https://db.gcve.eu Contains only the most 10 recent entries. http://www.rssboard.org/rss-specification python-feedgen en Thu, 05 Nov 2026 22:46:31 +0000 https://db.gcve.eu/vuln/ghsa-m943-m63m-w62w <p><strong>Affected:</strong> npm: nodemailer</p> <p>### Vulnerability summary</p> <p>addressparser ends an RFC 5322 group at the first `;`, including one inside a quoted display name or a comment. The text after it is parsed again as top level recipients with the quoting flipped, so text that every conformant parser reads as a display name or comment becomes a live address. `G: (a; &lt;evil@evil.com&gt;) &lt;v@victim.com&gt;;` names only `v@victim.com`, and Nodemailer read it as the single recipient `evil@evil.com`. Affected: 3.0.0 through 10.1.3.</p> <p>### Attacker capabilities</p> <p>The attacker controls the text of an address field that an application passes to Nodemailer, or the header of an inbound message parsed with mailparser. No access to the application, its configuration or its credentials is needed. The value is a syntactically valid RFC 5322 group that conformant parsers accept without defects.</p> <p>### Realistic exploitation scenario</p> <p>An application validates the recipients of a submitted address list with a conformant parser and only allows addresses at its own domain. The attacker submits `G: (a; &lt;evil@evil.com&gt;) &lt;v@victim.com&gt;;`. The validator sees one mailbox, `v@victim.com`, and approves it. Nodemailer delivers to `evil@evil.com` only. The same works through a quoted display name, `G: &#34;a;&#34; &#34;&lt;evil@evil.com&gt;&#34; &lt;v@victim.com&gt;;`. The boundary crossed is the application&#39;s recipient allow list.</p> <p>### Proof of concept</p> <p>```js const addressparser = require(&#39;nodemailer/lib/addressparser&#39;); console.log(addressparser(&#34;G: (a; &lt;evil@evil.com&gt;) &lt;v@victim.…</p> <p><strong>Affected:</strong> npm: nodemailer</p> <p>### Vulnerability summary</p> <p>addressparser ends an RFC 5322 group at the first `;`, including one inside a quoted display name or a comment. The text after it is parsed again as top level recipients with the quoting flipped, so text that every conformant parser reads as a display name or comment becomes a live address. `G: (a; &lt;evil@evil.com&gt;) &lt;v@victim.com&gt;;` names only `v@victim.com`, and Nodemailer read it as the single recipient `evil@evil.com`. Affected: 3.0.0 through 10.1.3.</p> <p>### Attacker capabilities</p> <p>The attacker controls the text of an address field that an application passes to Nodemailer, or the header of an inbound message parsed with mailparser. No access to the application, its configuration or its credentials is needed. The value is a syntactically valid RFC 5322 group that conformant parsers accept without defects.</p> <p>### Realistic exploitation scenario</p> <p>An application validates the recipients of a submitted address list with a conformant parser and only allows addresses at its own domain. The attacker submits `G: (a; &lt;evil@evil.com&gt;) &lt;v@victim.com&gt;;`. The validator sees one mailbox, `v@victim.com`, and approves it. Nodemailer delivers to `evil@evil.com` only. The same works through a quoted display name, `G: &#34;a;&#34; &#34;&lt;evil@evil.com&gt;&#34; &lt;v@victim.com&gt;;`. The boundary crossed is the application&#39;s recipient allow list.</p> <p>### Proof of concept</p> <p>```js const addressparser = require(&#39;nodemailer/lib/addressparser&#39;); console.log(addressparser(&#34;G: (a; &lt;evil@evil.com&gt;) &lt;v@victim.…</p> https://db.gcve.eu/vuln/ghsa-m943-m63m-w62w