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    <title>Most recent entries from all</title>
    <link>https://db.gcve.eu</link>
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    <lastBuildDate>Thu, 29 Oct 2026 17:24:07 +0000</lastBuildDate>
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      <title>CVE-2026-110859 — GitPython before 3.2.0 Arbitrary File Read via Head.checkout() Branch Name</title>
      <link>https://db.gcve.eu/vuln/cve-2026-110859</link>
      <description>&lt;p&gt;&lt;strong&gt;Affected:&lt;/strong&gt; gitpython-developers GitPython&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;GitPython before 3.2.0 contains an argument injection vulnerability in Head.checkout() that allows remote attackers to read arbitrary files by supplying a branch name parsed as a git option. Attackers can host a repository whose default branch is named --pathspec-from-file=&amp;lt;path&amp;gt;, causing cloning applications that check out the active branch to leak file contents through GitCommandError messages.&lt;/p&gt;</description>
      <content:encoded>&lt;p&gt;&lt;strong&gt;Affected:&lt;/strong&gt; gitpython-developers GitPython&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;GitPython before 3.2.0 contains an argument injection vulnerability in Head.checkout() that allows remote attackers to read arbitrary files by supplying a branch name parsed as a git option. Attackers can host a repository whose default branch is named --pathspec-from-file=&amp;lt;path&amp;gt;, causing cloning applications that check out the active branch to leak file contents through GitCommandError messages.&lt;/p&gt;</content:encoded>
      <guid isPermaLink="false">https://db.gcve.eu/vuln/cve-2026-110859</guid>
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    <item>
      <title>GHSA-23mf-xhv8-69c2 — GitPython: arbitrary file read via attacker-controlled branch name in `Head.checkout()` (incomplete fix of CVE-2026-786…</title>
      <link>https://db.gcve.eu/vuln/ghsa-23mf-xhv8-69c2</link>
      <description>&lt;p&gt;&lt;strong&gt;Affected:&lt;/strong&gt; PyPI: GitPython&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;&amp;gt; **A note on the referenced files.** This report was submitted through GitHub&amp;#39;s private
&amp;gt; vulnerability reporting API, which carries no attachments. Every transcript this report leans
&amp;gt; on is reproduced **inline above**, verbatim. The file names it mentions (`poc.sh`, `poc.log`,
&amp;gt; per-case transcripts, `evidence.md`, `negative-controls.md`, blob-sweep tables) are the local
&amp;gt; evidence bundle those inline excerpts were extracted from, with a checksum manifest. I am happy
&amp;gt; to send the bundle by any channel you prefer, or to open a private fork — just say which. The
&amp;gt; PoC scripts are self-contained and reproduce the result from a clean environment.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;---&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;**Affected:** `&amp;lt;= 3.1.62` — all published releases; also `main` @ `4905b4af`
**Verified at runtime:** GitPython `3.1.62` with git `2.55.0`
**Date:** 2026-09-10
**Reporter:** MAXI8594&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;---&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;## Threat model&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;| | |
|---|---|
| **Attacker** | anyone who can get the application to clone a URL they control. No account, no credential, no privilege in the consuming application. |
| **Pre-need** | a repository they host, with `HEAD` pointing at a branch whose name is the payload. A `git push` to a plain git server is enough — no filesystem access to a server is required (`raw/06`). |
| **Gets** | the contents of any file the application&amp;#39;s process can read, returned in band through the exception. `/etc/passwd` recovered 34 of 34 lines. |
| **Real-world likelihood** | **High.** The vulnerable consumer is six lines of ordinary code with n…&lt;/p&gt;</description>
      <content:encoded>&lt;p&gt;&lt;strong&gt;Affected:&lt;/strong&gt; PyPI: GitPython&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;&amp;gt; **A note on the referenced files.** This report was submitted through GitHub&amp;#39;s private
&amp;gt; vulnerability reporting API, which carries no attachments. Every transcript this report leans
&amp;gt; on is reproduced **inline above**, verbatim. The file names it mentions (`poc.sh`, `poc.log`,
&amp;gt; per-case transcripts, `evidence.md`, `negative-controls.md`, blob-sweep tables) are the local
&amp;gt; evidence bundle those inline excerpts were extracted from, with a checksum manifest. I am happy
&amp;gt; to send the bundle by any channel you prefer, or to open a private fork — just say which. The
&amp;gt; PoC scripts are self-contained and reproduce the result from a clean environment.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;---&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;**Affected:** `&amp;lt;= 3.1.62` — all published releases; also `main` @ `4905b4af`
**Verified at runtime:** GitPython `3.1.62` with git `2.55.0`
**Date:** 2026-09-10
**Reporter:** MAXI8594&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;---&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;## Threat model&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;| | |
|---|---|
| **Attacker** | anyone who can get the application to clone a URL they control. No account, no credential, no privilege in the consuming application. |
| **Pre-need** | a repository they host, with `HEAD` pointing at a branch whose name is the payload. A `git push` to a plain git server is enough — no filesystem access to a server is required (`raw/06`). |
| **Gets** | the contents of any file the application&amp;#39;s process can read, returned in band through the exception. `/etc/passwd` recovered 34 of 34 lines. |
| **Real-world likelihood** | **High.** The vulnerable consumer is six lines of ordinary code with n…&lt;/p&gt;</content:encoded>
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