https://db.gcve.eu Contains only the most 10 recent entries. http://www.rssboard.org/rss-specification python-feedgen en Tue, 20 Oct 2026 09:06:11 +0000 https://db.gcve.eu/vuln/ghsa-cq4q-cv5g-r8q5 <p><strong>Affected:</strong> Maven: io.netty:netty-codec-classes-quic</p> <p>### Summary Netty QUIC exposes the stateless reset token on the network path when using the default HMAC-based connection-ID and stateless-reset-token generators. The reset token for the server&#39;s current source connection ID can be derived from bytes that appear as the connection ID in QUIC headers after a source-CID rotation. An on-path attacker observing the headers can use the token to perform a Denial of Service by sending a spoofed Stateless Reset packet.</p> <p>### Details The sign-based connection ID generator (HmacSignQuicConnectionIdGenerator) and reset token generator (HmacSignQuicResetTokenGenerator) both evaluate HMAC-SHA256 with the same JVM-wide static key (io.netty.handler.codec.quic.Hmac).</p> <p>During source CID rotation (QuicheQuicChannel.newSourceConnectionIds), the current server source CID C is used as input to produce the next CID N. The stateless reset token for C is defined over HMAC(K, C), specifically the first 16 bytes. The next CID N is the first L bytes of the same digest, where L = |C|.</p> <p>Whenever L ≥ 16, the first 16 bytes of N are exactly the stateless reset token for C. Because N is carried in QUIC headers as a connection ID, an observer can read the headers and learn the reset token without decrypting the payload.</p> <p>This directly violates RFC 9000 https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/html/rfc9000#name-calculating-a-stateless-res: `The stateless reset token MUST be difficult to guess.` Additionally https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/html/rfc9000#name-stateless-…</p> <p><strong>Affected:</strong> Maven: io.netty:netty-codec-classes-quic</p> <p>### Summary Netty QUIC exposes the stateless reset token on the network path when using the default HMAC-based connection-ID and stateless-reset-token generators. The reset token for the server&#39;s current source connection ID can be derived from bytes that appear as the connection ID in QUIC headers after a source-CID rotation. An on-path attacker observing the headers can use the token to perform a Denial of Service by sending a spoofed Stateless Reset packet.</p> <p>### Details The sign-based connection ID generator (HmacSignQuicConnectionIdGenerator) and reset token generator (HmacSignQuicResetTokenGenerator) both evaluate HMAC-SHA256 with the same JVM-wide static key (io.netty.handler.codec.quic.Hmac).</p> <p>During source CID rotation (QuicheQuicChannel.newSourceConnectionIds), the current server source CID C is used as input to produce the next CID N. The stateless reset token for C is defined over HMAC(K, C), specifically the first 16 bytes. The next CID N is the first L bytes of the same digest, where L = |C|.</p> <p>Whenever L ≥ 16, the first 16 bytes of N are exactly the stateless reset token for C. Because N is carried in QUIC headers as a connection ID, an observer can read the headers and learn the reset token without decrypting the payload.</p> <p>This directly violates RFC 9000 https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/html/rfc9000#name-calculating-a-stateless-res: `The stateless reset token MUST be difficult to guess.` Additionally https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/html/rfc9000#name-stateless-…</p> https://db.gcve.eu/vuln/ghsa-cq4q-cv5g-r8q5