https://db.gcve.eu Contains only the most 10 recent entries. http://www.rssboard.org/rss-specification python-feedgen en Thu, 29 Oct 2026 20:15:29 +0000 https://db.gcve.eu/vuln/bdu:2026-16863 bdu:2026-16863 https://db.gcve.eu/vuln/bdu:2026-16863 https://db.gcve.eu/vuln/brew-nbdime-cve-2026-110857 <p><strong>Affected:</strong> Homebrew: nbdime</p> <p>### Summary</p> <p>GitPython has spent 2022-2026 rolling out two reusable guards method-by-method: `Git.check_unsafe_protocols(url)` (raises `UnsafeProtocolError` for `&lt;transport&gt;::` remote-helper URLs - CVE-2022-24439) and `Git.check_unsafe_options(...)` (raises `UnsafeOptionError` for denylisted option spellings - CVE-2023-40267, CVE-2026-42215, CVE-2026-67323). Three wrapper methods that build a `git` argv from caller-controlled values still have **neither**:</p> <p>1. **`Git.ls_remote`** (git/cmd.py:1128-1143) - checks options (:1139-1141) but forwards the URL positional unchecked; no `allow_unsafe_protocols` parameter exists. The same URL through `clone_from` raises `UnsafeProtocolError`. 2. **`Repo.merge_base`** (git/repo/base.py:895-936) - forwards `**kwargs`/`*rev` to `self.git.merge_base` with no guard; guarded sibling `iter_commits` sits 12 lines up. Its exception handler additionally swallows every non-128 `GitCommandError` into `[]`, masking the injection. 3. **`IndexFile.move`** (git/index/base.py:1092-1168) - forwards `**kwargs` to `git mv` twice (:1147, :1167); guarded sibling `remove()` is 23 lines above.</p> <p>Verified unfixed on `main @ a54d159` (2026-09-21), post-dating latest release 3.1.62 (2026-09-07) - all three sites re-verified today.</p> <p>### Impact</p> <p>**Site 1 (`ls_remote`)** - RCE conditional on the victim git transport policy. The common &#39;probe first, then clone&#39; pattern (`Git(...).ls_remote(attacker_url)`) with an `ext::sh -c ...` URL executes arbitrary commands when…</p> <p><strong>Affected:</strong> Homebrew: nbdime</p> <p>### Summary</p> <p>GitPython has spent 2022-2026 rolling out two reusable guards method-by-method: `Git.check_unsafe_protocols(url)` (raises `UnsafeProtocolError` for `&lt;transport&gt;::` remote-helper URLs - CVE-2022-24439) and `Git.check_unsafe_options(...)` (raises `UnsafeOptionError` for denylisted option spellings - CVE-2023-40267, CVE-2026-42215, CVE-2026-67323). Three wrapper methods that build a `git` argv from caller-controlled values still have **neither**:</p> <p>1. **`Git.ls_remote`** (git/cmd.py:1128-1143) - checks options (:1139-1141) but forwards the URL positional unchecked; no `allow_unsafe_protocols` parameter exists. The same URL through `clone_from` raises `UnsafeProtocolError`. 2. **`Repo.merge_base`** (git/repo/base.py:895-936) - forwards `**kwargs`/`*rev` to `self.git.merge_base` with no guard; guarded sibling `iter_commits` sits 12 lines up. Its exception handler additionally swallows every non-128 `GitCommandError` into `[]`, masking the injection. 3. **`IndexFile.move`** (git/index/base.py:1092-1168) - forwards `**kwargs` to `git mv` twice (:1147, :1167); guarded sibling `remove()` is 23 lines above.</p> <p>Verified unfixed on `main @ a54d159` (2026-09-21), post-dating latest release 3.1.62 (2026-09-07) - all three sites re-verified today.</p> <p>### Impact</p> <p>**Site 1 (`ls_remote`)** - RCE conditional on the victim git transport policy. The common &#39;probe first, then clone&#39; pattern (`Git(...).ls_remote(attacker_url)`) with an `ext::sh -c ...` URL executes arbitrary commands when…</p> https://db.gcve.eu/vuln/brew-nbdime-cve-2026-110857