https://db.gcve.eu Contains only the most 10 recent entries. http://www.rssboard.org/rss-specification python-feedgen en Wed, 30 Sep 2026 12:19:31 +0000 https://db.gcve.eu/vuln/brew-openclaw-cli-cve-2026-32977 <p><strong>Affected:</strong> Homebrew: openclaw-cli</p> <p>## Summary In affected versions of `openclaw`, the sandbox fs-bridge `writeFile` commit step used an unanchored container path during the final move into place. An attacker racing parent-path changes inside the sandbox could redirect the committed file outside the validated sandbox path.</p> <p>## Impact This is a sandbox boundary bypass. In-sandbox code could win a time-of-check-time-of-use race and cause host-approved `writeFile` operations to land outside the validated writable path within the container mount namespace.</p> <p>## Affected Packages and Versions - Package: `openclaw` (npm) - Affected versions: `&lt; 2026.3.11` - Fixed in: `2026.3.11`</p> <p>## Technical Details The hardening work for anchored remove, rename, and mkdir operations did not fully cover the `writeFile` commit path. The final `mv` still used the raw target path, leaving a race window between safety revalidation and the in-container commit step.</p> <p>## Fix OpenClaw now anchors the `writeFile` commit path to the canonical parent directory before the final move. The fix shipped in `openclaw@2026.3.11`.</p> <p>## Workarounds Upgrade to `2026.3.11` or later.</p> <p><strong>Affected:</strong> Homebrew: openclaw-cli</p> <p>## Summary In affected versions of `openclaw`, the sandbox fs-bridge `writeFile` commit step used an unanchored container path during the final move into place. An attacker racing parent-path changes inside the sandbox could redirect the committed file outside the validated sandbox path.</p> <p>## Impact This is a sandbox boundary bypass. In-sandbox code could win a time-of-check-time-of-use race and cause host-approved `writeFile` operations to land outside the validated writable path within the container mount namespace.</p> <p>## Affected Packages and Versions - Package: `openclaw` (npm) - Affected versions: `&lt; 2026.3.11` - Fixed in: `2026.3.11`</p> <p>## Technical Details The hardening work for anchored remove, rename, and mkdir operations did not fully cover the `writeFile` commit path. The final `mv` still used the raw target path, leaving a race window between safety revalidation and the in-container commit step.</p> <p>## Fix OpenClaw now anchors the `writeFile` commit path to the canonical parent directory before the final move. The fix shipped in `openclaw@2026.3.11`.</p> <p>## Workarounds Upgrade to `2026.3.11` or later.</p> https://db.gcve.eu/vuln/brew-openclaw-cli-cve-2026-32977 https://db.gcve.eu/vuln/cve-2026-32977 <p><strong>Affected:</strong> OpenClaw</p> <p>OpenClaw before 2026.3.11 contains a sandbox boundary bypass vulnerability in the fs-bridge writeFile commit step that uses an unanchored container path during the final move operation. An attacker can exploit a time-of-check-time-of-use race condition by modifying parent paths inside the sandbox to redirect committed files outside the validated writable path within the container mount namespace.</p> <p><strong>Affected:</strong> OpenClaw</p> <p>OpenClaw before 2026.3.11 contains a sandbox boundary bypass vulnerability in the fs-bridge writeFile commit step that uses an unanchored container path during the final move operation. An attacker can exploit a time-of-check-time-of-use race condition by modifying parent paths inside the sandbox to redirect committed files outside the validated writable path within the container mount namespace.</p> https://db.gcve.eu/vuln/cve-2026-32977