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    <title>Most recent entries from all</title>
    <link>https://db.gcve.eu</link>
    <description>Contains only the most 10 recent entries.</description>
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    <lastBuildDate>Thu, 19 Nov 2026 19:23:52 +0000</lastBuildDate>
    <item>
      <title>CVE-2026-63941 — KVM: arm64: Correctly cap ZCR_EL2 provided by a guest hypervisor</title>
      <link>https://db.gcve.eu/vuln/cve-2026-63941</link>
      <description>&lt;p&gt;&lt;strong&gt;Affected:&lt;/strong&gt; Linux&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;KVM: arm64: Correctly cap ZCR_EL2 provided by a guest hypervisor&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;ZCR_EL2 can be updated by a VHE guest hypervisor either using ZCR_EL2
(which traps) or ZCR_EL1 (which does not trap). KVM handles both in
different way:&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;- on ZCR_EL2 trap, ZCR_EL2.LEN is immediately capped at the VM&amp;#39;s own
  VL limit. This has the potential to break existing SW that relies
  on the full LEN field to be stateful.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;- on ZCR_EL1 access, we do absolutely nothing.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;On restoring the SVE context for an L2 guest, we directly restore the
guest hypervisor&amp;#39;s view of ZCR_EL2 into the physical ZCR_EL2. If the
guest&amp;#39;s view of the register was updated using the ZCR_EL2 accessor,
the value has already been sanitised (with the caveat mentioned above).&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;But if the guest used ZCR_EL1, the raw value is written into the HW,
and the L2 guest can now access VLs that it shouldn&amp;#39;t.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;Fix all the above by moving the VL capping to the restore points,
ensuring that:&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;- the HW is always programmed with a capped value, irrespective of
  the accessor being used,&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;- the ZCR_EL2.LEN field is always completely stateful, irrespective
  of the accessor being used.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;Additionally, move ZCR_EL2 to be a sanitised register, ensuring that
only the LEN field is actually stateful. This requires some creative
construction of the RES0 mask, as the sysreg generation script does
not yet generate RAZ/WI fields.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;[maz: rewrote commit message, tidy up access_zcr_el2()]&lt;/p&gt;</description>
      <content:encoded>&lt;p&gt;&lt;strong&gt;Affected:&lt;/strong&gt; Linux&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;KVM: arm64: Correctly cap ZCR_EL2 provided by a guest hypervisor&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;ZCR_EL2 can be updated by a VHE guest hypervisor either using ZCR_EL2
(which traps) or ZCR_EL1 (which does not trap). KVM handles both in
different way:&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;- on ZCR_EL2 trap, ZCR_EL2.LEN is immediately capped at the VM&amp;#39;s own
  VL limit. This has the potential to break existing SW that relies
  on the full LEN field to be stateful.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;- on ZCR_EL1 access, we do absolutely nothing.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;On restoring the SVE context for an L2 guest, we directly restore the
guest hypervisor&amp;#39;s view of ZCR_EL2 into the physical ZCR_EL2. If the
guest&amp;#39;s view of the register was updated using the ZCR_EL2 accessor,
the value has already been sanitised (with the caveat mentioned above).&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;But if the guest used ZCR_EL1, the raw value is written into the HW,
and the L2 guest can now access VLs that it shouldn&amp;#39;t.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;Fix all the above by moving the VL capping to the restore points,
ensuring that:&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;- the HW is always programmed with a capped value, irrespective of
  the accessor being used,&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;- the ZCR_EL2.LEN field is always completely stateful, irrespective
  of the accessor being used.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;Additionally, move ZCR_EL2 to be a sanitised register, ensuring that
only the LEN field is actually stateful. This requires some creative
construction of the RES0 mask, as the sysreg generation script does
not yet generate RAZ/WI fields.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;[maz: rewrote commit message, tidy up access_zcr_el2()]&lt;/p&gt;</content:encoded>
      <guid isPermaLink="false">https://db.gcve.eu/vuln/cve-2026-63941</guid>
    </item>
    <item>
      <title>USN-8593-1 — linux-ibm, linux-oracle vulnerabilities</title>
      <link>https://db.gcve.eu/vuln/usn-8593-1</link>
      <description>&lt;p&gt;&lt;strong&gt;Affected:&lt;/strong&gt; Ubuntu:26.04:LTS: linux-ibm, Ubuntu:26.04:LTS: linux-oracle&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;It was discovered that some AMD Zen 2 processors did not properly isolate
shared resources in the operation cache. A local attacker could possibly
use this issue to corrupt instructions executed at a higher privilege
level, resulting in privilege escalation. (CVE-2025-54518)&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;Several security issues were discovered in the Linux kernel.
An attacker could possibly use these to compromise the system.
This update corrects flaws in the following subsystems:
  - x86 platform drivers;
  - PSP security protocol;
  - ARM32 architecture;
  - ARM64 architecture;
  - MIPS architecture;
  - PowerPC architecture;
  - RISC-V architecture;
  - S390 architecture;
  - User-Mode Linux (UML);
  - x86 architecture;
  - Block layer subsystem;
  - Cryptographic API;
  - Intel NPU Driver;
  - Compute Acceleration Framework;
  - ACPI drivers;
  - Auxiliary display drivers;
  - Drivers core;
  - DRBD Distributed Replicated Block Device drivers;
  - Rados block device (RBD) driver;
  - Ublk userspace block driver;
  - Compressed RAM block device driver;
  - Bluetooth drivers;
  - Bus devices;
  - Character device driver;
  - Clock framework and drivers;
  - CPU frequency scaling framework;
  - Hardware crypto device drivers;
  - Buffer Sharing and Synchronization framework;
  - DPLL subsystem;
  - EDAC drivers;
  - Arm Firmware Framework for ARMv8-A(FFA);
  - EFI core;
  - FWCTL subsystem;
  - GPIO subsystem;
  - GPU drivers;
  - HID subsystem;
  - Hardware monitoring drivers;
  - I2C subsystem;
  - I…&lt;/p&gt;</description>
      <content:encoded>&lt;p&gt;&lt;strong&gt;Affected:&lt;/strong&gt; Ubuntu:26.04:LTS: linux-ibm, Ubuntu:26.04:LTS: linux-oracle&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;It was discovered that some AMD Zen 2 processors did not properly isolate
shared resources in the operation cache. A local attacker could possibly
use this issue to corrupt instructions executed at a higher privilege
level, resulting in privilege escalation. (CVE-2025-54518)&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;Several security issues were discovered in the Linux kernel.
An attacker could possibly use these to compromise the system.
This update corrects flaws in the following subsystems:
  - x86 platform drivers;
  - PSP security protocol;
  - ARM32 architecture;
  - ARM64 architecture;
  - MIPS architecture;
  - PowerPC architecture;
  - RISC-V architecture;
  - S390 architecture;
  - User-Mode Linux (UML);
  - x86 architecture;
  - Block layer subsystem;
  - Cryptographic API;
  - Intel NPU Driver;
  - Compute Acceleration Framework;
  - ACPI drivers;
  - Auxiliary display drivers;
  - Drivers core;
  - DRBD Distributed Replicated Block Device drivers;
  - Rados block device (RBD) driver;
  - Ublk userspace block driver;
  - Compressed RAM block device driver;
  - Bluetooth drivers;
  - Bus devices;
  - Character device driver;
  - Clock framework and drivers;
  - CPU frequency scaling framework;
  - Hardware crypto device drivers;
  - Buffer Sharing and Synchronization framework;
  - DPLL subsystem;
  - EDAC drivers;
  - Arm Firmware Framework for ARMv8-A(FFA);
  - EFI core;
  - FWCTL subsystem;
  - GPIO subsystem;
  - GPU drivers;
  - HID subsystem;
  - Hardware monitoring drivers;
  - I2C subsystem;
  - I…&lt;/p&gt;</content:encoded>
      <guid isPermaLink="false">https://db.gcve.eu/vuln/usn-8593-1</guid>
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