https://db.gcve.eu Contains only the most 10 recent entries. http://www.rssboard.org/rss-specification python-feedgen en Sat, 03 Oct 2026 05:59:55 +0000 https://db.gcve.eu/vuln/cve-2026-23968 <p><strong>Affected:</strong> copier-org copier</p> <p>Copier is a library and CLI app for rendering project templates. Prior to version 9.11.2, Copier suggests that it&#39;s safe to generate a project from a safe template, i.e. one that doesn&#39;t use unsafe features like custom Jinja extensions which would require passing the `--UNSAFE,--trust` flag. As it turns out, a safe template can currently include arbitrary files/directories outside the local template clone location by using symlinks along with `_preserve_symlinks: false` (which is Copier&#39;s default setting). Version 9.11.2 patches the issue.</p> <p><strong>Affected:</strong> copier-org copier</p> <p>Copier is a library and CLI app for rendering project templates. Prior to version 9.11.2, Copier suggests that it&#39;s safe to generate a project from a safe template, i.e. one that doesn&#39;t use unsafe features like custom Jinja extensions which would require passing the `--UNSAFE,--trust` flag. As it turns out, a safe template can currently include arbitrary files/directories outside the local template clone location by using symlinks along with `_preserve_symlinks: false` (which is Copier&#39;s default setting). Version 9.11.2 patches the issue.</p> https://db.gcve.eu/vuln/cve-2026-23968 https://db.gcve.eu/vuln/ghsa-xjhm-gp88-8pfx <p><strong>Affected:</strong> PyPI: copier</p> <p>### Impact</p> <p>Copier suggests that it&#39;s safe to generate a project from a safe template, i.e. one that doesn&#39;t use [unsafe](https://copier.readthedocs.io/en/stable/configuring/#unsafe) features like custom Jinja extensions which would require passing the `--UNSAFE,--trust` flag. As it turns out, a safe template can currently include arbitrary files/directories outside the local template clone location by using symlinks along with [`_preserve_symlinks: false`](https://copier.readthedocs.io/en/stable/configuring/#preserve_symlinks) (which is Copier&#39;s default setting).</p> <p>Imagine, e.g., a malicious template author who creates a template that reads SSH keys or other secrets from well-known locations and hopes for a user to push the generated project to a public location like [github.com](https://github.com/) where the template author can extract the secrets.</p> <p>Reproducible example:</p> <p>- Illegally include a file in the generated project via symlink resolution:</p> <p>```shell echo &#34;s3cr3t&#34; &gt; secret.txt</p> <p>mkdir src/ pushd src/ ln -s ../secret.txt stolen-secret.txt popd</p> <p>uvx copier copy src/ dst/</p> <p>cat dst/stolen-secret.txt #s3cr3t ```</p> <p>- Illegally include a directory in the generated project via symlink resolution:</p> <p>```shell mkdir secrets/ pushd secrets/ echo &#34;s3cr3t&#34; &gt; secret.txt popd</p> <p>mkdir src/ pushd src/ ln -s ../secrets stolen-secrets popd</p> <p>uvx copier copy src/ dst/</p> <p>tree dst/ # dst/ # └── stolen-se…</p> <p><strong>Affected:</strong> PyPI: copier</p> <p>### Impact</p> <p>Copier suggests that it&#39;s safe to generate a project from a safe template, i.e. one that doesn&#39;t use [unsafe](https://copier.readthedocs.io/en/stable/configuring/#unsafe) features like custom Jinja extensions which would require passing the `--UNSAFE,--trust` flag. As it turns out, a safe template can currently include arbitrary files/directories outside the local template clone location by using symlinks along with [`_preserve_symlinks: false`](https://copier.readthedocs.io/en/stable/configuring/#preserve_symlinks) (which is Copier&#39;s default setting).</p> <p>Imagine, e.g., a malicious template author who creates a template that reads SSH keys or other secrets from well-known locations and hopes for a user to push the generated project to a public location like [github.com](https://github.com/) where the template author can extract the secrets.</p> <p>Reproducible example:</p> <p>- Illegally include a file in the generated project via symlink resolution:</p> <p>```shell echo &#34;s3cr3t&#34; &gt; secret.txt</p> <p>mkdir src/ pushd src/ ln -s ../secret.txt stolen-secret.txt popd</p> <p>uvx copier copy src/ dst/</p> <p>cat dst/stolen-secret.txt #s3cr3t ```</p> <p>- Illegally include a directory in the generated project via symlink resolution:</p> <p>```shell mkdir secrets/ pushd secrets/ echo &#34;s3cr3t&#34; &gt; secret.txt popd</p> <p>mkdir src/ pushd src/ ln -s ../secrets stolen-secrets popd</p> <p>uvx copier copy src/ dst/</p> <p>tree dst/ # dst/ # └── stolen-se…</p> https://db.gcve.eu/vuln/ghsa-xjhm-gp88-8pfx https://db.gcve.eu/vuln/pysec-2026-1274 <p><strong>Affected:</strong> PyPI: copier</p> <p>### Impact</p> <p>Copier suggests that it&#39;s safe to generate a project from a safe template, i.e. one that doesn&#39;t use [unsafe](https://copier.readthedocs.io/en/stable/configuring/#unsafe) features like custom Jinja extensions which would require passing the `--UNSAFE,--trust` flag. As it turns out, a safe template can currently include arbitrary files/directories outside the local template clone location by using symlinks along with [`_preserve_symlinks: false`](https://copier.readthedocs.io/en/stable/configuring/#preserve_symlinks) (which is Copier&#39;s default setting).</p> <p>Imagine, e.g., a malicious template author who creates a template that reads SSH keys or other secrets from well-known locations and hopes for a user to push the generated project to a public location like [github.com](https://github.com/) where the template author can extract the secrets.</p> <p>Reproducible example:</p> <p>- Illegally include a file in the generated project via symlink resolution:</p> <p>```shell echo &#34;s3cr3t&#34; &gt; secret.txt</p> <p>mkdir src/ pushd src/ ln -s ../secret.txt stolen-secret.txt popd</p> <p>uvx copier copy src/ dst/</p> <p>cat dst/stolen-secret.txt #s3cr3t ```</p> <p>- Illegally include a directory in the generated project via symlink resolution:</p> <p>```shell mkdir secrets/ pushd secrets/ echo &#34;s3cr3t&#34; &gt; secret.txt popd</p> <p>mkdir src/ pushd src/ ln -s ../secrets stolen-secrets popd</p> <p>uvx copier copy src/ dst/</p> <p>tree dst/ # dst/ # └── stolen-se…</p> <p><strong>Affected:</strong> PyPI: copier</p> <p>### Impact</p> <p>Copier suggests that it&#39;s safe to generate a project from a safe template, i.e. one that doesn&#39;t use [unsafe](https://copier.readthedocs.io/en/stable/configuring/#unsafe) features like custom Jinja extensions which would require passing the `--UNSAFE,--trust` flag. As it turns out, a safe template can currently include arbitrary files/directories outside the local template clone location by using symlinks along with [`_preserve_symlinks: false`](https://copier.readthedocs.io/en/stable/configuring/#preserve_symlinks) (which is Copier&#39;s default setting).</p> <p>Imagine, e.g., a malicious template author who creates a template that reads SSH keys or other secrets from well-known locations and hopes for a user to push the generated project to a public location like [github.com](https://github.com/) where the template author can extract the secrets.</p> <p>Reproducible example:</p> <p>- Illegally include a file in the generated project via symlink resolution:</p> <p>```shell echo &#34;s3cr3t&#34; &gt; secret.txt</p> <p>mkdir src/ pushd src/ ln -s ../secret.txt stolen-secret.txt popd</p> <p>uvx copier copy src/ dst/</p> <p>cat dst/stolen-secret.txt #s3cr3t ```</p> <p>- Illegally include a directory in the generated project via symlink resolution:</p> <p>```shell mkdir secrets/ pushd secrets/ echo &#34;s3cr3t&#34; &gt; secret.txt popd</p> <p>mkdir src/ pushd src/ ln -s ../secrets stolen-secrets popd</p> <p>uvx copier copy src/ dst/</p> <p>tree dst/ # dst/ # └── stolen-se…</p> https://db.gcve.eu/vuln/pysec-2026-1274