https://db.gcve.eu Contains only the most 10 recent entries. http://www.rssboard.org/rss-specification python-feedgen en Mon, 12 Oct 2026 00:57:47 +0000 https://db.gcve.eu/vuln/ghsa-pwjx-qhcg-rvj4 <p><strong>Affected:</strong> crates.io: rustls-webpki</p> <p>If a certificate had more than one `distributionPoint`, then only the first `distributionPoint` would be considered against each CRL&#39;s `IssuingDistributionPoint` `distributionPoint`, and then the certificate&#39;s subsequent `distributionPoint`s would be ignored.</p> <p>The impact was that correct provided CRLs would not be consulted to check revocation. With `UnknownStatusPolicy::Deny` (the default) this would lead to incorrect but safe `Error::UnknownRevocationStatus`. With `UnknownStatusPolicy::Allow` this would lead to inappropriate acceptance of revoked certificates.</p> <p>This vulnerability is thought to be of limited impact. This is because both the certificate and CRL are signed -- an attacker would need to compromise a trusted issuing authority to trigger this bug. An attacker with such capabilities could likely bypass revocation checking through other more impactful means (such as publishing a valid, empty CRL.)</p> <p>More likely, this bug would be latent in normal use, and an attacker could leverage faulty revocation checking to continue using a revoked credential.</p> <p><strong>Affected:</strong> crates.io: rustls-webpki</p> <p>If a certificate had more than one `distributionPoint`, then only the first `distributionPoint` would be considered against each CRL&#39;s `IssuingDistributionPoint` `distributionPoint`, and then the certificate&#39;s subsequent `distributionPoint`s would be ignored.</p> <p>The impact was that correct provided CRLs would not be consulted to check revocation. With `UnknownStatusPolicy::Deny` (the default) this would lead to incorrect but safe `Error::UnknownRevocationStatus`. With `UnknownStatusPolicy::Allow` this would lead to inappropriate acceptance of revoked certificates.</p> <p>This vulnerability is thought to be of limited impact. This is because both the certificate and CRL are signed -- an attacker would need to compromise a trusted issuing authority to trigger this bug. An attacker with such capabilities could likely bypass revocation checking through other more impactful means (such as publishing a valid, empty CRL.)</p> <p>More likely, this bug would be latent in normal use, and an attacker could leverage faulty revocation checking to continue using a revoked credential.</p> https://db.gcve.eu/vuln/ghsa-pwjx-qhcg-rvj4