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      <title>CVE-2026-40080 — Cacti: Open Redirect via HTTP_REFERER substring check in auth_login_redirect</title>
      <link>https://db.gcve.eu/vuln/cve-2026-40080</link>
      <description>&lt;p&gt;&lt;strong&gt;Affected:&lt;/strong&gt; cacti&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;Cacti is an open source performance and fault management framework. Versions 1.2.30 and prior are vulnerable to Open Redirect through a substring check rather than a host check at str_contains($referer, CACTI_PATH_URL). When the user&amp;#39;s login_opts == &amp;#39;1&amp;#39; (redirect to referer after login), the function used $_SERVER[&amp;#39;HTTP_REFERER&amp;#39;] directly.  An attacker could craft a referer such as https://evil.com/cacti/. Where CACTI_PATH_URL is /cacti/, the substring matches and the user is redirected to evil.com after login. The pre-existing validate_redirect_url() helper at lib/html_utility.php performed proper validation but was not invoked from auth_login_redirect(). This issue has been fixed in version 1.2.31.&lt;/p&gt;</description>
      <content:encoded>&lt;p&gt;&lt;strong&gt;Affected:&lt;/strong&gt; cacti&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;Cacti is an open source performance and fault management framework. Versions 1.2.30 and prior are vulnerable to Open Redirect through a substring check rather than a host check at str_contains($referer, CACTI_PATH_URL). When the user&amp;#39;s login_opts == &amp;#39;1&amp;#39; (redirect to referer after login), the function used $_SERVER[&amp;#39;HTTP_REFERER&amp;#39;] directly.  An attacker could craft a referer such as https://evil.com/cacti/. Where CACTI_PATH_URL is /cacti/, the substring matches and the user is redirected to evil.com after login. The pre-existing validate_redirect_url() helper at lib/html_utility.php performed proper validation but was not invoked from auth_login_redirect(). This issue has been fixed in version 1.2.31.&lt;/p&gt;</content:encoded>
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