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      <title>CVE-2026-45402 — Open WebUI: Cross-User File Access via Unchecked file_id in Folder Knowledge and Knowledge-Base Attach Endpoints</title>
      <link>https://db.gcve.eu/vuln/cve-2026-45402</link>
      <description>&lt;p&gt;&lt;strong&gt;Affected:&lt;/strong&gt; open-webui&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;Open WebUI is a self-hosted artificial intelligence platform designed to operate entirely offline. Prior to 0.9.5, multiple endpoints accept a user-supplied file_id and attach the referenced file to a resource the caller controls (folder knowledge, knowledge-base contents) without verifying that the caller owns or has been granted access to the file. The file&amp;#39;s content then becomes reachable through the downstream RAG / file-content paths, allowing any authenticated user to exfiltrate any other user&amp;#39;s private file — and on the knowledge-base path, also to overwrite it — given knowledge of the file&amp;#39;s UUID. This affects backend/open_webui/routers/folders.py (POST /api/v1/folders/{id}/update), backend/open_webui/routers/knowledge.py (add_file_to_knowledge_by_id), and backend/open_webui/routers/knowledge.py (add_files_to_knowledge_by_id_batch). This vulnerability is fixed in 0.9.5.&lt;/p&gt;</description>
      <content:encoded>&lt;p&gt;&lt;strong&gt;Affected:&lt;/strong&gt; open-webui&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;Open WebUI is a self-hosted artificial intelligence platform designed to operate entirely offline. Prior to 0.9.5, multiple endpoints accept a user-supplied file_id and attach the referenced file to a resource the caller controls (folder knowledge, knowledge-base contents) without verifying that the caller owns or has been granted access to the file. The file&amp;#39;s content then becomes reachable through the downstream RAG / file-content paths, allowing any authenticated user to exfiltrate any other user&amp;#39;s private file — and on the knowledge-base path, also to overwrite it — given knowledge of the file&amp;#39;s UUID. This affects backend/open_webui/routers/folders.py (POST /api/v1/folders/{id}/update), backend/open_webui/routers/knowledge.py (add_file_to_knowledge_by_id), and backend/open_webui/routers/knowledge.py (add_files_to_knowledge_by_id_batch). This vulnerability is fixed in 0.9.5.&lt;/p&gt;</content:encoded>
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