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    <title>Most recent entries from all</title>
    <link>https://db.gcve.eu</link>
    <description>Contains only the most 10 recent entries.</description>
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      <title>CVE-2026-110858 — GitPython 3.1.30 before 3.2.0 Command Injection via Remote.pull() Refspec</title>
      <link>https://db.gcve.eu/vuln/cve-2026-110858</link>
      <description>&lt;p&gt;&lt;strong&gt;Affected:&lt;/strong&gt; gitpython-developers GitPython&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;GitPython from 3.1.30 before 3.2.0 contains a remote code execution vulnerability in Remote.pull() whose unsafe-option guard inspects only keyword arguments, not the positional refspec. Attackers controlling the refspec can supply --upload-pack=&amp;lt;command&amp;gt; to execute OS commands as the calling process over local-path or SSH transports.&lt;/p&gt;</description>
      <content:encoded>&lt;p&gt;&lt;strong&gt;Affected:&lt;/strong&gt; gitpython-developers GitPython&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;GitPython from 3.1.30 before 3.2.0 contains a remote code execution vulnerability in Remote.pull() whose unsafe-option guard inspects only keyword arguments, not the positional refspec. Attackers controlling the refspec can supply --upload-pack=&amp;lt;command&amp;gt; to execute OS commands as the calling process over local-path or SSH transports.&lt;/p&gt;</content:encoded>
      <guid isPermaLink="false">https://db.gcve.eu/vuln/cve-2026-110858</guid>
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    <item>
      <title>GHSA-f9j4-qggq-h239 — GitPython Remote.pull() refspec bypasses the --upload-pack unsafe-option guard, enabling arbitrary command execution</title>
      <link>https://db.gcve.eu/vuln/ghsa-f9j4-qggq-h239</link>
      <description>&lt;p&gt;&lt;strong&gt;Affected:&lt;/strong&gt; PyPI: GitPython&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;## Summary&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;`Remote.pull()` in GitPython forwards its positional `refspec` argument directly to the `git pull` child process while its unsafe-option guard inspects only keyword arguments. An application that passes attacker-influenced data as the `refspec` (for example a user-supplied branch or refspec parameter in a web or CI service) can supply an option-shaped value such as `--upload-pack=&amp;lt;command&amp;gt;`. The value bypasses the `unsafe_git_pull_options` check, is placed after the `--` separator on the `git pull` command line, and is executed as the upload-pack program for local-path or SSH transports. This yields arbitrary command execution with the privileges of the calling process using the documented default arguments (`allow_unsafe_options=False`).&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;## Root Cause&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;`Remote.pull()` is documented to reject dangerous options unless `allow_unsafe_options=True`, and `--upload-pack` is explicitly listed as such an option. The guard, however, only screens keyword arguments and never the positional `refspec`. The check builds its candidate list with `Git._option_candidates([], kwargs)`, passing an empty list in place of the positionals, so the `refspec` value is never compared against `unsafe_git_pull_options = [&amp;#34;--upload-pack&amp;#34;]`. The normalized `refspec` is then forwarded verbatim to the `git pull` invocation. The leading `--` separator that neutralizes an option-shaped refspec for `git fetch` and `git push` does not protect `git pull`, because `git pull` re-forwards its trailing…&lt;/p&gt;</description>
      <content:encoded>&lt;p&gt;&lt;strong&gt;Affected:&lt;/strong&gt; PyPI: GitPython&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;## Summary&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;`Remote.pull()` in GitPython forwards its positional `refspec` argument directly to the `git pull` child process while its unsafe-option guard inspects only keyword arguments. An application that passes attacker-influenced data as the `refspec` (for example a user-supplied branch or refspec parameter in a web or CI service) can supply an option-shaped value such as `--upload-pack=&amp;lt;command&amp;gt;`. The value bypasses the `unsafe_git_pull_options` check, is placed after the `--` separator on the `git pull` command line, and is executed as the upload-pack program for local-path or SSH transports. This yields arbitrary command execution with the privileges of the calling process using the documented default arguments (`allow_unsafe_options=False`).&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;## Root Cause&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;`Remote.pull()` is documented to reject dangerous options unless `allow_unsafe_options=True`, and `--upload-pack` is explicitly listed as such an option. The guard, however, only screens keyword arguments and never the positional `refspec`. The check builds its candidate list with `Git._option_candidates([], kwargs)`, passing an empty list in place of the positionals, so the `refspec` value is never compared against `unsafe_git_pull_options = [&amp;#34;--upload-pack&amp;#34;]`. The normalized `refspec` is then forwarded verbatim to the `git pull` invocation. The leading `--` separator that neutralizes an option-shaped refspec for `git fetch` and `git push` does not protect `git pull`, because `git pull` re-forwards its trailing…&lt;/p&gt;</content:encoded>
      <guid isPermaLink="false">https://db.gcve.eu/vuln/ghsa-f9j4-qggq-h239</guid>
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