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      <title>CVE-2026-63341 — Aedes has Uncaught Exception and Uncontrolled Resource Consumption</title>
      <link>https://db.gcve.eu/vuln/cve-2026-63341</link>
      <description>&lt;p&gt;&lt;strong&gt;Affected:&lt;/strong&gt; moscajs aedes&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;Aedes is an MQTT broker that can run on any stream server. Prior to 1.1.1, the MQTT broker does not bound topic depth or structural complexity before passing topics through `mqemitter` into `qlobber`. A `PUBLISH`, `SUBSCRIBE`, or registered `Will` message containing an excessively deep topic can reach `qlobber._split_words` in `lib/qlobber.js` and trigger an uncaught `too many words` exception. Calls from `handlers/subscribe.js` and the publishing logic are not protected against that exception, so it escapes to the `Node.js event loop` and terminates the entire broker. The `Will` path is independently reachable when a client disconnects ungracefully: it calls `broker.publish` directly and bypasses the `PUBLISH` handler. An attacker must be able to establish an `MQTT session`, authenticated or unauthenticated according to broker configuration. A successful attack disconnects all legitimate clients and prevents reconnection until the broker process restarts. This issue is fixed in version 1.1.1.&lt;/p&gt;</description>
      <content:encoded>&lt;p&gt;&lt;strong&gt;Affected:&lt;/strong&gt; moscajs aedes&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;Aedes is an MQTT broker that can run on any stream server. Prior to 1.1.1, the MQTT broker does not bound topic depth or structural complexity before passing topics through `mqemitter` into `qlobber`. A `PUBLISH`, `SUBSCRIBE`, or registered `Will` message containing an excessively deep topic can reach `qlobber._split_words` in `lib/qlobber.js` and trigger an uncaught `too many words` exception. Calls from `handlers/subscribe.js` and the publishing logic are not protected against that exception, so it escapes to the `Node.js event loop` and terminates the entire broker. The `Will` path is independently reachable when a client disconnects ungracefully: it calls `broker.publish` directly and bypasses the `PUBLISH` handler. An attacker must be able to establish an `MQTT session`, authenticated or unauthenticated according to broker configuration. A successful attack disconnects all legitimate clients and prevents reconnection until the broker process restarts. This issue is fixed in version 1.1.1.&lt;/p&gt;</content:encoded>
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