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    <title>Most recent entries from all</title>
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    <lastBuildDate>Thu, 15 Oct 2026 18:43:59 +0000</lastBuildDate>
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      <title>CVE-2026-49265 — OAuthLib: Timing Attack Vulnerability in PKCE code_verifier Comparison</title>
      <link>https://db.gcve.eu/vuln/cve-2026-49265</link>
      <description>&lt;p&gt;&lt;strong&gt;Affected:&lt;/strong&gt; oauthlib&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;OAuthLib is an implementation of the OAuth request-signing logic for Python 3.6+. From 3.0.0 until 4.0.0, OAuthLib&amp;#39;s PKCE checks in oauthlib/oauth2/rfc6749/grant_types/authorization_code.py compare attacker-supplied code_verifier values with stored challenges using ordinary string equality in code_challenge_method_plain and code_challenge_method_s256. Because the comparison can return after a length difference or the first mismatching character, repeated token endpoint measurements can reveal common-prefix timing information that could potentially allow recovery of the code_verifier, unauthorized access-token acquisition, and account takeover. Practical exploitation requires an intercepted, single-use authorization code and enough measurements to overcome real-world network noise; the local timing benchmark does not establish practical remote account takeover, so the weakness remains a defense-in-depth concern. This issue is fixed in version 4.0.0.&lt;/p&gt;</description>
      <content:encoded>&lt;p&gt;&lt;strong&gt;Affected:&lt;/strong&gt; oauthlib&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;OAuthLib is an implementation of the OAuth request-signing logic for Python 3.6+. From 3.0.0 until 4.0.0, OAuthLib&amp;#39;s PKCE checks in oauthlib/oauth2/rfc6749/grant_types/authorization_code.py compare attacker-supplied code_verifier values with stored challenges using ordinary string equality in code_challenge_method_plain and code_challenge_method_s256. Because the comparison can return after a length difference or the first mismatching character, repeated token endpoint measurements can reveal common-prefix timing information that could potentially allow recovery of the code_verifier, unauthorized access-token acquisition, and account takeover. Practical exploitation requires an intercepted, single-use authorization code and enough measurements to overcome real-world network noise; the local timing benchmark does not establish practical remote account takeover, so the weakness remains a defense-in-depth concern. This issue is fixed in version 4.0.0.&lt;/p&gt;</content:encoded>
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