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      <title>CVE-2026-40110 — jupyter-server CORS origin validation bypass via unanchored regex in allow_origin_pat</title>
      <link>https://db.gcve.eu/vuln/cve-2026-40110</link>
      <description>&lt;p&gt;&lt;strong&gt;Affected:&lt;/strong&gt; jupyter-server jupyter_server, Red Hat Migration Toolkit for Applications 8.2, Red Hat OpenShift AI (RHOAI)&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;Jupyter Server is the backend for Jupyter web applications. In versions 2.17.0 and earlier, the Origin header validation uses Python&amp;#39;s re.match() to check incoming origins against the allow_origin_pat configuration value. Because re.match() only anchors at the start of the string and does not require a full match, a pattern intended to match only a trusted domain (e.g., trusted.example.com) will also match any origin that begins with that domain followed by additional characters (e.g., trusted.example.com.evil.com). An attacker who controls such a domain can bypass the CORS origin restriction and make cross-origin requests to the Jupyter Server API from an untrusted site. This issue has been fixed in version 2.18.0.&lt;/p&gt;</description>
      <content:encoded>&lt;p&gt;&lt;strong&gt;Affected:&lt;/strong&gt; jupyter-server jupyter_server, Red Hat Migration Toolkit for Applications 8.2, Red Hat OpenShift AI (RHOAI)&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;Jupyter Server is the backend for Jupyter web applications. In versions 2.17.0 and earlier, the Origin header validation uses Python&amp;#39;s re.match() to check incoming origins against the allow_origin_pat configuration value. Because re.match() only anchors at the start of the string and does not require a full match, a pattern intended to match only a trusted domain (e.g., trusted.example.com) will also match any origin that begins with that domain followed by additional characters (e.g., trusted.example.com.evil.com). An attacker who controls such a domain can bypass the CORS origin restriction and make cross-origin requests to the Jupyter Server API from an untrusted site. This issue has been fixed in version 2.18.0.&lt;/p&gt;</content:encoded>
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