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      <title>BREW-openclaw-cli-GHSA-rchv-x836-w7xp — OpenClaw's dashboard leaked gateway auth material via browser URL/query and localStorage</title>
      <link>https://db.gcve.eu/vuln/brew-openclaw-cli-ghsa-rchv-x836-w7xp</link>
      <description>&lt;p&gt;&lt;strong&gt;Affected:&lt;/strong&gt; Homebrew: openclaw-cli&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;OpenClaw&amp;#39;s macOS Dashboard flow exposed Gateway authentication material to browser-controlled surfaces.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;Before the fix, the macOS app appended the shared Gateway `token` and `password` to the Dashboard URL query string when opening the Control UI in the browser. The Control UI then imported the token and persisted it into browser `localStorage` under `openclaw.control.settings.v1`.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;This expanded exposure of reusable Gateway admin credentials into browser address-bar/query surfaces and persistent script-readable storage.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;## Affected Packages / Versions&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;- Package: `openclaw` (npm)
- Latest published version verified vulnerable: `2026.3.2`
- Affected range: `&amp;lt;= 2026.3.2`
- Patched version: `&amp;gt;= 2026.3.7`&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;## Impact&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;An attacker with access to browser-controlled surfaces or persistent browser storage could recover a valid Gateway admin token and reuse it against the OpenClaw management interface.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;The exposure chain was:&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;1. macOS `Open Dashboard` constructed a URL with auth material.
2. The browser received that credential-bearing URL.
3. The Control UI imported the token from the URL.
4. The Control UI persisted the token in `localStorage`.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;## Fix&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;The fix aligns the macOS Dashboard flow with the safer existing CLI/bootstrap pattern and removes persistent browser token storage:&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;- macOS Dashboard now passes the Gateway token via URL fragment instead of query parameters.
- macOS Dashboard no longer propagates the shared Gateway password into browser URLs.
- Control UI keeps…&lt;/p&gt;</description>
      <content:encoded>&lt;p&gt;&lt;strong&gt;Affected:&lt;/strong&gt; Homebrew: openclaw-cli&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;OpenClaw&amp;#39;s macOS Dashboard flow exposed Gateway authentication material to browser-controlled surfaces.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;Before the fix, the macOS app appended the shared Gateway `token` and `password` to the Dashboard URL query string when opening the Control UI in the browser. The Control UI then imported the token and persisted it into browser `localStorage` under `openclaw.control.settings.v1`.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;This expanded exposure of reusable Gateway admin credentials into browser address-bar/query surfaces and persistent script-readable storage.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;## Affected Packages / Versions&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;- Package: `openclaw` (npm)
- Latest published version verified vulnerable: `2026.3.2`
- Affected range: `&amp;lt;= 2026.3.2`
- Patched version: `&amp;gt;= 2026.3.7`&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;## Impact&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;An attacker with access to browser-controlled surfaces or persistent browser storage could recover a valid Gateway admin token and reuse it against the OpenClaw management interface.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;The exposure chain was:&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;1. macOS `Open Dashboard` constructed a URL with auth material.
2. The browser received that credential-bearing URL.
3. The Control UI imported the token from the URL.
4. The Control UI persisted the token in `localStorage`.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;## Fix&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;The fix aligns the macOS Dashboard flow with the safer existing CLI/bootstrap pattern and removes persistent browser token storage:&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;- macOS Dashboard now passes the Gateway token via URL fragment instead of query parameters.
- macOS Dashboard no longer propagates the shared Gateway password into browser URLs.
- Control UI keeps…&lt;/p&gt;</content:encoded>
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