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      <title>fkie_cve-2026-100578</title>
      <link>https://db.gcve.eu/vuln/fkie_cve-2026-100578</link>
      <description>&lt;p&gt;OpenClaw (npm package `openclaw`) before 2026.7.1 fails to restrict owner-only infrastructure tools exposed through the chat.send endpoint. In Gateway deployments using authentication modes that honor caller identity and narrower operator scopes, a write-scoped non-owner caller can start a chat turn whose tool inventory includes the `gateway` and `cron` tools, causing the agent to invoke owner-only configuration or scheduling operations, including persistent state changes. Practical impact depends on the tools selected by the model and the caller&amp;#39;s ability to steer the turn. Shared-secret token and password callers are treated as fully trusted operators under OpenClaw&amp;#39;s security model and are outside the scope of this issue. The issue is fixed in 2026.7.1; as a workaround, restrict chat.send to administrators in identity-bearing deployments and remove `gateway` and `cron` from affected agent tool policies.&lt;/p&gt;</description>
      <content:encoded>&lt;p&gt;OpenClaw (npm package `openclaw`) before 2026.7.1 fails to restrict owner-only infrastructure tools exposed through the chat.send endpoint. In Gateway deployments using authentication modes that honor caller identity and narrower operator scopes, a write-scoped non-owner caller can start a chat turn whose tool inventory includes the `gateway` and `cron` tools, causing the agent to invoke owner-only configuration or scheduling operations, including persistent state changes. Practical impact depends on the tools selected by the model and the caller&amp;#39;s ability to steer the turn. Shared-secret token and password callers are treated as fully trusted operators under OpenClaw&amp;#39;s security model and are outside the scope of this issue. The issue is fixed in 2026.7.1; as a workaround, restrict chat.send to administrators in identity-bearing deployments and remove `gateway` and `cron` from affected agent tool policies.&lt;/p&gt;</content:encoded>
      <guid isPermaLink="false">https://db.gcve.eu/vuln/fkie_cve-2026-100578</guid>
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    <item>
      <title>GHSA-9cj9-w25j-5478</title>
      <link>https://db.gcve.eu/vuln/ghsa-9cj9-w25j-5478</link>
      <description>&lt;p&gt;OpenClaw (npm package `openclaw`) before 2026.7.1 fails to restrict owner-only infrastructure tools exposed through the chat.send endpoint. In Gateway deployments using authentication modes that honor caller identity and narrower operator scopes, a write-scoped non-owner caller can start a chat turn whose tool inventory includes the `gateway` and `cron` tools, causing the agent to invoke owner-only configuration or scheduling operations, including persistent state changes. Practical impact depends on the tools selected by the model and the caller&amp;#39;s ability to steer the turn. Shared-secret token and password callers are treated as fully trusted operators under OpenClaw&amp;#39;s security model and are outside the scope of this issue. The issue is fixed in 2026.7.1; as a workaround, restrict chat.send to administrators in identity-bearing deployments and remove `gateway` and `cron` from affected agent tool policies.&lt;/p&gt;</description>
      <content:encoded>&lt;p&gt;OpenClaw (npm package `openclaw`) before 2026.7.1 fails to restrict owner-only infrastructure tools exposed through the chat.send endpoint. In Gateway deployments using authentication modes that honor caller identity and narrower operator scopes, a write-scoped non-owner caller can start a chat turn whose tool inventory includes the `gateway` and `cron` tools, causing the agent to invoke owner-only configuration or scheduling operations, including persistent state changes. Practical impact depends on the tools selected by the model and the caller&amp;#39;s ability to steer the turn. Shared-secret token and password callers are treated as fully trusted operators under OpenClaw&amp;#39;s security model and are outside the scope of this issue. The issue is fixed in 2026.7.1; as a workaround, restrict chat.send to administrators in identity-bearing deployments and remove `gateway` and `cron` from affected agent tool policies.&lt;/p&gt;</content:encoded>
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