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      <title>GHSA-cjmm-f4jc-qw8r — DOMPurify ADD_ATTR predicate skips URI validation</title>
      <link>https://db.gcve.eu/vuln/ghsa-cjmm-f4jc-qw8r</link>
      <description>&lt;p&gt;&lt;strong&gt;Affected:&lt;/strong&gt; npm: dompurify&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;## Summary
DOMPurify allows `ADD_ATTR` to be provided as a predicate function via `EXTRA_ELEMENT_HANDLING.attributeCheck`. When the predicate returns `true`, `_isValidAttribute` short-circuits the attribute check before URI-safe validation runs. An attacker who supplies a predicate that accepts specific attribute/tag combinations can then sanitize input such as `&amp;lt;a href=&amp;#34;javascript:alert(document.domain)&amp;#34;&amp;gt;` and have the `javascript:` URL survive, because URI validation is skipped for that attribute while other checks still pass. The provided PoC accepts `href` for anchors and then triggers a click inside an iframe, showing that the sanitized payload executes despite the protocol bypass.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;## Impact
Predicate-based allowlisting bypasses DOMPurify&amp;#39;s URI validation, allowing unsafe protocols such as `javascript:` to reach the DOM and execute whenever the link is activated, resulting in DOM-based XSS.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;## Credits
Identified by Cantina’s Apex (https://www.cantina.security).&lt;/p&gt;</description>
      <content:encoded>&lt;p&gt;&lt;strong&gt;Affected:&lt;/strong&gt; npm: dompurify&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;## Summary
DOMPurify allows `ADD_ATTR` to be provided as a predicate function via `EXTRA_ELEMENT_HANDLING.attributeCheck`. When the predicate returns `true`, `_isValidAttribute` short-circuits the attribute check before URI-safe validation runs. An attacker who supplies a predicate that accepts specific attribute/tag combinations can then sanitize input such as `&amp;lt;a href=&amp;#34;javascript:alert(document.domain)&amp;#34;&amp;gt;` and have the `javascript:` URL survive, because URI validation is skipped for that attribute while other checks still pass. The provided PoC accepts `href` for anchors and then triggers a click inside an iframe, showing that the sanitized payload executes despite the protocol bypass.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;## Impact
Predicate-based allowlisting bypasses DOMPurify&amp;#39;s URI validation, allowing unsafe protocols such as `javascript:` to reach the DOM and execute whenever the link is activated, resulting in DOM-based XSS.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;## Credits
Identified by Cantina’s Apex (https://www.cantina.security).&lt;/p&gt;</content:encoded>
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