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      <title>GHSA-69x8-hrgq-fjj8 — LiteLLM: Password hash exposure and pass-the-hash authentication bypass</title>
      <link>https://db.gcve.eu/vuln/ghsa-69x8-hrgq-fjj8</link>
      <description>&lt;p&gt;&lt;strong&gt;Affected:&lt;/strong&gt; PyPI: litellm&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;### Impact&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;Three issues combine into a full authentication bypass chain:&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;1. Weak hashing: User passwords are stored as unsalted SHA-256 hashes, making them vulnerable to rainbow table attacks and trivially identifying users with identical passwords.
2. Hash exposure: Multiple API endpoints (/user/info, /user/update, /spend/users) return the password hash field in responses to any authenticated user regardless of role. Plaintext passwords could also potentially be exposed in certain scenarios.
4. Pass-the-hash: The /v2/login endpoint accepts the raw SHA-256 hash as a valid password without re-hashing, allowing direct login with a stolen&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;An already authenticated user can retrieve another user&amp;#39;s password hash from the API and use it to log in as that user. This enables full privilege escalation in three HTTP requests.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;### Patches&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;Fixed in v1.83.0. Passwords are now hashed with scrypt (random 16-byte salt, n=16384, r=8, p=1). Password hashes are stripped from all API responses. Existing SHA-256 hashes are transparently migrated on next login.&lt;/p&gt;</description>
      <content:encoded>&lt;p&gt;&lt;strong&gt;Affected:&lt;/strong&gt; PyPI: litellm&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;### Impact&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;Three issues combine into a full authentication bypass chain:&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;1. Weak hashing: User passwords are stored as unsalted SHA-256 hashes, making them vulnerable to rainbow table attacks and trivially identifying users with identical passwords.
2. Hash exposure: Multiple API endpoints (/user/info, /user/update, /spend/users) return the password hash field in responses to any authenticated user regardless of role. Plaintext passwords could also potentially be exposed in certain scenarios.
4. Pass-the-hash: The /v2/login endpoint accepts the raw SHA-256 hash as a valid password without re-hashing, allowing direct login with a stolen&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;An already authenticated user can retrieve another user&amp;#39;s password hash from the API and use it to log in as that user. This enables full privilege escalation in three HTTP requests.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;### Patches&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;Fixed in v1.83.0. Passwords are now hashed with scrypt (random 16-byte salt, n=16384, r=8, p=1). Password hashes are stripped from all API responses. Existing SHA-256 hashes are transparently migrated on next login.&lt;/p&gt;</content:encoded>
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