https://db.gcve.eu Contains only the most 10 recent entries. http://www.rssboard.org/rss-specification python-feedgen en Wed, 30 Sep 2026 17:04:18 +0000 https://db.gcve.eu/vuln/cve-2026-53225 <p><strong>Affected:</strong> Linux</p> <p>In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:</p> <p>sctp: fix uninit-value in __sctp_rcv_asconf_lookup()</p> <p>__sctp_rcv_asconf_lookup() in net/sctp/input.c only checks that the ASCONF chunk can hold the ADDIP header and a parameter header, then calls af-&gt;from_addr_param(), which reads the full address (16 bytes for IPv6) trusting the parameter&#39;s declared length.</p> <p>An unauthenticated peer can send a truncated trailing ASCONF chunk that declares an IPv6 address parameter but stops after the 4-byte parameter header; reached from the no-association lookup path, from_addr_param() then reads uninitialized bytes past the parameter.</p> <p>Impact: an unauthenticated SCTP peer makes the receive path read up to 16 bytes of uninitialized memory past a truncated ASCONF address parameter.</p> <p>The sibling __sctp_rcv_init_lookup() bounds parameters with sctp_walk_params(); this path open-codes the fetch and omits the bound. Verify the whole address parameter lies within the chunk before from_addr_param() reads it, the same class of fix as commit 51e5ad549c43 (&#34;net: sctp: fix KMSAN uninit-value in sctp_inq_pop&#34;).</p> <p><strong>Affected:</strong> Linux</p> <p>In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:</p> <p>sctp: fix uninit-value in __sctp_rcv_asconf_lookup()</p> <p>__sctp_rcv_asconf_lookup() in net/sctp/input.c only checks that the ASCONF chunk can hold the ADDIP header and a parameter header, then calls af-&gt;from_addr_param(), which reads the full address (16 bytes for IPv6) trusting the parameter&#39;s declared length.</p> <p>An unauthenticated peer can send a truncated trailing ASCONF chunk that declares an IPv6 address parameter but stops after the 4-byte parameter header; reached from the no-association lookup path, from_addr_param() then reads uninitialized bytes past the parameter.</p> <p>Impact: an unauthenticated SCTP peer makes the receive path read up to 16 bytes of uninitialized memory past a truncated ASCONF address parameter.</p> <p>The sibling __sctp_rcv_init_lookup() bounds parameters with sctp_walk_params(); this path open-codes the fetch and omits the bound. Verify the whole address parameter lies within the chunk before from_addr_param() reads it, the same class of fix as commit 51e5ad549c43 (&#34;net: sctp: fix KMSAN uninit-value in sctp_inq_pop&#34;).</p> https://db.gcve.eu/vuln/cve-2026-53225