https://db.gcve.eu Contains only the most 10 recent entries. http://www.rssboard.org/rss-specification python-feedgen en Thu, 01 Oct 2026 05:43:18 +0000 https://db.gcve.eu/vuln/cve-2022-29238 <p><strong>Affected:</strong> jupyter notebook</p> <p>Jupyter Notebook is a web-based notebook environment for interactive computing. Prior to version 6.4.12, authenticated requests to the notebook server with `ContentsManager.allow_hidden = False` only prevented listing the contents of hidden directories, not accessing individual hidden files or files in hidden directories (i.e. hidden files were &#39;hidden&#39; but not &#39;inaccessible&#39;). This could lead to notebook configurations allowing authenticated access to files that may reasonably be expected to be disallowed. Because fully authenticated requests are required, this is of relatively low impact. But if a server&#39;s root directory contains sensitive files whose only protection from the server is being hidden (e.g. `~/.ssh` while serving $HOME), then any authenticated requests could access files if their names are guessable. Such contexts also necessarily have full access to the server and therefore execution permissions, which also generally grants access to all the same files. So this does not generally result in any privilege escalation or increase in information access, only an additional, unintended means by which the files could be accessed. Version 6.4.12 contains a patch for this issue. There are currently no known workarounds.</p> <p><strong>Affected:</strong> jupyter notebook</p> <p>Jupyter Notebook is a web-based notebook environment for interactive computing. Prior to version 6.4.12, authenticated requests to the notebook server with `ContentsManager.allow_hidden = False` only prevented listing the contents of hidden directories, not accessing individual hidden files or files in hidden directories (i.e. hidden files were &#39;hidden&#39; but not &#39;inaccessible&#39;). This could lead to notebook configurations allowing authenticated access to files that may reasonably be expected to be disallowed. Because fully authenticated requests are required, this is of relatively low impact. But if a server&#39;s root directory contains sensitive files whose only protection from the server is being hidden (e.g. `~/.ssh` while serving $HOME), then any authenticated requests could access files if their names are guessable. Such contexts also necessarily have full access to the server and therefore execution permissions, which also generally grants access to all the same files. So this does not generally result in any privilege escalation or increase in information access, only an additional, unintended means by which the files could be accessed. Version 6.4.12 contains a patch for this issue. There are currently no known workarounds.</p> https://db.gcve.eu/vuln/cve-2022-29238 https://db.gcve.eu/vuln/ghsa-v7vq-3x77-87vg <p><strong>Affected:</strong> PyPI: notebook</p> <p>### Impact _What kind of vulnerability is it? Who is impacted?_</p> <p>Authenticated requests to the notebook server with `ContentsManager.allow_hidden = False` only prevented listing the contents of hidden directories, not accessing individual hidden files or files in hidden directories (i.e. hidden files were &#39;hidden&#39; but not &#39;inaccessible&#39;). This could lead to notebook configurations allowing authenticated access to files that may reasonably be expected to be disallowed.</p> <p>Because fully authenticated requests are required, this is of relatively low impact. But if a server&#39;s root directory contains sensitive files whose only protection from the server is being hidden (e.g. `~/.ssh` while serving $HOME), then any authenticated requests could access files if their names are guessable. Such contexts also necessarily have full access to the server and therefore execution permissions, which also generally grants access to all the same files. So this does not generally result in any privilege escalation or increase in information access, only an additional, unintended _means_ by which the files could be accessed.</p> <p>### Patches _Has the problem been patched? What versions should users upgrade to?_</p> <p>notebook 6.4.12</p> <p>### Workarounds _Is there a way for users to fix or remediate the vulnerability without upgrading?_</p> <p>- Do not run the notebook server in a directory with hidden files, use subdirectories - Use a custom ContentsManager with additional checks for `self.is_hidden(path)` prior to…</p> <p><strong>Affected:</strong> PyPI: notebook</p> <p>### Impact _What kind of vulnerability is it? Who is impacted?_</p> <p>Authenticated requests to the notebook server with `ContentsManager.allow_hidden = False` only prevented listing the contents of hidden directories, not accessing individual hidden files or files in hidden directories (i.e. hidden files were &#39;hidden&#39; but not &#39;inaccessible&#39;). This could lead to notebook configurations allowing authenticated access to files that may reasonably be expected to be disallowed.</p> <p>Because fully authenticated requests are required, this is of relatively low impact. But if a server&#39;s root directory contains sensitive files whose only protection from the server is being hidden (e.g. `~/.ssh` while serving $HOME), then any authenticated requests could access files if their names are guessable. Such contexts also necessarily have full access to the server and therefore execution permissions, which also generally grants access to all the same files. So this does not generally result in any privilege escalation or increase in information access, only an additional, unintended _means_ by which the files could be accessed.</p> <p>### Patches _Has the problem been patched? What versions should users upgrade to?_</p> <p>notebook 6.4.12</p> <p>### Workarounds _Is there a way for users to fix or remediate the vulnerability without upgrading?_</p> <p>- Do not run the notebook server in a directory with hidden files, use subdirectories - Use a custom ContentsManager with additional checks for `self.is_hidden(path)` prior to…</p> https://db.gcve.eu/vuln/ghsa-v7vq-3x77-87vg https://db.gcve.eu/vuln/pysec-2022-212 <p><strong>Affected:</strong> PyPI: notebook</p> <p>Jupyter Notebook is a web-based notebook environment for interactive computing. Prior to version 6.4.12, authenticated requests to the notebook server with `ContentsManager.allow_hidden = False` only prevented listing the contents of hidden directories, not accessing individual hidden files or files in hidden directories (i.e. hidden files were &#39;hidden&#39; but not &#39;inaccessible&#39;). This could lead to notebook configurations allowing authenticated access to files that may reasonably be expected to be disallowed. Because fully authenticated requests are required, this is of relatively low impact. But if a server&#39;s root directory contains sensitive files whose only protection from the server is being hidden (e.g. `~/.ssh` while serving $HOME), then any authenticated requests could access files if their names are guessable. Such contexts also necessarily have full access to the server and therefore execution permissions, which also generally grants access to all the same files. So this does not generally result in any privilege escalation or increase in information access, only an additional, unintended means by which the files could be accessed. Version 6.4.12 contains a patch for this issue. There are currently no known workarounds.</p> <p><strong>Affected:</strong> PyPI: notebook</p> <p>Jupyter Notebook is a web-based notebook environment for interactive computing. Prior to version 6.4.12, authenticated requests to the notebook server with `ContentsManager.allow_hidden = False` only prevented listing the contents of hidden directories, not accessing individual hidden files or files in hidden directories (i.e. hidden files were &#39;hidden&#39; but not &#39;inaccessible&#39;). This could lead to notebook configurations allowing authenticated access to files that may reasonably be expected to be disallowed. Because fully authenticated requests are required, this is of relatively low impact. But if a server&#39;s root directory contains sensitive files whose only protection from the server is being hidden (e.g. `~/.ssh` while serving $HOME), then any authenticated requests could access files if their names are guessable. Such contexts also necessarily have full access to the server and therefore execution permissions, which also generally grants access to all the same files. So this does not generally result in any privilege escalation or increase in information access, only an additional, unintended means by which the files could be accessed. Version 6.4.12 contains a patch for this issue. There are currently no known workarounds.</p> https://db.gcve.eu/vuln/pysec-2022-212