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    <item>
      <title>GHSA-83g3-92jg-28cx — Arbitrary File Read/Write via Hardlink Target Escape Through Symlink Chain in node-tar Extraction</title>
      <link>https://db.gcve.eu/vuln/ghsa-83g3-92jg-28cx</link>
      <description>&lt;p&gt;&lt;strong&gt;Affected:&lt;/strong&gt; npm: tar&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;### Summary
`tar.extract()` in Node `tar` allows an attacker-controlled archive to create a hardlink inside the extraction directory that points to a file outside the extraction root, using default options.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;This enables **arbitrary file read and write** as the extracting user (no root, no chmod, no `preservePaths`).&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;Severity is high because the primitive bypasses path protections and turns archive extraction into a direct filesystem access primitive.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;### Details
The bypass chain uses two symlinks plus one hardlink:&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;1. `a/b/c/up -&amp;gt; ../..`
2. `a/b/escape -&amp;gt; c/up/../..`
3. `exfil` (hardlink) -&amp;gt; `a/b/escape/&amp;lt;target-relative-to-parent-of-extract&amp;gt;`&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;Why this works:&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;- Linkpath checks are string-based and do not resolve symlinks on disk for hardlink target safety.
  - See `STRIPABSOLUTEPATH` logic in:
    - `../tar-audit-setuid - CVE/node_modules/tar/dist/commonjs/unpack.js:255`
    - `../tar-audit-setuid - CVE/node_modules/tar/dist/commonjs/unpack.js:268`
    - `../tar-audit-setuid - CVE/node_modules/tar/dist/commonjs/unpack.js:281`&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;- Hardlink extraction resolves target as `path.resolve(cwd, entry.linkpath)` and then calls `fs.link(target, destination)`.
  - `../tar-audit-setuid - CVE/node_modules/tar/dist/commonjs/unpack.js:566`
  - `../tar-audit-setuid - CVE/node_modules/tar/dist/commonjs/unpack.js:567`
  - `../tar-audit-setuid - CVE/node_modules/tar/dist/commonjs/unpack.js:703`&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;- Parent directory safety checks (`mkdir` + symlink detection) are applied to the destination p…&lt;/p&gt;</description>
      <content:encoded>&lt;p&gt;&lt;strong&gt;Affected:&lt;/strong&gt; npm: tar&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;### Summary
`tar.extract()` in Node `tar` allows an attacker-controlled archive to create a hardlink inside the extraction directory that points to a file outside the extraction root, using default options.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;This enables **arbitrary file read and write** as the extracting user (no root, no chmod, no `preservePaths`).&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;Severity is high because the primitive bypasses path protections and turns archive extraction into a direct filesystem access primitive.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;### Details
The bypass chain uses two symlinks plus one hardlink:&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;1. `a/b/c/up -&amp;gt; ../..`
2. `a/b/escape -&amp;gt; c/up/../..`
3. `exfil` (hardlink) -&amp;gt; `a/b/escape/&amp;lt;target-relative-to-parent-of-extract&amp;gt;`&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;Why this works:&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;- Linkpath checks are string-based and do not resolve symlinks on disk for hardlink target safety.
  - See `STRIPABSOLUTEPATH` logic in:
    - `../tar-audit-setuid - CVE/node_modules/tar/dist/commonjs/unpack.js:255`
    - `../tar-audit-setuid - CVE/node_modules/tar/dist/commonjs/unpack.js:268`
    - `../tar-audit-setuid - CVE/node_modules/tar/dist/commonjs/unpack.js:281`&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;- Hardlink extraction resolves target as `path.resolve(cwd, entry.linkpath)` and then calls `fs.link(target, destination)`.
  - `../tar-audit-setuid - CVE/node_modules/tar/dist/commonjs/unpack.js:566`
  - `../tar-audit-setuid - CVE/node_modules/tar/dist/commonjs/unpack.js:567`
  - `../tar-audit-setuid - CVE/node_modules/tar/dist/commonjs/unpack.js:703`&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;- Parent directory safety checks (`mkdir` + symlink detection) are applied to the destination p…&lt;/p&gt;</content:encoded>
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