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      <title>GHSA-69x3-g4r3-p962 — Blocklist Bypass possible via ECDSA Signature Malleability</title>
      <link>https://db.gcve.eu/vuln/ghsa-69x3-g4r3-p962</link>
      <description>&lt;p&gt;&lt;strong&gt;Affected:&lt;/strong&gt; Go: github.com/slackhq/nebula&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;### Impact&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;When using P256 certificates (which is not the default configuration), it is possible to evade a blocklist entry created against the fingerprint of a certificate by using ECDSA Signature Malleability to use a copy of the certificate with a different fingerprint.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;In order for this to affect a user or network, all of the following must be true:
* `CURVE_P256` certificates are being used
* There are one or more entries on the blocklist
* The certificates for those entries are signed by a trusted CA and not expired
* An attacker has a copy of the private key, and corresponding certificate, for one of those blocklist entries&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;### Patches&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;See attached&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;### Workarounds&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;If full copies of each certificate on the existing blocklist are available, it is possible to compute their opposite-chirality signature, and then the appropriate second fingerprint to list in the blocklist.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;Rotating out all CAs that have signed hosts on the blocklist will also prevent exploitation of this vulnerability.&lt;/p&gt;</description>
      <content:encoded>&lt;p&gt;&lt;strong&gt;Affected:&lt;/strong&gt; Go: github.com/slackhq/nebula&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;### Impact&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;When using P256 certificates (which is not the default configuration), it is possible to evade a blocklist entry created against the fingerprint of a certificate by using ECDSA Signature Malleability to use a copy of the certificate with a different fingerprint.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;In order for this to affect a user or network, all of the following must be true:
* `CURVE_P256` certificates are being used
* There are one or more entries on the blocklist
* The certificates for those entries are signed by a trusted CA and not expired
* An attacker has a copy of the private key, and corresponding certificate, for one of those blocklist entries&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;### Patches&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;See attached&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;### Workarounds&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;If full copies of each certificate on the existing blocklist are available, it is possible to compute their opposite-chirality signature, and then the appropriate second fingerprint to list in the blocklist.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;Rotating out all CAs that have signed hosts on the blocklist will also prevent exploitation of this vulnerability.&lt;/p&gt;</content:encoded>
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