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    <title>Most recent entries from all</title>
    <link>https://db.gcve.eu</link>
    <description>Contains only the most 10 recent entries.</description>
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    <item>
      <title>BIT-virtualenv-2026-113715 — virtualenv: Venv configuration readback can reinterpret path boundaries</title>
      <link>https://db.gcve.eu/vuln/bit-virtualenv-2026-113715</link>
      <description>&lt;p&gt;&lt;strong&gt;Affected:&lt;/strong&gt; Bitnami: virtualenv&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;virtualenv is a tool for creating isolated virtual python environments. Prior to 21.14.9, the stdlib venv creator reads generated pyvenv.cfg with str.splitlines() and merges parsed keys over virtualenv&amp;#39;s selected configuration. An untrusted caller who influences the destination pathname can include a line-boundary character such as U+2028 to inject keys including home and include-system-site-packages, causing path data to change configuration structure before final output. Setting include-system-site-packages to true weakens environment isolation, while an altered home can change which standard-library files the interpreter loads if the attacker also controls that location. The builtin creator does not use this readback path. This issue is fixed in version 21.14.9.&lt;/p&gt;</description>
      <content:encoded>&lt;p&gt;&lt;strong&gt;Affected:&lt;/strong&gt; Bitnami: virtualenv&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;virtualenv is a tool for creating isolated virtual python environments. Prior to 21.14.9, the stdlib venv creator reads generated pyvenv.cfg with str.splitlines() and merges parsed keys over virtualenv&amp;#39;s selected configuration. An untrusted caller who influences the destination pathname can include a line-boundary character such as U+2028 to inject keys including home and include-system-site-packages, causing path data to change configuration structure before final output. Setting include-system-site-packages to true weakens environment isolation, while an altered home can change which standard-library files the interpreter loads if the attacker also controls that location. The builtin creator does not use this readback path. This issue is fixed in version 21.14.9.&lt;/p&gt;</content:encoded>
      <guid isPermaLink="false">https://db.gcve.eu/vuln/bit-virtualenv-2026-113715</guid>
    </item>
    <item>
      <title>CVE-2026-113715 — virtualenv: Venv configuration readback can reinterpret path boundaries</title>
      <link>https://db.gcve.eu/vuln/cve-2026-113715</link>
      <description>&lt;p&gt;&lt;strong&gt;Affected:&lt;/strong&gt; pypa virtualenv&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;virtualenv is a tool for creating isolated virtual python environments. Prior to 21.14.9, the stdlib venv creator reads generated pyvenv.cfg with str.splitlines() and merges parsed keys over virtualenv&amp;#39;s selected configuration. An untrusted caller who influences the destination pathname can include a line-boundary character such as U+2028 to inject keys including home and include-system-site-packages, causing path data to change configuration structure before final output. Setting include-system-site-packages to true weakens environment isolation, while an altered home can change which standard-library files the interpreter loads if the attacker also controls that location. The builtin creator does not use this readback path. This issue is fixed in version 21.14.9.&lt;/p&gt;</description>
      <content:encoded>&lt;p&gt;&lt;strong&gt;Affected:&lt;/strong&gt; pypa virtualenv&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;virtualenv is a tool for creating isolated virtual python environments. Prior to 21.14.9, the stdlib venv creator reads generated pyvenv.cfg with str.splitlines() and merges parsed keys over virtualenv&amp;#39;s selected configuration. An untrusted caller who influences the destination pathname can include a line-boundary character such as U+2028 to inject keys including home and include-system-site-packages, causing path data to change configuration structure before final output. Setting include-system-site-packages to true weakens environment isolation, while an altered home can change which standard-library files the interpreter loads if the attacker also controls that location. The builtin creator does not use this readback path. This issue is fixed in version 21.14.9.&lt;/p&gt;</content:encoded>
      <guid isPermaLink="false">https://db.gcve.eu/vuln/cve-2026-113715</guid>
    </item>
    <item>
      <title>GHSA-qmx5-4p3x-wvqf — virtualenv: Venv configuration readback can reinterpret path boundaries</title>
      <link>https://db.gcve.eu/vuln/ghsa-qmx5-4p3x-wvqf</link>
      <description>&lt;p&gt;&lt;strong&gt;Affected:&lt;/strong&gt; PyPI: virtualenv&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;## Summary&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;The venv creator reads the standard library&amp;#39;s generated pyvenv.cfg with splitlines() and merges all resulting keys over
virtualenv&amp;#39;s configuration. Line-boundary characters from destination data can therefore become configuration structure
before output sanitization.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;Anthropic&amp;#39;s OSS Scanner reported this as `ANT-2026-6ZQHJ6VI` in `virtualenv-20261015-005`, received on 15 October 2026.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;## Affected area&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;Configuration readback by the stdlib venv creator.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;## Attacker-controlled input&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;An untrusted caller must influence the destination pathname passed to the venv creator. That pathname must contain a
character that Python treats as a line boundary. The builtin creator follows a different configuration-writing path.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;## Affected code&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;The relevant 21.14.8 source is in
[venv readback](https://github.com/pypa/virtualenv/blob/a795ab116356afde11039cf2763d77e8a06da738/src/virtualenv/create/via_global_ref/venv.py),
[configuration parser](https://github.com/pypa/virtualenv/blob/a795ab116356afde11039cf2763d77e8a06da738/src/virtualenv/create/pyenv_cfg.py).&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;## Mechanism&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;With `--creator venv`, virtualenv asks the standard library to create an environment, reads its `pyvenv.cfg` with
`str.splitlines()`, and merges the parsed keys over virtualenv&amp;#39;s chosen settings. CPython writes the destination into a
`command =` value without escaping every character that `splitlines()` recognizes as a line boundary. A destination
containing U+2028, for example, can therefore supply new `ho…&lt;/p&gt;</description>
      <content:encoded>&lt;p&gt;&lt;strong&gt;Affected:&lt;/strong&gt; PyPI: virtualenv&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;## Summary&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;The venv creator reads the standard library&amp;#39;s generated pyvenv.cfg with splitlines() and merges all resulting keys over
virtualenv&amp;#39;s configuration. Line-boundary characters from destination data can therefore become configuration structure
before output sanitization.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;Anthropic&amp;#39;s OSS Scanner reported this as `ANT-2026-6ZQHJ6VI` in `virtualenv-20261015-005`, received on 15 October 2026.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;## Affected area&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;Configuration readback by the stdlib venv creator.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;## Attacker-controlled input&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;An untrusted caller must influence the destination pathname passed to the venv creator. That pathname must contain a
character that Python treats as a line boundary. The builtin creator follows a different configuration-writing path.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;## Affected code&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;The relevant 21.14.8 source is in
[venv readback](https://github.com/pypa/virtualenv/blob/a795ab116356afde11039cf2763d77e8a06da738/src/virtualenv/create/via_global_ref/venv.py),
[configuration parser](https://github.com/pypa/virtualenv/blob/a795ab116356afde11039cf2763d77e8a06da738/src/virtualenv/create/pyenv_cfg.py).&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;## Mechanism&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;With `--creator venv`, virtualenv asks the standard library to create an environment, reads its `pyvenv.cfg` with
`str.splitlines()`, and merges the parsed keys over virtualenv&amp;#39;s chosen settings. CPython writes the destination into a
`command =` value without escaping every character that `splitlines()` recognizes as a line boundary. A destination
containing U+2028, for example, can therefore supply new `ho…&lt;/p&gt;</content:encoded>
      <guid isPermaLink="false">https://db.gcve.eu/vuln/ghsa-qmx5-4p3x-wvqf</guid>
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