https://db.gcve.eu Contains only the most 10 recent entries. http://www.rssboard.org/rss-specification python-feedgen en Sat, 03 Oct 2026 00:37:10 +0000 https://db.gcve.eu/vuln/ghsa-mvh2-crg5-v77c <p><strong>Affected:</strong> Maven: io.netty:netty-codec-http</p> <p>### Summary Netty SPDY header decoding continues inflating zlib-compressed header blocks after the raw header parser has already exceeded maxHeaderSize and marked the frame truncated. At commit b2d2137c4404af425bf9d5d601a62576f5c06925, a 12,253-byte compressed SPDY header block can declare and inflate a 12 MiB header-name field with maxHeaderSize=16, forcing compression-amplified decode and skip work in a reachable SpdyFrameCodec pipeline.</p> <p>### PoC [poc.zip](https://github.com/user-attachments/files/28445780/poc.zip)</p> <p>run with: ```bash bash ./poc/run.sh ``` expected output: ```text NETTY_SPDY_ZLIB_DECODED_AFTER_LIMIT_TRIGGERED compressed_bytes=12253 declared_name_length=12582912 max_header_size=16 truncated=true invalid=false ```</p> <p>The fingerprint means the compressed input was fully consumed while the raw header parser ended with `truncated=true` and `invalid=false` after processing the oversized decoded name. That specific state distinguishes this bug from a generic setup failure: the maxHeaderSize guard fired, but the zlib/raw decode path still inflated and skipped the full 12 MiB declared name.</p> <p>### Impact A remote unauthenticated peer that can speak SPDY to a Netty pipeline containing SpdyFrameCodec can send a small compressed HEADERS block that expands into much larger raw header data after the configured maxHeaderSize limit has already been exceeded. The attack requires a reachable SPDY codec, ordinary transport setup such as TCP and optional TLS, and no independent co…</p> <p><strong>Affected:</strong> Maven: io.netty:netty-codec-http</p> <p>### Summary Netty SPDY header decoding continues inflating zlib-compressed header blocks after the raw header parser has already exceeded maxHeaderSize and marked the frame truncated. At commit b2d2137c4404af425bf9d5d601a62576f5c06925, a 12,253-byte compressed SPDY header block can declare and inflate a 12 MiB header-name field with maxHeaderSize=16, forcing compression-amplified decode and skip work in a reachable SpdyFrameCodec pipeline.</p> <p>### PoC [poc.zip](https://github.com/user-attachments/files/28445780/poc.zip)</p> <p>run with: ```bash bash ./poc/run.sh ``` expected output: ```text NETTY_SPDY_ZLIB_DECODED_AFTER_LIMIT_TRIGGERED compressed_bytes=12253 declared_name_length=12582912 max_header_size=16 truncated=true invalid=false ```</p> <p>The fingerprint means the compressed input was fully consumed while the raw header parser ended with `truncated=true` and `invalid=false` after processing the oversized decoded name. That specific state distinguishes this bug from a generic setup failure: the maxHeaderSize guard fired, but the zlib/raw decode path still inflated and skipped the full 12 MiB declared name.</p> <p>### Impact A remote unauthenticated peer that can speak SPDY to a Netty pipeline containing SpdyFrameCodec can send a small compressed HEADERS block that expands into much larger raw header data after the configured maxHeaderSize limit has already been exceeded. The attack requires a reachable SPDY codec, ordinary transport setup such as TCP and optional TLS, and no independent co…</p> https://db.gcve.eu/vuln/ghsa-mvh2-crg5-v77c