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      <title>GHSA-w7jw-789q-3m8p — shell-quote quote() does not escape newlines in object .op values</title>
      <link>https://db.gcve.eu/vuln/ghsa-w7jw-789q-3m8p</link>
      <description>&lt;p&gt;&lt;strong&gt;Affected:&lt;/strong&gt; npm: shell-quote&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;### Summary&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;`shell-quote`&amp;#39;s `quote()` function did not validate object-token inputs against the operator model used by `parse()`. The `.op` field was backslash-escaped character by character using `/(.)/g`, which in JavaScript does not match line terminators (`\n`, `\r`, U+2028, U+2029). A line terminator in `.op` therefore passed through unescaped into the output; POSIX shells treat a literal `\n` as a command separator, so any content after it would execute as a second command.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;The vulnerable code path is reachable in two ways. Neither requires the parser to misbehave — `parse()` only emits ops from a fixed control set — but both are documented API surface:&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;1. **Direct construction.** A caller builds `{ op: &amp;#39;...\n...&amp;#39; }` from external input (e.g. a deserialized argument array) and passes it to `quote()`.
2. **`envFn` return.** `parse(cmd, envFn)` is documented to splice the return value of `envFn` into the result array when it is an object. An attacker-influenced data source consulted by `envFn` can introduce an object token whose `.op` reaches `quote()`.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;### Impact&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;Shell command injection in callers that pass object tokens with attacker-influenced `.op` values to `quote()` and then hand the result to a shell. The preconditions are narrower than ordinary string injection — they require the caller to feed object tokens into `quote()` — but object tokens are a public, documented part of the API surface, and `quote()` is intended to be a shell-safety boundary.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;### PoC…&lt;/p&gt;</description>
      <content:encoded>&lt;p&gt;&lt;strong&gt;Affected:&lt;/strong&gt; npm: shell-quote&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;### Summary&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;`shell-quote`&amp;#39;s `quote()` function did not validate object-token inputs against the operator model used by `parse()`. The `.op` field was backslash-escaped character by character using `/(.)/g`, which in JavaScript does not match line terminators (`\n`, `\r`, U+2028, U+2029). A line terminator in `.op` therefore passed through unescaped into the output; POSIX shells treat a literal `\n` as a command separator, so any content after it would execute as a second command.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;The vulnerable code path is reachable in two ways. Neither requires the parser to misbehave — `parse()` only emits ops from a fixed control set — but both are documented API surface:&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;1. **Direct construction.** A caller builds `{ op: &amp;#39;...\n...&amp;#39; }` from external input (e.g. a deserialized argument array) and passes it to `quote()`.
2. **`envFn` return.** `parse(cmd, envFn)` is documented to splice the return value of `envFn` into the result array when it is an object. An attacker-influenced data source consulted by `envFn` can introduce an object token whose `.op` reaches `quote()`.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;### Impact&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;Shell command injection in callers that pass object tokens with attacker-influenced `.op` values to `quote()` and then hand the result to a shell. The preconditions are narrower than ordinary string injection — they require the caller to feed object tokens into `quote()` — but object tokens are a public, documented part of the API surface, and `quote()` is intended to be a shell-safety boundary.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;### PoC…&lt;/p&gt;</content:encoded>
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