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    <lastBuildDate>Tue, 29 Sep 2026 01:49:33 +0000</lastBuildDate>
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      <title>GHSA-4xpc-pv4p-pm3w — LiteLLM: Authentication Bypass via Host Header Injection</title>
      <link>https://db.gcve.eu/vuln/ghsa-4xpc-pv4p-pm3w</link>
      <description>&lt;p&gt;&lt;strong&gt;Affected:&lt;/strong&gt; PyPI: litellm&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;### Impact&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;A Host-header parsing flaw in the LiteLLM proxy could, under specific conditions, allow unauthenticated access to protected management routes.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;The auth layer derived the effective route from `request.url.path` in `litellm/proxy/auth/auth_utils.py::get_request_route()`, which Starlette reconstructs from the `Host` header. A crafted `Host` could therefore make the auth gate evaluate a different route from the one FastAPI dispatched.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;**Most deployments are not affected.** The bypass is blocked by any upstream layer that validates or normalizes `Host`, such as:&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;- a CDN or WAF, such as Cloudflare
- a reverse proxy with `server_name` allowlists
- a host-based load balancer&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;**LiteLLM Cloud customers are not affected.**&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;### Patches&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;Fixed in **`1.84.0`**. Upgrade to `1.84.0` or later. No configuration change is required.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;### Workarounds&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;If upgrading is not immediately possible, place the proxy behind an upstream component that validates or normalizes the `Host` header before forwarding (a CDN/WAF, a reverse proxy with explicit `server_name` allowlists, or a cloud load balancer with host-based routing rules), or otherwise restrict network access to the proxy listener.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;### References&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;- Patched release: [`v1.84.0`](https://github.com/BerriAI/litellm/releases/tag/v1.84.0)&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;**Discovery Credit**: Le The Thang (KCSC) and Kim Ngoc Chung (One Mount Group)&lt;/p&gt;</description>
      <content:encoded>&lt;p&gt;&lt;strong&gt;Affected:&lt;/strong&gt; PyPI: litellm&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;### Impact&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;A Host-header parsing flaw in the LiteLLM proxy could, under specific conditions, allow unauthenticated access to protected management routes.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;The auth layer derived the effective route from `request.url.path` in `litellm/proxy/auth/auth_utils.py::get_request_route()`, which Starlette reconstructs from the `Host` header. A crafted `Host` could therefore make the auth gate evaluate a different route from the one FastAPI dispatched.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;**Most deployments are not affected.** The bypass is blocked by any upstream layer that validates or normalizes `Host`, such as:&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;- a CDN or WAF, such as Cloudflare
- a reverse proxy with `server_name` allowlists
- a host-based load balancer&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;**LiteLLM Cloud customers are not affected.**&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;### Patches&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;Fixed in **`1.84.0`**. Upgrade to `1.84.0` or later. No configuration change is required.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;### Workarounds&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;If upgrading is not immediately possible, place the proxy behind an upstream component that validates or normalizes the `Host` header before forwarding (a CDN/WAF, a reverse proxy with explicit `server_name` allowlists, or a cloud load balancer with host-based routing rules), or otherwise restrict network access to the proxy listener.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;### References&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;- Patched release: [`v1.84.0`](https://github.com/BerriAI/litellm/releases/tag/v1.84.0)&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;**Discovery Credit**: Le The Thang (KCSC) and Kim Ngoc Chung (One Mount Group)&lt;/p&gt;</content:encoded>
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