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    <lastBuildDate>Tue, 29 Sep 2026 03:53:05 +0000</lastBuildDate>
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      <title>GHSA-c4qc-4q9p-m9q9 — Apache Shiro Affected by an Observable Timing Discrepancy Vulnerability</title>
      <link>https://db.gcve.eu/vuln/ghsa-c4qc-4q9p-m9q9</link>
      <description>&lt;p&gt;&lt;strong&gt;Affected:&lt;/strong&gt; Maven: org.apache.shiro:shiro-core&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;Observable Timing Discrepancy vulnerability in Apache Shiro.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;This issue affects Apache Shiro: from 1.*, 2.* before 2.0.7.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;Users are recommended to upgrade to version 2.0.7 or later, which fixes the issue.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;Prior to Shiro 2.0.7, code paths for non-existent vs. existing users are different enough,
that a brute-force attack may be able to tell, by timing the requests only, determine if
the request failed because of a non-existent user vs. wrong password.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;The most likely attack vector is a local attack only.
Shiro security model  https://shiro.apache.org/security-model.html#username_enumeration  discusses this as well.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;Typically, brute force attack can be mitigated at the infrastructure level.&lt;/p&gt;</description>
      <content:encoded>&lt;p&gt;&lt;strong&gt;Affected:&lt;/strong&gt; Maven: org.apache.shiro:shiro-core&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;Observable Timing Discrepancy vulnerability in Apache Shiro.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;This issue affects Apache Shiro: from 1.*, 2.* before 2.0.7.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;Users are recommended to upgrade to version 2.0.7 or later, which fixes the issue.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;Prior to Shiro 2.0.7, code paths for non-existent vs. existing users are different enough,
that a brute-force attack may be able to tell, by timing the requests only, determine if
the request failed because of a non-existent user vs. wrong password.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;The most likely attack vector is a local attack only.
Shiro security model  https://shiro.apache.org/security-model.html#username_enumeration  discusses this as well.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;Typically, brute force attack can be mitigated at the infrastructure level.&lt;/p&gt;</content:encoded>
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