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      <title>GHSA-8238-w5pm-2374 — adm-zip: Unhandled error event in async DEFLATE decompression crashes Node.js process (DoS)</title>
      <link>https://db.gcve.eu/vuln/ghsa-8238-w5pm-2374</link>
      <description>&lt;p&gt;&lt;strong&gt;Affected:&lt;/strong&gt; npm: adm-zip&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;## Summary&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;Denial of Service in `adm-zip`&amp;#39;s async decompression API allows an unauthenticated attacker to crash the entire Node.js host process by supplying a single malformed ZIP file.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;## Details&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;**Affected package**: adm-zip
**Affected versions**: at least 0.6.0 (current latest); likely all versions containing the current `inflateAsync` implementation in `methods/inflater.js`
**Patched version**: 0.6.1&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;### Root Cause&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;`methods/inflater.js:12-32` (`inflateAsync`) creates a `zlib.createInflateRaw(option)` stream and feeds it attacker-controlled compressed bytes via `tmp.end(inbuf)`, but never registers an `&amp;#34;error&amp;#34;` listener on the stream:&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;```js
inflateAsync: function (/*Function*/ callback) {
    var tmp = zlib.createInflateRaw(option),
        parts = [],
        total = 0;
    tmp.on(&amp;#34;data&amp;#34;, function (data) { parts.push(data); total += data.length; });
    tmp.on(&amp;#34;end&amp;#34;, function () { /* build buf, callback(buf) */ });
    tmp.end(inbuf);   // no tmp.on(&amp;#34;error&amp;#34;, ...) registered anywhere
}
```&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;Per Node.js `EventEmitter`/stream semantics, an `&amp;#34;error&amp;#34;` event emitted with zero listeners is rethrown as an **uncaught exception on a later tick**, originating from the zlib C++ binding. This cannot be caught by a `try/catch` wrapped around the calling code, because the throw happens asynchronously, outside the synchronous call stack the `try/catch` covers.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;This code path is reached from every public async API that decompresses entry data: `readFileAsync`, `readAsTextAsync`, `…&lt;/p&gt;</description>
      <content:encoded>&lt;p&gt;&lt;strong&gt;Affected:&lt;/strong&gt; npm: adm-zip&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;## Summary&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;Denial of Service in `adm-zip`&amp;#39;s async decompression API allows an unauthenticated attacker to crash the entire Node.js host process by supplying a single malformed ZIP file.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;## Details&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;**Affected package**: adm-zip
**Affected versions**: at least 0.6.0 (current latest); likely all versions containing the current `inflateAsync` implementation in `methods/inflater.js`
**Patched version**: 0.6.1&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;### Root Cause&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;`methods/inflater.js:12-32` (`inflateAsync`) creates a `zlib.createInflateRaw(option)` stream and feeds it attacker-controlled compressed bytes via `tmp.end(inbuf)`, but never registers an `&amp;#34;error&amp;#34;` listener on the stream:&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;```js
inflateAsync: function (/*Function*/ callback) {
    var tmp = zlib.createInflateRaw(option),
        parts = [],
        total = 0;
    tmp.on(&amp;#34;data&amp;#34;, function (data) { parts.push(data); total += data.length; });
    tmp.on(&amp;#34;end&amp;#34;, function () { /* build buf, callback(buf) */ });
    tmp.end(inbuf);   // no tmp.on(&amp;#34;error&amp;#34;, ...) registered anywhere
}
```&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;Per Node.js `EventEmitter`/stream semantics, an `&amp;#34;error&amp;#34;` event emitted with zero listeners is rethrown as an **uncaught exception on a later tick**, originating from the zlib C++ binding. This cannot be caught by a `try/catch` wrapped around the calling code, because the throw happens asynchronously, outside the synchronous call stack the `try/catch` covers.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;This code path is reached from every public async API that decompresses entry data: `readFileAsync`, `readAsTextAsync`, `…&lt;/p&gt;</content:encoded>
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