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    <title>Most recent entries from all</title>
    <link>https://db.gcve.eu</link>
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    <item>
      <title>CVE-2026-114618 — Authlib: Default JWT bearer grant accepts assertions for the wrong audience</title>
      <link>https://db.gcve.eu/vuln/cve-2026-114618</link>
      <description>&lt;p&gt;&lt;strong&gt;Affected:&lt;/strong&gt; authlib&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;Authlib is a Python library which builds OAuth and OpenID Connect servers. Prior to 1.9.0, the default RFC 7523 JWTBearerGrant.get_audiences() returns an empty list, causing JWTBearerGrant.verify_claims() to require only that an aud claim exists without matching the current authorization server. An attacker holding a legitimate assertion for another service can present it to a server that shares the signing key and uses the default grant, obtaining an access token across a trust boundary. Implementations that override get_audiences() with the server&amp;#39;s valid audience identifiers are not affected. This issue is fixed in version 1.9.0.&lt;/p&gt;</description>
      <content:encoded>&lt;p&gt;&lt;strong&gt;Affected:&lt;/strong&gt; authlib&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;Authlib is a Python library which builds OAuth and OpenID Connect servers. Prior to 1.9.0, the default RFC 7523 JWTBearerGrant.get_audiences() returns an empty list, causing JWTBearerGrant.verify_claims() to require only that an aud claim exists without matching the current authorization server. An attacker holding a legitimate assertion for another service can present it to a server that shares the signing key and uses the default grant, obtaining an access token across a trust boundary. Implementations that override get_audiences() with the server&amp;#39;s valid audience identifiers are not affected. This issue is fixed in version 1.9.0.&lt;/p&gt;</content:encoded>
      <guid isPermaLink="false">https://db.gcve.eu/vuln/cve-2026-114618</guid>
    </item>
    <item>
      <title>GHSA-fch4-3c6x-j4gc — Authlib: Default JWT bearer grant accepts assertions for the wrong audience</title>
      <link>https://db.gcve.eu/vuln/ghsa-fch4-3c6x-j4gc</link>
      <description>&lt;p&gt;&lt;strong&gt;Affected:&lt;/strong&gt; PyPI: authlib&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;## Description&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;### Summary&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;Authlib&amp;#39;s default RFC 7523 JWT bearer grant leaves `get_audiences()` empty, so `verify_claims()` only checks that an `aud` claim *exists* instead of requiring it to match the current authorization server&amp;#39;s token endpoint. An attacker holding a legitimately issued JWT assertion for *any* audience can present it to a different authorization server sharing the same signing key and obtain an access token.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;To be completely transparent, AI tools helped surface it. However, we have independently reproduced and carefully validated the issue. We follow responsible disclosure practices and are sharing this privately.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;### Affected Entrypoints&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;- `authlib.oauth2.rfc7523.JWTBearerGrant` — default `get_audiences()` returns empty list
- `authlib.jose.jwt.decode()` with `claims_options` for audience validation
- `authlib.integrations.flask_oauth2.ResourceProtector.validate_request()` when audience checking is enabled&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;### Exploit Path&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;```
1. Attacker authenticates to Service A (low-privilege)
2. Authorization server issues JWT with &amp;#34;aud&amp;#34;: &amp;#34;https://evil.test/token&amp;#34;
3. Attacker presents this assertion to Service B&amp;#39;s token endpoint
4. Service B uses default JWTBearerGrant (get_audiences() = [])
5. verify_claims() only checks aud *exists*, not its value
6. Service B issues an access token — audience bypass achieved
```&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;### Proof of Concept&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;```python
#!/usr/bin/env python3
&amp;#34;&amp;#34;&amp;#34;
Demonstrates that the default JWTBearerGrant accepts JWT assertions
whose audience doe…&lt;/p&gt;</description>
      <content:encoded>&lt;p&gt;&lt;strong&gt;Affected:&lt;/strong&gt; PyPI: authlib&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;## Description&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;### Summary&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;Authlib&amp;#39;s default RFC 7523 JWT bearer grant leaves `get_audiences()` empty, so `verify_claims()` only checks that an `aud` claim *exists* instead of requiring it to match the current authorization server&amp;#39;s token endpoint. An attacker holding a legitimately issued JWT assertion for *any* audience can present it to a different authorization server sharing the same signing key and obtain an access token.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;To be completely transparent, AI tools helped surface it. However, we have independently reproduced and carefully validated the issue. We follow responsible disclosure practices and are sharing this privately.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;### Affected Entrypoints&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;- `authlib.oauth2.rfc7523.JWTBearerGrant` — default `get_audiences()` returns empty list
- `authlib.jose.jwt.decode()` with `claims_options` for audience validation
- `authlib.integrations.flask_oauth2.ResourceProtector.validate_request()` when audience checking is enabled&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;### Exploit Path&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;```
1. Attacker authenticates to Service A (low-privilege)
2. Authorization server issues JWT with &amp;#34;aud&amp;#34;: &amp;#34;https://evil.test/token&amp;#34;
3. Attacker presents this assertion to Service B&amp;#39;s token endpoint
4. Service B uses default JWTBearerGrant (get_audiences() = [])
5. verify_claims() only checks aud *exists*, not its value
6. Service B issues an access token — audience bypass achieved
```&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;### Proof of Concept&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;```python
#!/usr/bin/env python3
&amp;#34;&amp;#34;&amp;#34;
Demonstrates that the default JWTBearerGrant accepts JWT assertions
whose audience doe…&lt;/p&gt;</content:encoded>
      <guid isPermaLink="false">https://db.gcve.eu/vuln/ghsa-fch4-3c6x-j4gc</guid>
    </item>
    <item>
      <title>PYSEC-2026-4358</title>
      <link>https://db.gcve.eu/vuln/pysec-2026-4358</link>
      <description>&lt;p&gt;&lt;strong&gt;Affected:&lt;/strong&gt; PyPI: authlib&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;Authlib is a Python library which builds OAuth and OpenID Connect servers. Prior to 1.9.0, the default RFC 7523 JWTBearerGrant.get_audiences() returns an empty list, causing JWTBearerGrant.verify_claims() to require only that an aud claim exists without matching the current authorization server. An attacker holding a legitimate assertion for another service can present it to a server that shares the signing key and uses the default grant, obtaining an access token across a trust boundary. Implementations that override get_audiences() with the server&amp;#39;s valid audience identifiers are not affected. This issue is fixed in version 1.9.0.&lt;/p&gt;</description>
      <content:encoded>&lt;p&gt;&lt;strong&gt;Affected:&lt;/strong&gt; PyPI: authlib&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;Authlib is a Python library which builds OAuth and OpenID Connect servers. Prior to 1.9.0, the default RFC 7523 JWTBearerGrant.get_audiences() returns an empty list, causing JWTBearerGrant.verify_claims() to require only that an aud claim exists without matching the current authorization server. An attacker holding a legitimate assertion for another service can present it to a server that shares the signing key and uses the default grant, obtaining an access token across a trust boundary. Implementations that override get_audiences() with the server&amp;#39;s valid audience identifiers are not affected. This issue is fixed in version 1.9.0.&lt;/p&gt;</content:encoded>
      <guid isPermaLink="false">https://db.gcve.eu/vuln/pysec-2026-4358</guid>
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