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    <link>https://db.gcve.eu</link>
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    <lastBuildDate>Fri, 02 Oct 2026 00:32:44 +0000</lastBuildDate>
    <item>
      <title>CVE-2026-44727 — Jupyter Server: Stored XSS in `NbconvertFileHandler` / `NbconvertPostHandler` via missing `sandbox` CSP</title>
      <link>https://db.gcve.eu/vuln/cve-2026-44727</link>
      <description>&lt;p&gt;&lt;strong&gt;Affected:&lt;/strong&gt; jupyter-server jupyter_server, Red Hat Migration Toolkit for Applications 8.2, Red Hat OpenShift AI 3.4, Red Hat OpenShift AI (RHOAI)&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;Jupyter Server is the backend for Jupyter web applications. Prior to 2.20, the nbconvert HTTP handlers in jupyter_server render user-authored notebook HTML under the Jupyter origin without a sandbox directive in their Content-Security-Policy. Combined with nbconvert.HTMLExporter&amp;#39;s default non-sanitizing behavior, a notebook carrying an HTML payload in a display_data output triggers stored XSS with cookie access, full /api/* authority, and kernel RCE. This vulnerability is fixed in 2.20.&lt;/p&gt;</description>
      <content:encoded>&lt;p&gt;&lt;strong&gt;Affected:&lt;/strong&gt; jupyter-server jupyter_server, Red Hat Migration Toolkit for Applications 8.2, Red Hat OpenShift AI 3.4, Red Hat OpenShift AI (RHOAI)&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;Jupyter Server is the backend for Jupyter web applications. Prior to 2.20, the nbconvert HTTP handlers in jupyter_server render user-authored notebook HTML under the Jupyter origin without a sandbox directive in their Content-Security-Policy. Combined with nbconvert.HTMLExporter&amp;#39;s default non-sanitizing behavior, a notebook carrying an HTML payload in a display_data output triggers stored XSS with cookie access, full /api/* authority, and kernel RCE. This vulnerability is fixed in 2.20.&lt;/p&gt;</content:encoded>
      <guid isPermaLink="false">https://db.gcve.eu/vuln/cve-2026-44727</guid>
    </item>
    <item>
      <title>GHSA-fcw5-x6j4-ccmp — Jupyter Server: Stored XSS in `NbconvertFileHandler` / `NbconvertPostHandler` via missing `sandbox` CSP</title>
      <link>https://db.gcve.eu/vuln/ghsa-fcw5-x6j4-ccmp</link>
      <description>&lt;p&gt;&lt;strong&gt;Affected:&lt;/strong&gt; PyPI: jupyter-server&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;The nbconvert HTTP handlers in jupyter_server render user-authored notebook HTML under the Jupyter origin without a sandbox directive in their `Content-Security-Policy`.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;Combined with `nbconvert.HTMLExporter`&amp;#39;s default non-sanitizing behavior, a notebook carrying an HTML payload in a display_data output triggers stored XSS with cookie access, full /api/* authority, and kernel RCE.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;### Impact&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;An authenticated victim who navigates to `/nbconvert/html/&amp;lt;path&amp;gt;` containing attacker-authored output can have their token exfiltrated to another domain because it is executed in the Jupyter origin.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;### Patches&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;Fixed in v2.20.0, commit [6cbee8d](https://github.com/jupyter-server/jupyter_server/commit/6cbee8d65e71abac851c4492fea987ad080580bd)&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;### Workarounds&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;For deployments where editing the installed jupyter_server is impractical (containerized builds, read-only images), adding this to jupyter_server_config.py has the same effect as the patch above without touching source files:&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;```
import jupyter_server.nbconvert.handlers as _nb&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;def _csp(self):
    return super(type(self), self).content_security_policy + &amp;#34;; sandbox allow-scripts&amp;#34;&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;_nb.NbconvertFileHandler.content_security_policy = property(_csp)
_nb.NbconvertPostHandler.content_security_policy = property(_csp)
```&lt;/p&gt;</description>
      <content:encoded>&lt;p&gt;&lt;strong&gt;Affected:&lt;/strong&gt; PyPI: jupyter-server&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;The nbconvert HTTP handlers in jupyter_server render user-authored notebook HTML under the Jupyter origin without a sandbox directive in their `Content-Security-Policy`.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;Combined with `nbconvert.HTMLExporter`&amp;#39;s default non-sanitizing behavior, a notebook carrying an HTML payload in a display_data output triggers stored XSS with cookie access, full /api/* authority, and kernel RCE.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;### Impact&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;An authenticated victim who navigates to `/nbconvert/html/&amp;lt;path&amp;gt;` containing attacker-authored output can have their token exfiltrated to another domain because it is executed in the Jupyter origin.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;### Patches&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;Fixed in v2.20.0, commit [6cbee8d](https://github.com/jupyter-server/jupyter_server/commit/6cbee8d65e71abac851c4492fea987ad080580bd)&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;### Workarounds&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;For deployments where editing the installed jupyter_server is impractical (containerized builds, read-only images), adding this to jupyter_server_config.py has the same effect as the patch above without touching source files:&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;```
import jupyter_server.nbconvert.handlers as _nb&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;def _csp(self):
    return super(type(self), self).content_security_policy + &amp;#34;; sandbox allow-scripts&amp;#34;&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;_nb.NbconvertFileHandler.content_security_policy = property(_csp)
_nb.NbconvertPostHandler.content_security_policy = property(_csp)
```&lt;/p&gt;</content:encoded>
      <guid isPermaLink="false">https://db.gcve.eu/vuln/ghsa-fcw5-x6j4-ccmp</guid>
    </item>
    <item>
      <title>PYSEC-2026-366 — Jupyter Server: Stored XSS in `NbconvertFileHandler` / `NbconvertPostHandler` via missing `sandbox` CSP</title>
      <link>https://db.gcve.eu/vuln/pysec-2026-366</link>
      <description>&lt;p&gt;&lt;strong&gt;Affected:&lt;/strong&gt; PyPI: jupyter-server&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;The nbconvert HTTP handlers in jupyter_server render user-authored notebook HTML under the Jupyter origin without a sandbox directive in their `Content-Security-Policy`.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;Combined with `nbconvert.HTMLExporter`&amp;#39;s default non-sanitizing behavior, a notebook carrying an HTML payload in a display_data output triggers stored XSS with cookie access, full /api/* authority, and kernel RCE.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;### Impact&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;An authenticated victim who navigates to `/nbconvert/html/&amp;lt;path&amp;gt;` containing attacker-authored output can have their token exfiltrated to another domain because it is executed in the Jupyter origin.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;### Patches&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;Fixed in v2.20.0, commit [6cbee8d](https://github.com/jupyter-server/jupyter_server/commit/6cbee8d65e71abac851c4492fea987ad080580bd)&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;### Workarounds&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;For deployments where editing the installed jupyter_server is impractical (containerized builds, read-only images), adding this to jupyter_server_config.py has the same effect as the patch above without touching source files:&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;```
import jupyter_server.nbconvert.handlers as _nb&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;def _csp(self):
    return super(type(self), self).content_security_policy + &amp;#34;; sandbox allow-scripts&amp;#34;&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;_nb.NbconvertFileHandler.content_security_policy = property(_csp)
_nb.NbconvertPostHandler.content_security_policy = property(_csp)
```&lt;/p&gt;</description>
      <content:encoded>&lt;p&gt;&lt;strong&gt;Affected:&lt;/strong&gt; PyPI: jupyter-server&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;The nbconvert HTTP handlers in jupyter_server render user-authored notebook HTML under the Jupyter origin without a sandbox directive in their `Content-Security-Policy`.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;Combined with `nbconvert.HTMLExporter`&amp;#39;s default non-sanitizing behavior, a notebook carrying an HTML payload in a display_data output triggers stored XSS with cookie access, full /api/* authority, and kernel RCE.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;### Impact&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;An authenticated victim who navigates to `/nbconvert/html/&amp;lt;path&amp;gt;` containing attacker-authored output can have their token exfiltrated to another domain because it is executed in the Jupyter origin.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;### Patches&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;Fixed in v2.20.0, commit [6cbee8d](https://github.com/jupyter-server/jupyter_server/commit/6cbee8d65e71abac851c4492fea987ad080580bd)&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;### Workarounds&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;For deployments where editing the installed jupyter_server is impractical (containerized builds, read-only images), adding this to jupyter_server_config.py has the same effect as the patch above without touching source files:&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;```
import jupyter_server.nbconvert.handlers as _nb&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;def _csp(self):
    return super(type(self), self).content_security_policy + &amp;#34;; sandbox allow-scripts&amp;#34;&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;_nb.NbconvertFileHandler.content_security_policy = property(_csp)
_nb.NbconvertPostHandler.content_security_policy = property(_csp)
```&lt;/p&gt;</content:encoded>
      <guid isPermaLink="false">https://db.gcve.eu/vuln/pysec-2026-366</guid>
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