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    <title>Most recent entries from all</title>
    <link>https://db.gcve.eu</link>
    <description>Contains only the most 10 recent entries.</description>
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    <item>
      <title>CVE-2026-23986 — Copier safe template has arbitrary filesystem write access via directory symlinks when _preserve_symlinks: true</title>
      <link>https://db.gcve.eu/vuln/cve-2026-23986</link>
      <description>&lt;p&gt;&lt;strong&gt;Affected:&lt;/strong&gt; copier-org copier&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;Copier is a library and CLI app for rendering project templates. Prior to version 9.11.2, Copier suggests that it&amp;#39;s safe to generate a project from a safe template, i.e. one that doesn&amp;#39;t use unsafe features like custom Jinja extensions which would require passing the `--UNSAFE,--trust` flag. As it turns out, a safe template can currently write to arbitrary directories outside the destination path by using directory a symlink along with `_preserve_symlinks: true` and a generated directory structure whose rendered path is inside the symlinked directory. This way, a malicious template author can create a template that overwrites arbitrary files (according to the user&amp;#39;s write permissions), e.g., to cause havoc. Version 9.11.2 patches the issue.&lt;/p&gt;</description>
      <content:encoded>&lt;p&gt;&lt;strong&gt;Affected:&lt;/strong&gt; copier-org copier&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;Copier is a library and CLI app for rendering project templates. Prior to version 9.11.2, Copier suggests that it&amp;#39;s safe to generate a project from a safe template, i.e. one that doesn&amp;#39;t use unsafe features like custom Jinja extensions which would require passing the `--UNSAFE,--trust` flag. As it turns out, a safe template can currently write to arbitrary directories outside the destination path by using directory a symlink along with `_preserve_symlinks: true` and a generated directory structure whose rendered path is inside the symlinked directory. This way, a malicious template author can create a template that overwrites arbitrary files (according to the user&amp;#39;s write permissions), e.g., to cause havoc. Version 9.11.2 patches the issue.&lt;/p&gt;</content:encoded>
      <guid isPermaLink="false">https://db.gcve.eu/vuln/cve-2026-23986</guid>
    </item>
    <item>
      <title>GHSA-4fqp-r85r-hxqh — Copier safe template has arbitrary filesystem write access via directory symlinks when _preserve_symlinks: true</title>
      <link>https://db.gcve.eu/vuln/ghsa-4fqp-r85r-hxqh</link>
      <description>&lt;p&gt;&lt;strong&gt;Affected:&lt;/strong&gt; PyPI: copier&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;### Impact&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;Copier suggests that it&amp;#39;s safe to generate a project from a safe template, i.e. one that doesn&amp;#39;t use [unsafe](https://copier.readthedocs.io/en/stable/configuring/#unsafe) features like custom Jinja extensions which would require passing the `--UNSAFE,--trust` flag. As it turns out, a safe template can currently write to arbitrary directories outside the destination path by using directory a symlink along with [`_preserve_symlinks: true`](https://copier.readthedocs.io/en/stable/configuring/#preserve_symlinks) and a [generated directory structure](https://copier.readthedocs.io/en/stable/configuring/#generating-a-directory-structure) whose rendered path is inside the symlinked directory. This way, a malicious template author can create a template that overwrites arbitrary files (according to the user&amp;#39;s write permissions), e.g., to cause havoc.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;&amp;gt; [!NOTE]
&amp;gt;
&amp;gt; At the time of writing, the exploit is non-deterministic, as Copier walks the template&amp;#39;s file tree using [`os.scandir`](https://docs.python.org/3/library/os.html#os.scandir) which yields directory entries in arbitrary order.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;Reproducible example (may or may not work depending on directory entry yield order):&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;```shell
mkdir other/
pushd other/
echo &amp;#34;sensitive&amp;#34; &amp;gt; sensitive.txt
popd&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;mkdir src/
pushd src/
ln -s ../other other
echo &amp;#34;overwritten&amp;#34; &amp;gt; &amp;#34;{{ pathjoin(&amp;#39;other&amp;#39;, &amp;#39;sensitive.txt&amp;#39;) }}.jinja&amp;#34;
echo &amp;#34;_preserve_symlinks: true&amp;#34; &amp;gt; copier.yml
tree .
# .
# ├── copier.yml
# ├── other -&amp;gt; ../other
# └── {{ pathjoin(&amp;#39;othe…&lt;/p&gt;</description>
      <content:encoded>&lt;p&gt;&lt;strong&gt;Affected:&lt;/strong&gt; PyPI: copier&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;### Impact&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;Copier suggests that it&amp;#39;s safe to generate a project from a safe template, i.e. one that doesn&amp;#39;t use [unsafe](https://copier.readthedocs.io/en/stable/configuring/#unsafe) features like custom Jinja extensions which would require passing the `--UNSAFE,--trust` flag. As it turns out, a safe template can currently write to arbitrary directories outside the destination path by using directory a symlink along with [`_preserve_symlinks: true`](https://copier.readthedocs.io/en/stable/configuring/#preserve_symlinks) and a [generated directory structure](https://copier.readthedocs.io/en/stable/configuring/#generating-a-directory-structure) whose rendered path is inside the symlinked directory. This way, a malicious template author can create a template that overwrites arbitrary files (according to the user&amp;#39;s write permissions), e.g., to cause havoc.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;&amp;gt; [!NOTE]
&amp;gt;
&amp;gt; At the time of writing, the exploit is non-deterministic, as Copier walks the template&amp;#39;s file tree using [`os.scandir`](https://docs.python.org/3/library/os.html#os.scandir) which yields directory entries in arbitrary order.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;Reproducible example (may or may not work depending on directory entry yield order):&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;```shell
mkdir other/
pushd other/
echo &amp;#34;sensitive&amp;#34; &amp;gt; sensitive.txt
popd&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;mkdir src/
pushd src/
ln -s ../other other
echo &amp;#34;overwritten&amp;#34; &amp;gt; &amp;#34;{{ pathjoin(&amp;#39;other&amp;#39;, &amp;#39;sensitive.txt&amp;#39;) }}.jinja&amp;#34;
echo &amp;#34;_preserve_symlinks: true&amp;#34; &amp;gt; copier.yml
tree .
# .
# ├── copier.yml
# ├── other -&amp;gt; ../other
# └── {{ pathjoin(&amp;#39;othe…&lt;/p&gt;</content:encoded>
      <guid isPermaLink="false">https://db.gcve.eu/vuln/ghsa-4fqp-r85r-hxqh</guid>
    </item>
    <item>
      <title>PYSEC-2026-1272 — Copier safe template has arbitrary filesystem write access via directory symlinks when _preserve_symlinks: true</title>
      <link>https://db.gcve.eu/vuln/pysec-2026-1272</link>
      <description>&lt;p&gt;&lt;strong&gt;Affected:&lt;/strong&gt; PyPI: copier&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;### Impact&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;Copier suggests that it&amp;#39;s safe to generate a project from a safe template, i.e. one that doesn&amp;#39;t use [unsafe](https://copier.readthedocs.io/en/stable/configuring/#unsafe) features like custom Jinja extensions which would require passing the `--UNSAFE,--trust` flag. As it turns out, a safe template can currently write to arbitrary directories outside the destination path by using directory a symlink along with [`_preserve_symlinks: true`](https://copier.readthedocs.io/en/stable/configuring/#preserve_symlinks) and a [generated directory structure](https://copier.readthedocs.io/en/stable/configuring/#generating-a-directory-structure) whose rendered path is inside the symlinked directory. This way, a malicious template author can create a template that overwrites arbitrary files (according to the user&amp;#39;s write permissions), e.g., to cause havoc.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;&amp;gt; [!NOTE]
&amp;gt;
&amp;gt; At the time of writing, the exploit is non-deterministic, as Copier walks the template&amp;#39;s file tree using [`os.scandir`](https://docs.python.org/3/library/os.html#os.scandir) which yields directory entries in arbitrary order.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;Reproducible example (may or may not work depending on directory entry yield order):&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;```shell
mkdir other/
pushd other/
echo &amp;#34;sensitive&amp;#34; &amp;gt; sensitive.txt
popd&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;mkdir src/
pushd src/
ln -s ../other other
echo &amp;#34;overwritten&amp;#34; &amp;gt; &amp;#34;{{ pathjoin(&amp;#39;other&amp;#39;, &amp;#39;sensitive.txt&amp;#39;) }}.jinja&amp;#34;
echo &amp;#34;_preserve_symlinks: true&amp;#34; &amp;gt; copier.yml
tree .
# .
# ├── copier.yml
# ├── other -&amp;gt; ../other
# └── {{ pathjoin(&amp;#39;othe…&lt;/p&gt;</description>
      <content:encoded>&lt;p&gt;&lt;strong&gt;Affected:&lt;/strong&gt; PyPI: copier&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;### Impact&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;Copier suggests that it&amp;#39;s safe to generate a project from a safe template, i.e. one that doesn&amp;#39;t use [unsafe](https://copier.readthedocs.io/en/stable/configuring/#unsafe) features like custom Jinja extensions which would require passing the `--UNSAFE,--trust` flag. As it turns out, a safe template can currently write to arbitrary directories outside the destination path by using directory a symlink along with [`_preserve_symlinks: true`](https://copier.readthedocs.io/en/stable/configuring/#preserve_symlinks) and a [generated directory structure](https://copier.readthedocs.io/en/stable/configuring/#generating-a-directory-structure) whose rendered path is inside the symlinked directory. This way, a malicious template author can create a template that overwrites arbitrary files (according to the user&amp;#39;s write permissions), e.g., to cause havoc.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;&amp;gt; [!NOTE]
&amp;gt;
&amp;gt; At the time of writing, the exploit is non-deterministic, as Copier walks the template&amp;#39;s file tree using [`os.scandir`](https://docs.python.org/3/library/os.html#os.scandir) which yields directory entries in arbitrary order.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;Reproducible example (may or may not work depending on directory entry yield order):&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;```shell
mkdir other/
pushd other/
echo &amp;#34;sensitive&amp;#34; &amp;gt; sensitive.txt
popd&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;mkdir src/
pushd src/
ln -s ../other other
echo &amp;#34;overwritten&amp;#34; &amp;gt; &amp;#34;{{ pathjoin(&amp;#39;other&amp;#39;, &amp;#39;sensitive.txt&amp;#39;) }}.jinja&amp;#34;
echo &amp;#34;_preserve_symlinks: true&amp;#34; &amp;gt; copier.yml
tree .
# .
# ├── copier.yml
# ├── other -&amp;gt; ../other
# └── {{ pathjoin(&amp;#39;othe…&lt;/p&gt;</content:encoded>
      <guid isPermaLink="false">https://db.gcve.eu/vuln/pysec-2026-1272</guid>
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