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    <title>Most recent entries from all</title>
    <link>https://db.gcve.eu</link>
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    <lastBuildDate>Mon, 16 Nov 2026 09:29:26 +0000</lastBuildDate>
    <item>
      <title>CVE-2026-79782 — rclone before 1.74.4 Security Token Disclosure via HTTPS to HTTP Redirect</title>
      <link>https://db.gcve.eu/vuln/cve-2026-79782</link>
      <description>&lt;p&gt;&lt;strong&gt;Affected:&lt;/strong&gt; rclone&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;rclone before 1.74.4 fails to strip the X-Amz-Security-Token header when an S3 redirect changes scheme from HTTPS to HTTP on the same host. Attackers can intercept plaintext HTTP traffic to capture AWS STS session tokens sent in request headers.&lt;/p&gt;</description>
      <content:encoded>&lt;p&gt;&lt;strong&gt;Affected:&lt;/strong&gt; rclone&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;rclone before 1.74.4 fails to strip the X-Amz-Security-Token header when an S3 redirect changes scheme from HTTPS to HTTP on the same host. Attackers can intercept plaintext HTTP traffic to capture AWS STS session tokens sent in request headers.&lt;/p&gt;</content:encoded>
      <guid isPermaLink="false">https://db.gcve.eu/vuln/cve-2026-79782</guid>
    </item>
    <item>
      <title>GHSA-gx4c-2hqx-cw2r — rclone: S3 backend does not strip X-Amz-Security-Token on a same-host HTTPS-&gt;HTTP redirect</title>
      <link>https://db.gcve.eu/vuln/ghsa-gx4c-2hqx-cw2r</link>
      <description>&lt;p&gt;&lt;strong&gt;Affected:&lt;/strong&gt; Go: github.com/rclone/rclone&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;## Vulnerability Details&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;**File**: `backend/s3/s3.go`
**Lines**: 1359-1380 (functions `s3CheckRedirect` / `s3RedirectCrossesHost`)&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;### Root Cause
Commit `e7b1eb774` (released in v1.74.3) added a `CheckRedirect` policy for
the S3 HTTP client whose purpose is to strip the `X-Amz-Security-Token`
header (the AWS STS session token) whenever a redirect chain &amp;#34;crosses a
host&amp;#34;, so the token isn&amp;#39;t forwarded to an unintended origin.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;`s3RedirectCrossesHost` decides this purely by comparing `url.URL.Host`
(hostname[:port]); it never looks at `url.URL.Scheme`. A redirect that keeps
the exact same host:port but changes the scheme from `https://` to `http://`
therefore compares as &amp;#34;same host&amp;#34; and `X-Amz-Security-Token` is *not*
stripped — it is sent again, this time over plaintext HTTP.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;```go
func s3RedirectCrossesHost(req *http.Request, via []*http.Request) bool {
	if len(via) == 0 {
		return false
	}
	host := via[0].URL.Host
	for _, redirect := range via[1:] {
		if redirect.URL.Host != host {
			return true
		}
	}
	return host != req.URL.Host
}
```&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;### Attack Scenario
1. The user configures an `s3` remote (or `--s3-endpoint` pointing at a
   self-hosted/third-party S3-compatible service) using temporary
   credentials that include an STS `session_token` (common for assumed-role
   / CI / Kubernetes IRSA setups).
2. The configured endpoint responds to a request with a 3xx redirect to the
   *same* host:port but with `http://` instead of `https://` (TLS-front
   misconfiguration, main…&lt;/p&gt;</description>
      <content:encoded>&lt;p&gt;&lt;strong&gt;Affected:&lt;/strong&gt; Go: github.com/rclone/rclone&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;## Vulnerability Details&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;**File**: `backend/s3/s3.go`
**Lines**: 1359-1380 (functions `s3CheckRedirect` / `s3RedirectCrossesHost`)&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;### Root Cause
Commit `e7b1eb774` (released in v1.74.3) added a `CheckRedirect` policy for
the S3 HTTP client whose purpose is to strip the `X-Amz-Security-Token`
header (the AWS STS session token) whenever a redirect chain &amp;#34;crosses a
host&amp;#34;, so the token isn&amp;#39;t forwarded to an unintended origin.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;`s3RedirectCrossesHost` decides this purely by comparing `url.URL.Host`
(hostname[:port]); it never looks at `url.URL.Scheme`. A redirect that keeps
the exact same host:port but changes the scheme from `https://` to `http://`
therefore compares as &amp;#34;same host&amp;#34; and `X-Amz-Security-Token` is *not*
stripped — it is sent again, this time over plaintext HTTP.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;```go
func s3RedirectCrossesHost(req *http.Request, via []*http.Request) bool {
	if len(via) == 0 {
		return false
	}
	host := via[0].URL.Host
	for _, redirect := range via[1:] {
		if redirect.URL.Host != host {
			return true
		}
	}
	return host != req.URL.Host
}
```&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;### Attack Scenario
1. The user configures an `s3` remote (or `--s3-endpoint` pointing at a
   self-hosted/third-party S3-compatible service) using temporary
   credentials that include an STS `session_token` (common for assumed-role
   / CI / Kubernetes IRSA setups).
2. The configured endpoint responds to a request with a 3xx redirect to the
   *same* host:port but with `http://` instead of `https://` (TLS-front
   misconfiguration, main…&lt;/p&gt;</content:encoded>
      <guid isPermaLink="false">https://db.gcve.eu/vuln/ghsa-gx4c-2hqx-cw2r</guid>
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