https://db.gcve.eu Contains only the most 10 recent entries. http://www.rssboard.org/rss-specification python-feedgen en Tue, 29 Sep 2026 09:35:39 +0000 https://db.gcve.eu/vuln/cve-2026-43529 <p><strong>Affected:</strong> OpenClaw</p> <p>OpenClaw before 2026.4.10 contains a time-of-check-time-of-use vulnerability in the validateScriptFileForShellBleed function that allows local attackers to bypass workspace boundary checks. An attacker with workspace write access can race-condition swap the target file between validation and preflight read, causing the validator to inspect a different file identity than the one that passed the initial boundary check.</p> <p><strong>Affected:</strong> OpenClaw</p> <p>OpenClaw before 2026.4.10 contains a time-of-check-time-of-use vulnerability in the validateScriptFileForShellBleed function that allows local attackers to bypass workspace boundary checks. An attacker with workspace write access can race-condition swap the target file between validation and preflight read, causing the validator to inspect a different file identity than the one that passed the initial boundary check.</p> https://db.gcve.eu/vuln/cve-2026-43529 https://db.gcve.eu/vuln/ghsa-gj9q-8w99-mp8j <p><strong>Affected:</strong> npm: openclaw</p> <p>## Summary</p> <p>OpenClaw&#39;s exec script preflight validator previously validated and then read a script by mutable pathname. A local race could swap the path between validation and read, causing preflight analysis to inspect a different file identity than the one that passed the workspace boundary check.</p> <p>## Affected Packages / Versions</p> <p>- Package: `openclaw` - Ecosystem: npm - Affected versions: `&lt; 2026.4.10` - Patched versions: `&gt;= 2026.4.10`</p> <p>## Impact</p> <p>The impact is limited. This was not arbitrary full-file disclosure through the preflight error path. The validator only surfaced derived preflight content, such as a matched token, a line number, or the first non-empty JavaScript line in one branch. Exploitation also required the ability to mutate the relevant workspace path during the preflight window.</p> <p>Still, this was a real TOCTOU boundary bug in code that is supposed to reason about workspace-local script files before execution. A file identity that passed the initial boundary validation could differ from the identity that was later read for preflight analysis.</p> <p>## Technical Details</p> <p>The vulnerable flow performed separate path validation and file reads in `validateScriptFileForShellBleed`. Because the read was path-based, an attacker with write access to the workspace path could race replacement of the target after validation but before preflight read.</p> <p>## Fix</p> <p>PR #62333 replaced the check-then-read flow with a pinned safe-open/read path using the shared `readFileWithinRoot…</p> <p><strong>Affected:</strong> npm: openclaw</p> <p>## Summary</p> <p>OpenClaw&#39;s exec script preflight validator previously validated and then read a script by mutable pathname. A local race could swap the path between validation and read, causing preflight analysis to inspect a different file identity than the one that passed the workspace boundary check.</p> <p>## Affected Packages / Versions</p> <p>- Package: `openclaw` - Ecosystem: npm - Affected versions: `&lt; 2026.4.10` - Patched versions: `&gt;= 2026.4.10`</p> <p>## Impact</p> <p>The impact is limited. This was not arbitrary full-file disclosure through the preflight error path. The validator only surfaced derived preflight content, such as a matched token, a line number, or the first non-empty JavaScript line in one branch. Exploitation also required the ability to mutate the relevant workspace path during the preflight window.</p> <p>Still, this was a real TOCTOU boundary bug in code that is supposed to reason about workspace-local script files before execution. A file identity that passed the initial boundary validation could differ from the identity that was later read for preflight analysis.</p> <p>## Technical Details</p> <p>The vulnerable flow performed separate path validation and file reads in `validateScriptFileForShellBleed`. Because the read was path-based, an attacker with write access to the workspace path could race replacement of the target after validation but before preflight read.</p> <p>## Fix</p> <p>PR #62333 replaced the check-then-read flow with a pinned safe-open/read path using the shared `readFileWithinRoot…</p> https://db.gcve.eu/vuln/ghsa-gj9q-8w99-mp8j