-side TLS/DTLS handshake parsers in NetX Secure read fields from a server-supplied message before validating that the message is long enough to contain them. Both are bounded out-of-bounds reads on a remotely reachable path, both are reached from a TLS or DTLS client connecting to a malicious or malformed server, and both have the same shape: the bounds check exists and returns the correct status, but it runs after the read it is meant to guard.&lt;/p&gt;</description>
      <content:encoded>&lt;p&gt;Two client-side TLS/DTLS handshake parsers in NetX Secure read fields from a server-supplied message before validating that the message is long enough to contain them. Both are bounded out-of-bounds reads on a remotely reachable path, both are reached from a TLS or DTLS client connecting to a malicious or malformed server, and both have the same shape: the bounds check exists and returns the correct status, but it runs after the read it is meant to guard.&lt;/p&gt;</content:encoded>
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