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    <item>
      <title>GHSA-m7cr-m3pv-hgrp — go-git: Improper single-quote escaping in go-git SSH transport</title>
      <link>https://db.gcve.eu/vuln/ghsa-m7cr-m3pv-hgrp</link>
      <description>&lt;p&gt;&lt;strong&gt;Affected:&lt;/strong&gt; Go: github.com/go-git/go-git/v5, Go: github.com/go-git/go-git/v6, Go: github.com/go-git/go-git&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;### Impact&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;`go-git`&amp;#39;s SSH transport constructs the remote exec command by wrapping the repository path in single quotes without escaping single quotes embedded inside the path. This diverges from canonical Git, which shell-quotes the path through `sq_quote_buf` so that an embedded `&amp;#39;` becomes the `&amp;#39;\&amp;#39;&amp;#39;` close-escape-reopen sequence and the whole path round-trips as a single quoted argument.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;A repository path containing a single quote can therefore break out of the quoted region in the exec command and be appended as additional shell tokens. On SSH servers that evaluate the exec command through a shell (for example a user account whose login shell is `/bin/sh` or `/bin/bash`, or a `ForceCommand` wrapper that re-evaluates `$SSH_ORIGINAL_COMMAND`), those additional tokens execute in that account&amp;#39;s command-execution context. SSH servers that tokenize the exec command without shell evaluation, including the canonical `git-shell` setup, are not affected.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;The vulnerable behaviour is on the SSH server side, not in `go-git`: the same bytes can be produced by any SSH client. The change in `go-git` is defense-in-depth that restores parity with canonical Git&amp;#39;s wire format and prevents `go-git` from being a vehicle for reaching shell-evaluating servers through attacker-influenced repository paths.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;### Patches&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;Users should upgrade to a patched version in order to mitigate this issue. The fix ports `sq_quote_buf` from canonical Git into `go-git`&amp;#39;s SSH transport so that the wire output…&lt;/p&gt;</description>
      <content:encoded>&lt;p&gt;&lt;strong&gt;Affected:&lt;/strong&gt; Go: github.com/go-git/go-git/v5, Go: github.com/go-git/go-git/v6, Go: github.com/go-git/go-git&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;### Impact&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;`go-git`&amp;#39;s SSH transport constructs the remote exec command by wrapping the repository path in single quotes without escaping single quotes embedded inside the path. This diverges from canonical Git, which shell-quotes the path through `sq_quote_buf` so that an embedded `&amp;#39;` becomes the `&amp;#39;\&amp;#39;&amp;#39;` close-escape-reopen sequence and the whole path round-trips as a single quoted argument.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;A repository path containing a single quote can therefore break out of the quoted region in the exec command and be appended as additional shell tokens. On SSH servers that evaluate the exec command through a shell (for example a user account whose login shell is `/bin/sh` or `/bin/bash`, or a `ForceCommand` wrapper that re-evaluates `$SSH_ORIGINAL_COMMAND`), those additional tokens execute in that account&amp;#39;s command-execution context. SSH servers that tokenize the exec command without shell evaluation, including the canonical `git-shell` setup, are not affected.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;The vulnerable behaviour is on the SSH server side, not in `go-git`: the same bytes can be produced by any SSH client. The change in `go-git` is defense-in-depth that restores parity with canonical Git&amp;#39;s wire format and prevents `go-git` from being a vehicle for reaching shell-evaluating servers through attacker-influenced repository paths.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;### Patches&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;Users should upgrade to a patched version in order to mitigate this issue. The fix ports `sq_quote_buf` from canonical Git into `go-git`&amp;#39;s SSH transport so that the wire output…&lt;/p&gt;</content:encoded>
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