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    <title>Most recent entries from all</title>
    <link>https://db.gcve.eu</link>
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    <lastBuildDate>Tue, 17 Nov 2026 15:32:47 +0000</lastBuildDate>
    <item>
      <title>CVE-2026-79783 — rclone before 1.74.4 Privilege Escalation via setuid Metadata</title>
      <link>https://db.gcve.eu/vuln/cve-2026-79783</link>
      <description>&lt;p&gt;&lt;strong&gt;Affected:&lt;/strong&gt; rclone&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;rclone before 1.74.4 fails to mask special permission bits when applying source-supplied mode metadata in the local backend, allowing attackers to set setuid/setgid bits on attacker-controlled files. When copying with metadata preservation from an untrusted remote, attackers can plant a setuid binary that escalates privileges to root if rclone runs as root, or to the service account user otherwise.&lt;/p&gt;</description>
      <content:encoded>&lt;p&gt;&lt;strong&gt;Affected:&lt;/strong&gt; rclone&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;rclone before 1.74.4 fails to mask special permission bits when applying source-supplied mode metadata in the local backend, allowing attackers to set setuid/setgid bits on attacker-controlled files. When copying with metadata preservation from an untrusted remote, attackers can plant a setuid binary that escalates privileges to root if rclone runs as root, or to the service account user otherwise.&lt;/p&gt;</content:encoded>
      <guid isPermaLink="false">https://db.gcve.eu/vuln/cve-2026-79783</guid>
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    <item>
      <title>GHSA-945v-v9p3-v5xw — rclone local `--metadata` applies attacker-controlled mode/uid - setuid binary planted from an untrusted remote</title>
      <link>https://db.gcve.eu/vuln/ghsa-945v-v9p3-v5xw</link>
      <description>&lt;p&gt;&lt;strong&gt;Affected:&lt;/strong&gt; Go: github.com/rclone/rclone&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;### Summary
When writing an object with metadata, the local backend applies the source-supplied `mode`, `uid`, and `gid` verbatim: it parses `mode` as an octal integer and passes it straight into `os.Chmod(o.path, os.FileMode(umode))`, and passes `uid`/`gid` straight into `os.Chown`. The value is never masked to permission bits, so any value with Go&amp;#39;s `ModeSetuid` (1&amp;lt;&amp;lt;23) or `ModeSetgid` (1&amp;lt;&amp;lt;22) bit set causes the setuid/setgid bit to be applied. Because both the file content and its metadata come from the (attacker-controlled) source remote, an attacker stores a binary of their choosing with `mode = 40000755` (and `uid = 0`); when the victim runs `rclone copy -M &amp;lt;remote&amp;gt;: /dest`, rclone writes the attacker&amp;#39;s binary and makes it setuid. If the victim runs rclone as root (typical for system backup/restore), the `uid=0` chown plus setuid produces a root-owned setuid binary with attacker content — any local user then escalates to root. When rclone runs as a non-root service user, the planted setuid binary is owned by that user, giving any local user that user&amp;#39;s privileges (lateral escalation / persistent backdoor).&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;### Details
`backend/local/metadata.go`, `writeMetadataToFile()`:
```go
uid, hasUID := o.parseMetadataInt(m, &amp;#34;uid&amp;#34;, 10)
gid, hasGID := o.parseMetadataInt(m, &amp;#34;gid&amp;#34;, 10)
if hasUID {
    ...
    err = os.Chown(o.path, uid, gid)        // source-controlled owner, no same-uid guard
}
mode, hasMode := o.parseMetadataInt(m, &amp;#34;mode&amp;#34;, 8)
if hasMode &amp;amp;&amp;amp; mode &amp;gt;= 0 {
    umode :=…&lt;/p&gt;</description>
      <content:encoded>&lt;p&gt;&lt;strong&gt;Affected:&lt;/strong&gt; Go: github.com/rclone/rclone&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;### Summary
When writing an object with metadata, the local backend applies the source-supplied `mode`, `uid`, and `gid` verbatim: it parses `mode` as an octal integer and passes it straight into `os.Chmod(o.path, os.FileMode(umode))`, and passes `uid`/`gid` straight into `os.Chown`. The value is never masked to permission bits, so any value with Go&amp;#39;s `ModeSetuid` (1&amp;lt;&amp;lt;23) or `ModeSetgid` (1&amp;lt;&amp;lt;22) bit set causes the setuid/setgid bit to be applied. Because both the file content and its metadata come from the (attacker-controlled) source remote, an attacker stores a binary of their choosing with `mode = 40000755` (and `uid = 0`); when the victim runs `rclone copy -M &amp;lt;remote&amp;gt;: /dest`, rclone writes the attacker&amp;#39;s binary and makes it setuid. If the victim runs rclone as root (typical for system backup/restore), the `uid=0` chown plus setuid produces a root-owned setuid binary with attacker content — any local user then escalates to root. When rclone runs as a non-root service user, the planted setuid binary is owned by that user, giving any local user that user&amp;#39;s privileges (lateral escalation / persistent backdoor).&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;### Details
`backend/local/metadata.go`, `writeMetadataToFile()`:
```go
uid, hasUID := o.parseMetadataInt(m, &amp;#34;uid&amp;#34;, 10)
gid, hasGID := o.parseMetadataInt(m, &amp;#34;gid&amp;#34;, 10)
if hasUID {
    ...
    err = os.Chown(o.path, uid, gid)        // source-controlled owner, no same-uid guard
}
mode, hasMode := o.parseMetadataInt(m, &amp;#34;mode&amp;#34;, 8)
if hasMode &amp;amp;&amp;amp; mode &amp;gt;= 0 {
    umode :=…&lt;/p&gt;</content:encoded>
      <guid isPermaLink="false">https://db.gcve.eu/vuln/ghsa-945v-v9p3-v5xw</guid>
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