GHSA-47m2-4cr7-mhcw — quic-go: Panic occurs when queuing undecryptable packets after handshake completion

Affected: Go: github.com/quic-go/quic-go

## Summary

A misbehaving or malicious server can trigger an assertion in a quic-go client (and crash the process) by sending a premature HANDSHAKE_DONE frame during the handshake.

## Impact

A misbehaving or malicious server can cause a denial-of-service (DoS) attack on the quic-go client by triggering an assertion failure, leading to a process crash. This requires no authentication and can be exploited during the handshake phase. Observed in the wild with certain server implementations (e.g. Solana's Firedancer QUIC).

## Affected Versions

- All versions prior to v0.49.1 (for the 0.49 branch) - Versions v0.50.0 to v0.54.0 (inclusive) - Fixed in v0.49.1, v0.54.1, and v0.55.0 onward

Users are recommended to upgrade to the latest patched version in their respective maintenance branch or to v0.55.0 or later.

## Details

For a regular 1-RTT handshake, QUIC uses three sets of keys to encrypt / decrypt QUIC packets:

- Initial keys (derived from a static key and the connection ID) - Handshake keys (derived from the client's and server's key shares in the TLS handshake) - 1-RTT keys (derived when the TLS handshake finishes)

On the client side, Initial keys are discarded when the first Handshake packet is sent. Handshake keys are discarded when the server's HANDSHAKE_DONE frame is received, as specified in section 4.9.2 of RFC 9001. Crucially, Initial keys are always dropped before Handshake keys in a standard handshake.

Due to packet reordering, it is possible to receive a p…

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GHSA-47m2-4cr7-mhcw — quic-go: Panic occurs when queuing undecryptable packets after handshake completion