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    <lastBuildDate>Thu, 01 Oct 2026 13:38:36 +0000</lastBuildDate>
    <item>
      <title>CVE-2026-102937 — virtualenv: Command injection via --prompt in activate.bat (batch activator)</title>
      <link>https://db.gcve.eu/vuln/cve-2026-102937</link>
      <description>&lt;p&gt;&lt;strong&gt;Affected:&lt;/strong&gt; pypa virtualenv&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;virtualenv is a tool for creating isolated virtual python environments. Prior to 21.7.12, BatchActivator.quote() returns prompt text unchanged before activate.bat inserts it into a cmd.exe set &amp;#34;VAR=value&amp;#34; statement. An attacker who influences --prompt, VIRTUALENV_PROMPT, or the corresponding configuration value can include a double quote that closes the assignment and leaves following cmd.exe operators as executable syntax. When a user activates the generated Windows environment, the injected commands run with that user&amp;#39;s privileges. This issue is fixed in version 21.7.12.&lt;/p&gt;</description>
      <content:encoded>&lt;p&gt;&lt;strong&gt;Affected:&lt;/strong&gt; pypa virtualenv&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;virtualenv is a tool for creating isolated virtual python environments. Prior to 21.7.12, BatchActivator.quote() returns prompt text unchanged before activate.bat inserts it into a cmd.exe set &amp;#34;VAR=value&amp;#34; statement. An attacker who influences --prompt, VIRTUALENV_PROMPT, or the corresponding configuration value can include a double quote that closes the assignment and leaves following cmd.exe operators as executable syntax. When a user activates the generated Windows environment, the injected commands run with that user&amp;#39;s privileges. This issue is fixed in version 21.7.12.&lt;/p&gt;</content:encoded>
      <guid isPermaLink="false">https://db.gcve.eu/vuln/cve-2026-102937</guid>
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    <item>
      <title>PYSEC-2026-4014 — Command injection via --prompt in activate.bat (batch activator)</title>
      <link>https://db.gcve.eu/vuln/pysec-2026-4014</link>
      <description>&lt;p&gt;&lt;strong&gt;Affected:&lt;/strong&gt; PyPI: virtualenv&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;`BatchActivator.quote()` returned its input unchanged, the only activator with
no escaping at all. `--prompt`, the `VIRTUALENV_PROMPT` environment variable,
and the config file all set the prompt, and `activate.bat` writes it straight
into `@set &amp;#34;VAR=value&amp;#34;`. A prompt containing a double quote closes that string
early, and whatever follows runs as live cmd.exe syntax. For example, a venv
created with `--prompt &amp;#39;x&amp;#34; &amp;amp; calc &amp;amp; &amp;#34;&amp;#39;` runs `calc` the moment someone runs
`activate.bat`.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;Anyone who templates a prompt from untrusted input (a CI job using a branch
name, a wrapper script deriving an environment name from user input) hands an
attacker code execution in the shell of anyone who activates the resulting venv
on Windows.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;Fixed in 21.7.12 by escaping the characters cmd.exe treats as live syntax
inside this construct.&lt;/p&gt;</description>
      <content:encoded>&lt;p&gt;&lt;strong&gt;Affected:&lt;/strong&gt; PyPI: virtualenv&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;`BatchActivator.quote()` returned its input unchanged, the only activator with
no escaping at all. `--prompt`, the `VIRTUALENV_PROMPT` environment variable,
and the config file all set the prompt, and `activate.bat` writes it straight
into `@set &amp;#34;VAR=value&amp;#34;`. A prompt containing a double quote closes that string
early, and whatever follows runs as live cmd.exe syntax. For example, a venv
created with `--prompt &amp;#39;x&amp;#34; &amp;amp; calc &amp;amp; &amp;#34;&amp;#39;` runs `calc` the moment someone runs
`activate.bat`.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;Anyone who templates a prompt from untrusted input (a CI job using a branch
name, a wrapper script deriving an environment name from user input) hands an
attacker code execution in the shell of anyone who activates the resulting venv
on Windows.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;Fixed in 21.7.12 by escaping the characters cmd.exe treats as live syntax
inside this construct.&lt;/p&gt;</content:encoded>
      <guid isPermaLink="false">https://db.gcve.eu/vuln/pysec-2026-4014</guid>
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