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    <title>Most recent entries from all</title>
    <link>https://db.gcve.eu</link>
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    <lastBuildDate>Wed, 30 Sep 2026 11:37:54 +0000</lastBuildDate>
    <item>
      <title>BREW-openclaw-cli-CVE-2026-28469 — OpenClaw Google Chat shared-path webhook target ambiguity allowed cross-account policy-context misrouting</title>
      <link>https://db.gcve.eu/vuln/brew-openclaw-cli-cve-2026-28469</link>
      <description>&lt;p&gt;&lt;strong&gt;Affected:&lt;/strong&gt; Homebrew: openclaw-cli&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;## Summary
When multiple Google Chat webhook targets are registered on the same HTTP path, and request verification succeeds for more than one target, inbound webhook events could be routed by first-match semantics. This can cause cross-account policy/context misrouting.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;## Affected Packages / Versions
- npm: `openclaw` &amp;lt;= 2026.2.13
- npm: `clawdbot` &amp;lt;= 2026.1.24-3&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;## Details
Affected component: `extensions/googlechat/src/monitor.ts`.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;Baseline behavior allowed multiple webhook targets per path and selected the first target that passed `verifyGoogleChatRequest(...)`. In shared-path deployments where multiple targets can verify successfully (for example, equivalent audience validation), inbound events could be processed under the wrong account context (wrong allowlist/session/policy).&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;## Fix
- Fix commit (merged to `main`): `61d59a802869177d9cef52204767cd83357ab79e`
- `openclaw` will be patched in the next planned release: `2026.2.14`.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;`clawdbot` is a legacy/deprecated package name; no patched version is currently planned. Migrate to `openclaw` and upgrade to `openclaw &amp;gt;= 2026.2.14`.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;## Workaround
Ensure each Google Chat webhook target uses a unique webhook path so routing is never ambiguous.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;## Release Process Note
The advisory is pre-populated with the planned patched version. After the npm release is published, the remaining action should be to publish the advisory.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;Thanks @vincentkoc for reporting.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;---&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;Fix commit 61d59a802869177d9cef52204767cd83357ab79e confirmed…&lt;/p&gt;</description>
      <content:encoded>&lt;p&gt;&lt;strong&gt;Affected:&lt;/strong&gt; Homebrew: openclaw-cli&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;## Summary
When multiple Google Chat webhook targets are registered on the same HTTP path, and request verification succeeds for more than one target, inbound webhook events could be routed by first-match semantics. This can cause cross-account policy/context misrouting.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;## Affected Packages / Versions
- npm: `openclaw` &amp;lt;= 2026.2.13
- npm: `clawdbot` &amp;lt;= 2026.1.24-3&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;## Details
Affected component: `extensions/googlechat/src/monitor.ts`.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;Baseline behavior allowed multiple webhook targets per path and selected the first target that passed `verifyGoogleChatRequest(...)`. In shared-path deployments where multiple targets can verify successfully (for example, equivalent audience validation), inbound events could be processed under the wrong account context (wrong allowlist/session/policy).&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;## Fix
- Fix commit (merged to `main`): `61d59a802869177d9cef52204767cd83357ab79e`
- `openclaw` will be patched in the next planned release: `2026.2.14`.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;`clawdbot` is a legacy/deprecated package name; no patched version is currently planned. Migrate to `openclaw` and upgrade to `openclaw &amp;gt;= 2026.2.14`.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;## Workaround
Ensure each Google Chat webhook target uses a unique webhook path so routing is never ambiguous.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;## Release Process Note
The advisory is pre-populated with the planned patched version. After the npm release is published, the remaining action should be to publish the advisory.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;Thanks @vincentkoc for reporting.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;---&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;Fix commit 61d59a802869177d9cef52204767cd83357ab79e confirmed…&lt;/p&gt;</content:encoded>
      <guid isPermaLink="false">https://db.gcve.eu/vuln/brew-openclaw-cli-cve-2026-28469</guid>
    </item>
    <item>
      <title>CVE-2026-28469 — OpenClaw &lt; 2026.2.14 - Cross-Account Policy Context Misrouting via Shared Webhook Path Ambiguity</title>
      <link>https://db.gcve.eu/vuln/cve-2026-28469</link>
      <description>&lt;p&gt;&lt;strong&gt;Affected:&lt;/strong&gt; OpenClaw&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;OpenClaw versions prior to 2026.2.14 contain a webhook routing vulnerability in the Google Chat monitor component that allows cross-account policy context misrouting when multiple webhook targets share the same HTTP path. Attackers can exploit first-match request verification semantics to process inbound webhook events under incorrect account contexts, bypassing intended allowlists and session policies.&lt;/p&gt;</description>
      <content:encoded>&lt;p&gt;&lt;strong&gt;Affected:&lt;/strong&gt; OpenClaw&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;OpenClaw versions prior to 2026.2.14 contain a webhook routing vulnerability in the Google Chat monitor component that allows cross-account policy context misrouting when multiple webhook targets share the same HTTP path. Attackers can exploit first-match request verification semantics to process inbound webhook events under incorrect account contexts, bypassing intended allowlists and session policies.&lt;/p&gt;</content:encoded>
      <guid isPermaLink="false">https://db.gcve.eu/vuln/cve-2026-28469</guid>
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