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      <title>BREW-openclaw-cli-CVE-2026-44998 — OpenClaw: Bundled MCP/LSP tools could bypass configured tool policy</title>
      <link>https://db.gcve.eu/vuln/brew-openclaw-cli-cve-2026-44998</link>
      <description>&lt;p&gt;&lt;strong&gt;Affected:&lt;/strong&gt; Homebrew: openclaw-cli&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;## Affected Packages / Versions&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;- Package: `openclaw` (npm)
- Affected versions: `&amp;lt; 2026.4.20`
- Patched version: `2026.4.20`&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;## Impact&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;Bundled MCP and LSP tools could be appended to the agent&amp;#39;s effective tool set after the normal tool-policy pipeline had already filtered core tools. If an operator configured a restrictive policy, such as a tool profile, explicit allow/deny list, owner-only tool restriction, sandbox tool policy, or subagent tool policy, a bundled MCP/LSP tool could remain available even though the same policy would have denied it.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;The issue required a configured bundled MCP or LSP tool source and an operator policy that should have restricted that tool. This was a local agent policy-enforcement bypass, not an unauthenticated remote gateway compromise. Severity is medium.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;## Fix&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;OpenClaw now applies a final effective tool policy pass to bundled MCP/LSP tools before merging them into the tool set used by normal runs and compaction. The pass covers profile policy, provider profile policy, global/agent/group policies, owner-only filtering, sandbox tool policy, and subagent tool policy.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;Fix commit:&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;- `0e7a992d3f3155199c1acc2dd9a53c5b3a4d3ada`&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;## Release&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;Fixed in OpenClaw `2026.4.20`.&lt;/p&gt;</description>
      <content:encoded>&lt;p&gt;&lt;strong&gt;Affected:&lt;/strong&gt; Homebrew: openclaw-cli&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;## Affected Packages / Versions&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;- Package: `openclaw` (npm)
- Affected versions: `&amp;lt; 2026.4.20`
- Patched version: `2026.4.20`&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;## Impact&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;Bundled MCP and LSP tools could be appended to the agent&amp;#39;s effective tool set after the normal tool-policy pipeline had already filtered core tools. If an operator configured a restrictive policy, such as a tool profile, explicit allow/deny list, owner-only tool restriction, sandbox tool policy, or subagent tool policy, a bundled MCP/LSP tool could remain available even though the same policy would have denied it.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;The issue required a configured bundled MCP or LSP tool source and an operator policy that should have restricted that tool. This was a local agent policy-enforcement bypass, not an unauthenticated remote gateway compromise. Severity is medium.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;## Fix&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;OpenClaw now applies a final effective tool policy pass to bundled MCP/LSP tools before merging them into the tool set used by normal runs and compaction. The pass covers profile policy, provider profile policy, global/agent/group policies, owner-only filtering, sandbox tool policy, and subagent tool policy.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;Fix commit:&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;- `0e7a992d3f3155199c1acc2dd9a53c5b3a4d3ada`&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;## Release&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;Fixed in OpenClaw `2026.4.20`.&lt;/p&gt;</content:encoded>
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