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      <title>fkie_cve-2026-102649</title>
      <link>https://db.gcve.eu/vuln/fkie_cve-2026-102649</link>
      <description>&lt;p&gt;Burrito is a Terraform Automation Collaboration Software (TACoS) Kubernetes operator. Prior to 0.13.0, `POST /api/webhook` accepts unsigned GitHub and GitLab events when a `TerraformRepository`&amp;#39;s credentials omit `webhookSecret` or set it to an empty value, including credentials configured for git authentication and polling. `Credential.WebhookSecret` is optional, and `go-playground/webhooks` skips signature or token verification when the secret is empty. Anyone who can reach `burrito-server`&amp;#39;s endpoint and knows a tracked repository&amp;#39;s URL can forge events to create or delete `TerraformPullRequest` custom resources with attacker-chosen `Branch`, `Base`, and `ID` fields. For GitHub `pull_request` events, the controller fetches changed files using the real pull request number but does not cross-check the payload&amp;#39;s branch against that pull request. Pairing a real, existing pull request number with an unrelated existing branch in the same repository can therefore cause an unauthorized `terraform plan` for affected layers using the operator&amp;#39;s stored git and cloud credentials. Code analysis also indicates that the resulting plan can be posted to the real pull request&amp;#39;s comment thread, exposing and misattributing another branch&amp;#39;s infrastructure changes. Auto-apply is disabled for these temporary layers, so this vulnerability alone cannot force a `terraform apply`; plan-time provider and data-source code execution depends on the selected branch&amp;#39;s contents. This issue is fixed in ver…&lt;/p&gt;</description>
      <content:encoded>&lt;p&gt;Burrito is a Terraform Automation Collaboration Software (TACoS) Kubernetes operator. Prior to 0.13.0, `POST /api/webhook` accepts unsigned GitHub and GitLab events when a `TerraformRepository`&amp;#39;s credentials omit `webhookSecret` or set it to an empty value, including credentials configured for git authentication and polling. `Credential.WebhookSecret` is optional, and `go-playground/webhooks` skips signature or token verification when the secret is empty. Anyone who can reach `burrito-server`&amp;#39;s endpoint and knows a tracked repository&amp;#39;s URL can forge events to create or delete `TerraformPullRequest` custom resources with attacker-chosen `Branch`, `Base`, and `ID` fields. For GitHub `pull_request` events, the controller fetches changed files using the real pull request number but does not cross-check the payload&amp;#39;s branch against that pull request. Pairing a real, existing pull request number with an unrelated existing branch in the same repository can therefore cause an unauthorized `terraform plan` for affected layers using the operator&amp;#39;s stored git and cloud credentials. Code analysis also indicates that the resulting plan can be posted to the real pull request&amp;#39;s comment thread, exposing and misattributing another branch&amp;#39;s infrastructure changes. Auto-apply is disabled for these temporary layers, so this vulnerability alone cannot force a `terraform apply`; plan-time provider and data-source code execution depends on the selected branch&amp;#39;s contents. This issue is fixed in ver…&lt;/p&gt;</content:encoded>
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