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    <lastBuildDate>Wed, 11 Nov 2026 19:24:20 +0000</lastBuildDate>
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      <title>CVE-2026-116790 — FreeSWITCH: Inbound ICE connectivity checks are accepted without verifying STUN MESSAGE-INTEGRITY</title>
      <link>https://db.gcve.eu/vuln/cve-2026-116790</link>
      <description>&lt;p&gt;&lt;strong&gt;Affected:&lt;/strong&gt; signalwire freeswitch&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;FreeSWITCH is a Software Defined Telecom Stack enabling the digital transformation from proprietary telecom switches to a software implementation that runs on any commodity hardware. Prior to 1.11.2, FreeSWITCH&amp;#39;s inbound ICE handling accepted every connectivity check without cryptographically validating its STUN MESSAGE-INTEGRITY attribute. A network peer able to reach an ICE-enabled leg&amp;#39;s media port could forge an ICE connectivity check without SDP credentials, nominate its own address, redirect RTP and DTLS traffic, and terminate the legitimate media path. On unencrypted legs this enables eavesdropping and media injection, while all WebRTC and SIP legs that negotiate ICE are in scope. Version 1.11.2 introduces the remediation, which requires ice_verify_message_integrity=true.&lt;/p&gt;</description>
      <content:encoded>&lt;p&gt;&lt;strong&gt;Affected:&lt;/strong&gt; signalwire freeswitch&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;FreeSWITCH is a Software Defined Telecom Stack enabling the digital transformation from proprietary telecom switches to a software implementation that runs on any commodity hardware. Prior to 1.11.2, FreeSWITCH&amp;#39;s inbound ICE handling accepted every connectivity check without cryptographically validating its STUN MESSAGE-INTEGRITY attribute. A network peer able to reach an ICE-enabled leg&amp;#39;s media port could forge an ICE connectivity check without SDP credentials, nominate its own address, redirect RTP and DTLS traffic, and terminate the legitimate media path. On unencrypted legs this enables eavesdropping and media injection, while all WebRTC and SIP legs that negotiate ICE are in scope. Version 1.11.2 introduces the remediation, which requires ice_verify_message_integrity=true.&lt;/p&gt;</content:encoded>
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