https://db.gcve.eu Contains only the most 10 recent entries. http://www.rssboard.org/rss-specification python-feedgen en Tue, 20 Oct 2026 21:32:47 +0000 https://db.gcve.eu/vuln/cve-2026-57118 <p><strong>Affected:</strong> MervinPraison PraisonAI, MervinPraison praisonaiagents</p> <p>PraisonAI is a multi-agent teams system. Prior to praisonaiagents 1.6.59, AgentTeam.launch and the Agents alias register GET /{path}/list, POST /{path}, and `POST /{path}/{agent_id}&#39; without access-control checks before listing agents or calling agent.chat. A remotely exposed server can therefore let unauthenticated clients enumerate agents, consume model resources, access connected private context, and trigger agent tools or workflow side effects. This vulnerability is fixed in praisonaiagents 1.6.59.</p> <p><strong>Affected:</strong> MervinPraison PraisonAI, MervinPraison praisonaiagents</p> <p>PraisonAI is a multi-agent teams system. Prior to praisonaiagents 1.6.59, AgentTeam.launch and the Agents alias register GET /{path}/list, POST /{path}, and `POST /{path}/{agent_id}&#39; without access-control checks before listing agents or calling agent.chat. A remotely exposed server can therefore let unauthenticated clients enumerate agents, consume model resources, access connected private context, and trigger agent tools or workflow side effects. This vulnerability is fixed in praisonaiagents 1.6.59.</p> https://db.gcve.eu/vuln/cve-2026-57118 https://db.gcve.eu/vuln/pysec-2026-3537 <p><strong>Affected:</strong> PyPI: praisonaiagents</p> <p># PraisonAI `AgentTeam.launch()` exposes unauthenticated remote agent invocation endpoints</p> <p>## Summary</p> <p>PraisonAI&#39;s documented Python `AgentTeam.launch()` / `Agents.launch()` HTTP server starts externally reachable agent invocation endpoints without any authentication enforcement.</p> <p>The current implementation registers `GET /{path}/list`, `POST /{path}`, and `POST /{path}/{agent_id}` routes. The POST routes directly call `agent.chat(...)`. Requests with no `Authorization` header are accepted, and requests with an obviously wrong bearer token are also accepted. The default Python API bind host for `Agents.launch()` is `0.0.0.0`, and official documentation shows `host=&#34;0.0.0.0&#34;` for remote access.</p> <p>This is a sibling/incomplete-fix variant of PraisonAI&#39;s prior unauthenticated API server and call server advisory family. Nearby server surfaces were hardened to require tokens, fail closed, or bind locally by default, but the `AgentTeam.launch()` FastAPI path still exposes unauthenticated agent execution on current upstream main and the latest release.</p> <p>This report is scoped to the Python `AgentTeam.launch()` / `Agents.launch()` route-registration path. It does not require adjudicating whether the separate `praisonai serve agents --api-key` CLI path is correctly enforced.</p> <p>## Affected Components</p> <p>- Package: `praisonaiagents` - Current upstream main tested: `2f9677abb2ea68eab864ee8b6a828fd0141612e1` - Latest release tag tested: `v4.6.57` - Primary file: `src/praisonai-agents/praisona…</p> <p><strong>Affected:</strong> PyPI: praisonaiagents</p> <p># PraisonAI `AgentTeam.launch()` exposes unauthenticated remote agent invocation endpoints</p> <p>## Summary</p> <p>PraisonAI&#39;s documented Python `AgentTeam.launch()` / `Agents.launch()` HTTP server starts externally reachable agent invocation endpoints without any authentication enforcement.</p> <p>The current implementation registers `GET /{path}/list`, `POST /{path}`, and `POST /{path}/{agent_id}` routes. The POST routes directly call `agent.chat(...)`. Requests with no `Authorization` header are accepted, and requests with an obviously wrong bearer token are also accepted. The default Python API bind host for `Agents.launch()` is `0.0.0.0`, and official documentation shows `host=&#34;0.0.0.0&#34;` for remote access.</p> <p>This is a sibling/incomplete-fix variant of PraisonAI&#39;s prior unauthenticated API server and call server advisory family. Nearby server surfaces were hardened to require tokens, fail closed, or bind locally by default, but the `AgentTeam.launch()` FastAPI path still exposes unauthenticated agent execution on current upstream main and the latest release.</p> <p>This report is scoped to the Python `AgentTeam.launch()` / `Agents.launch()` route-registration path. It does not require adjudicating whether the separate `praisonai serve agents --api-key` CLI path is correctly enforced.</p> <p>## Affected Components</p> <p>- Package: `praisonaiagents` - Current upstream main tested: `2f9677abb2ea68eab864ee8b6a828fd0141612e1` - Latest release tag tested: `v4.6.57` - Primary file: `src/praisonai-agents/praisona…</p> https://db.gcve.eu/vuln/pysec-2026-3537